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Deutsche Zusammenfassung: 
In dieser Dissertation untersuche ich die Frage warum und unter welchen Bedingungen Mitgliedsstaaten 
des African Peer Review Mechanismus (APRM) Entscheidungskompetenzen an mehrere Organe im 
Entscheidungsprozess delegieren. Ich untersuche dabei, wie und mit welchen Konsequenzen funktionale 
Differenzierung im APRM-Entscheidungsprozess Muster der Entscheidungsfindung und den Gehalt der 
Entscheidungen über länderspezifische Review Berichte beeinflusst. Der APRM ist ein Peer Review 
Instrument der Afrikanischen Union und wurde als Mechanismus geschaffen, um Politiken zu fördern, 
welche die Qualität der Regierungsführung von Mitgliedsstaaten verbessern. Der Reviewprozess beruht 
auf Berichterstattungs- und Überwachungsmechanismen, welche dazu dienen die Politiken der 
teilnehmenden Länder zu beurteilen. In Rückgriff auf die moderne Institutionentheorie erkläre ich die 
Entstehung des Governance Systems des APR-Prozesses. Das APR Forum (die Versammlung der 
teilnehmenden Staatsoberhäupter des APRM) schafft eine zunehmend komplexere Governance Struktur 
und delegiert Kompetenzen an Unterorgane, um Entscheidungen zu treffen, welche die Mitgliedsstaaten 
implementieren müssen. Basierend auf Erkenntnissen der modernen Institutionentheorie argumentiere 
ich, dass die Organisationsstruktur des APR Prozesses funktional ausdifferenziert ist. Als Konsequenz ist 
das Entscheidungssystem, in welchem der Reviewprozess eingebettet ist, aufgeteilt zwischen einer 
Regelsetzungsfunktion und einer nachgelagerten Anwendung der Regeln auf länderspezifische 
Reviewprozesse. In dieser Hinsicht konzentriert sich das APR Forum darauf allgemeine Regeln zu 
formulieren während das APR Panel und seine Unterorgane diese Regeln auf die einzelnen 
fallspezifischen Reviewprozesse anwendet. Ich argumentiere, dass funktionale Differenzierung im APRM 
deliberative Entscheidungsfindung sowohl bei der Regelsetzung als auch bei der Regelanwendung 
begünstigt. Dies wiederum beeinflusst den Entscheidungsprozess dahingehend, dass er leistungsbasierte 
Entscheidungen gegenüber machtpolitischen Entscheidungen begünstigt. Basierend auf bislang 
unbeachteten Quellen, analysiere ich mit Hilfe der Prozessanalyse und qualitativer Experteninterviews die 
Effekte von funktionaler Differenzierung in drei APR Länderüberprüfungen (in Südafrika, Ghana und 
Kenia). Ich komme zu dem Schluss, dass der APRM Entscheidungsprozess einen bedeutenden 
Mechanismus bietet um leistungsbasierte Entscheidungen selbst auf der Ebene, auf welcher der Prozess 
von den zu begutachteten Ländern geführt wird, hervorzubringen.  
Schlagwörter:  
Internationale Institutionen, Funktionale Differenzierung, Delegation, Peer Review, African Peer Review 
Mechanismus, Südafrika APR Prozess, Ghana APR Prozess, Kenia APR Prozess 
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Abstract: 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is the peer review instrument adopted by the African 
Union as a mechanism to foster the adoption of policies to enhance the quality of governance among 
member States. Its review process relies on using self-reporting and monitoring tools to assess and 
encourage improvements in the policies of participating States. This dissertation explores the question of 
why, and under what conditions, member States acting within the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) decide to delegate decision competence to other bodies as part of the Review’s decision-making 
process. It investigates how, and with what consequences, this delegation creates consequent mechanisms 
of functional differentiation which determines the patterns of decision-making in the APRM review 
process and the contents of country review reports. The dissertation engages modern institutional theory 
in order to explain the emergence of the governance system of the APR process. The APR Forum (the 
assembly of Heads of State participating in the APRM) has acted over time to create an increasingly 
complex governance structure and to delegate decision-making competencies to subsidiary bodies in 
order to arrive at decisions that require implementation by participating member States under the review 
process. With insight taken from modern institutional theory, this dissertation argues that the 
organizational structure of the APRM process is functionally differentiated, and that the decision-making 
system embedded within the review process therefore becomes divided between a rule-making function 
and the concomitant application of those rules to the specific historical circumstances of APR country 
processes. In this regard, therefore, the APR Forum concentrates its functions on formulating general 
rules, while the APR Panel and subsidiary committees subsequently apply these rules to individual case 
specific review processes. This dissertation contends that such functional differentiation in the APRM 
promotes deliberations, at both the rule making stage and the norm application phase of the decision 
process, which consequently affect the decision process in ways that favour merit-based decisions-making 
and inhibit raw power politics. Based on previously overlooked sources, the dissertation further conducts 
an empirical analysis of the effects of functional differentiation in the examples of three APR country 
processes (i.e. South Africa, Ghana and Kenya), using qualitative expert interviews and process-tracing. It 
concludes that functional differentiation in the decision process of the APRM provides a powerful 
mechanism to promote merit-based decisions, even at the country level where the process is led by the 
country under review. 
Keywords:  
International Institutions, Functional Differentiation, Delegation, Peer Reviews, African Peer Review 
Mechanism, South Africa APR Process, Ghana APR Process, Kenya APR Process 
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Chapter 1 
1.1. Introduction 
A predominant trend in contemporary world politics is clearly evident in the increasing number, 
complexity and influence of international organizations (IOs). Since the end of the Second World 
War in 1945, an exponential growth in a variety of types of international organization has been 
apparent. Whilst this can be attributed in part to a proliferation of newly formed international 
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), operating without formal links to government, the 
role of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), with precisely those links, still dominates global 
political processes, displaying a much stronger influence in global governance. This can be 
attributed to the advantages that IGOs possess in reflecting the authority of the Nation States 
who have participated in their creation (Davies and Woodward 2014: 1).  
Nevertheless, an investigation of the role of these powerful international organizations is still 
seriously under-researched within the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations 
(Abbott and Snidal 1998; Davies and Woodward 2014). This observation is particularly 
surprising as international organizations, and institutions of similar character, are the most 
common and enduring feature of global governance systems. Any relevant issue in the arena of 
international affairs inevitably involves or implies a response from at least one international 
institution, whose framework and rationale encompasses formalised approaches to any issue 
constituted in the mandate of that organization, and concomitant with the general interests of 
member States who comprise their constituency. In most instances, international organizations 
have acquired considerable authority and competence in these areas of their mandate. Pre-
eminent examples of sophisticated and well established international organizations that act 
within elaborate global governance systems include the United Nations (UN), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) and the European 
Union (EU), as well as many other more specific organisations acting within a more limited 
ambit.  
As has been strongly argued in scholarly discourse, this limited attention accorded to 
international organizations as part of the study of International Relations may be attributed not 
least to the absence of a reliable theory which gives adequate attention to the nature of 
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international organizations (Gehring and Dorsch 2010: 2). It has to be acknowledged that 
thorough and successful research has afforded vigorous theoretical scrutiny to topics such as 
cooperation theory (Axelrod 1984), decision-making within international organizations (Haas 
1964; Cox and Jacobson 1973), transnationalism (Keohane and Nye 1972), international regimes 
(Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984), the creation and effects of international institutions (Keohane 
1984; Goldstein, Rivers and Tomz 2007: 39 ), and institutional interaction (Oberthuer and 
Gehring 2006; Gehring and Oberthuer 2009). Yet it might be argued that these wide-ranging 
studies fail to attribute any independence to the behaviour and effect of international 
organizations. Despite their focus being firmly on their area of operation, the dominant Realist 
school in International Relations theory insists that States are the main actors in the international 
political environment, while international organizations remain a barely relevant component of 
their conception of world politics. Their approach maintains a stance in which intergovernmental 
organizations are recognised merely as forums where the more important agents of governments 
representing Nation States can meet (Reinalda 2009: 5).  
It is the contention of this dissertation that this view of international institutions, as exhibited in 
the ongoing evolution of research in International Relations, has tended to seriously impede the 
development of a comprehensive and well-focused theory for the study of international 
organizations in general. In particular it maintains that the evidence suggests that, in practice, 
international organisations have been operating increasingly independently as a function of the 
common modes of governance. This dissertation thus attempts to address this gap in the 
recognition of the agency of international organisations.  
While there is some recent global governance research which has recognised and identified new 
actors in world politics, including international non-governmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations and professional transnational groups, this newer focus has not 
yet dislodged the tendency to pay insufficient account to the study of international organizations.  
Two instructive paths that have been followed within the study of global governance are worth 
mentioning in the context of their contribution to a better understanding of international 
organizations. Firstly, reflecting a long-standing scepticism about the efficacy of bureaucratic 
forms of organization, there has been an attempt by scholars to focus on and explain the 
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autonomy of bureaucracies in the operations of international organizations. Scholars in this 
enterprise increasingly identify the Secretariats of international organizations as actors in 
international relations and point to the potential of these bodies to gain a life of their own, acting 
powerfully and independently beyond their original function. They particularly focus on a 
determination of dysfunction in the bureaucracy’s organizing environment and the policy process 
that underlines the activities of those organizations (Barnett and Finnermore 1999; Nielson and 
Tierney 2003; Barnett and Finnermore 2004; Biermann and Siebenhuener 2009). While this in 
itself is a useful exercise in analysing the bureaucratic function, it has also shed light on aspects 
of the organisations within which these bureaucracies are generated. However, this analysis in its 
fruition, has generally necessitated a limited focus, obscuring the potential theoretical potency of 
giving recognition to the fact that international organizations as actors have far wider importance 
and resonance than in the behaviour of their Secretariats.  
A second existing line of research explores organizational decision-making processes. Reinalda 
and Verbeek (2004), in particular, pay special attention to the Council of Europe, the United 
Nations, the EU, G8, the World Trade Organization, International Maritime Organization, the 
World Health Organization and the OECD, examining the extent to which non-State actors, for 
example non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations, are influential in the 
decision-making of such international organizations. Some scholars have given special attention 
to the rationality of the design and framework of organizational decision-making procedures 
(Koremenos et al 2001), while research on the delegation of these procedures to independent 
agents and adjudicative bodies has also had considerable significance (Keohane et al 2000; 
Majone 2001; Hawkins et al 2006; Alter 2008; Sobol 2015). Influential theory-driven research 
into the institutional mechanisms for producing decisions that are problem-adequate, regardless 
of their distributive effects, (Gehring and Kerler 2008; Gehring and Plocher 2009), and the 
analysis of interactions between international institutions (Gehring and Oberthuer 2009), has 
made some contribution to a theoretical understanding of the functions and properties of 
international organization. As with the above work on bureaucratic functions, the role within the 
decision-making function remains a partial aspect of any overall analysis of the full nature of an 
organisation, and suggests a need for further understanding in more general research into the 
nature of international organisations.  
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A further pressing aspect of this identified dearth in the scope of relevant research specifically 
indicates a woeful neglect of research into international organizations that emanate from or 
operate within the global South, in particular. It may not be surprising that research has been 
focused more upon the more powerful actors and bodies in the international arena that are drawn 
from the Northern hemisphere, and have long been considered to dominate global politics. This 
dissertation intends to redress this lack of direction by drawing on insights from modern 
institutional theory to elucidate the organizational aspects of one such institution operating in the 
Southern hemisphere, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).  
Relying on the literature regarding processes of delegation to international institutions, the 
dissertation advances a functional theory of international institutions which illustrates the way in 
which the member States of an organization sometimes empower their international 
organizational agents with the capacity to make decisions pro illis. As a consequence of this 
assertion, a serious consideration of this dissertation is to ask how the overriding challenge and 
inherent conundrums of such a decision-making situation is managed within appropriate 
measures to guarantee the proper functioning of such agents. A question is raised by this 
evidence as to whether such operations necessarily jeopardise the autonomy of these 
organisations. In the light of such possible difficulties, this dissertation proposes the use of a 
theory of functional differentiation to create a mechanism to assess problem-adequate decisions, 
even where problems concerning cooperation present a range of distributive outcomes. The 
dissertation therefore particularly tests the importance of a differentiation between rule-making 
functions and the application of agreed standards at different levels of a decision process. These 
factors, elucidated through the example of an empirical study of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism process, provide a relevant context for how international organisations operate 
within Southern global politics, leading to clear conclusions about their operation.   
 
1.2. Statement of Research Problem and Research Questions  
The African Peer Review Mechanism provides a strong example of the use of peer reviews in 
practice. Peer reviews are increasingly favoured by Nation States and widely used by 
international organizations as potent instruments of global governance. These reviews involve 
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the regular collection of information on the policy performance of a State and the assessment of 
such information by ‘other peers’. ‘Peers’ in this respect are normally representatives of other 
States or non-State actors, who create insight into performance in relation to agreed norms, codes 
and standards for any given issue.  
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) characterizes peer 
review as the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a State by other 
States (peers), carried out by designated institutions, or a combination of States and designated 
institutions, with the ultimate goal of assisting the reviewed State to improve its policy making, 
adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and principles (Pagani 2002: 16). 
Peer reviews are conducted on a non-adversarial basis, and need to be conducted in an 
atmosphere of mutual trust among the States involved in the review, as well as with a shared 
confidence in the procedures and processes that underlie their conduct. The purpose of peer 
reviews in most international organizations is to engender the sharing of best practice among 
peers, and to create an avenue for sharing information on particular issues and productive areas 
of cooperation. One distinctive feature of this “soft mode of governance” is that peer reviews are 
mostly devoid of explicit sanctions or coercive mechanisms. Therefore they are constructed in 
order to avoid the implication of any resulting punitive decision, sanction or any form of legally 
binding acts or enforcement mechanism (Pagani and Godfrey 2002: 8).  
This dissertation investigates how, in the process of peer review, States may delegate decision-
making authority to independent agents in the governance structure, and under what conditions 
any agent may be held accountable for their decisions. This research focuses specifically on the 
decision-making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). It investigates the 
incentive structures created for the APR Panel and other committees within the governance 
structure of the review process, and assesses whether it is able to produce decision that represent 
the general interests of member States of the organization.  
Within the governance structure of the APRM, substantial decision-making authority is 
delegated to the APR Panel and other committees, often comprised of eminent persons. This 
practice represents a contradiction in International Relations theory, in that it illustrates how the 
APR Panel over the years has exhibited significant independence from member governments. 
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Traditional International Relations theories of Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism, as currently 
conceived, fall short of explaining such autonomous action by international organizations, as 
they operate state-centric ontologies (Nielson and Tierney 2003:242). This dissertation 
specifically investigates this seeming anomaly, and asks why member States of the African 
Union delegate substantial decision-making authority to the APR Panel. 
The practice of delegation to the APR Panel presents a puzzle which leads one to interrogate 
whether the arrangements put in place in the decision process of the APRM have a serious 
consequences. Given the prevalence of this practice of delegation of decision-making away from 
the State, this dissertation asks whether these conditions may enhance the quality of decisions at 
each level of the decision-making process in the APRM. This enhancement may occur when, in 
line with the arguments of modern institutional theory, the delegation of decision-making 
competence to various sub-organs within the APRM decision system creates a functional 
differentiation of the system. This differentiation has been seen to empower less powerful actors 
within the system to argue for the correct application of the institutional guidelines over specific 
issues, instead of resorting to bargaining to attain their goals and preferences. Functional 
differentiation within the APRM system, it is argued, may produce a new form of horizontal 
accountability of the involved actors towards other actors at the same level. These horizontal 
accountability structures are expected to increase the incentives of decisions-making by the APR 
Panel and to producing decisions that are accepted by all actors in the peer review process.  
The choice of peer review, as discussed in this study, refers to established interrelated 
mechanisms utilized for international monitoring of compliance with agreed norms and standards 
in international organizations. It involves the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of the 
policies, legislations and important institutions of various countries (OECD 2002). Peer reviews 
in this sense offers a forum where policies of participating States can be discussed and 
information sought on various issues of concern to interested parties. 
The literature has over the years established new paradigms for the conditions under which 
States may utilize either hard or soft legalization in international interactions (Abbot and Snidal 
2000; Bayne 2004; Sindico 2006; Checkel 1999). Hard legalization in international interactions 
is portrayed to have a potential of reducing transaction costs among actors, strengthening the 
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credibility of their commitment, as well as making diverse political strategies available to 
members co-operating in an issue area. The potential of soft legalization to promote learning and 
normative processes, and to reduce the costs involved in contracting soft legal rules, is 
highlighted as a point of attraction for their usage.  
The popularity of peer reviews in international organizations, especially as voluntary and non-
sanctioning forms of public action, has historically reflected their increasing use as a solution to 
problems of effectiveness and efficiency in policy making, especially within the European Union 
(Borras and Conzelmann 2007). Abbot and Snidal (2000), for instance, argue that international 
actors may choose softer forms of governance, such as a peer review, when it is apparent that 
those forms offer superior and greater institutional solutions. In most instances, States adopt 
softer forms of governance because they can provide flexibility and the capacity to promote 
compromise among actors with different interests and preferences.   
Debate on peer reviews, as instruments of global governance, usually focuses on whether peer 
reviews prove effective for domestic policy development and compliance with international 
norms and agreements (Conzelmann 2010). Some commentators have rejected outright the 
effectiveness of peer reviews because of their lack of sanctions and enforcement. However, a 
group of scholars with the ‘management’ approach tend to see immense potential in peer 
reviews. This school argues that States are mindful of their reputation, and sensitive to avoiding 
hard solutions that may be seen to flagrantly violate their obligations in the international system 
(Conzelmann 2010). As a result of reputational issues States tend to comply with 
recommendations made in peer review reports, as their compliance enhances their credibility 
among the international comity of States.  
Pagani argues that when peer reviews are undertaken within the framework of an international 
organization, the Secretariat of the organization plays an important role in stimulating and 
supporting the process. Where the environment of the peer review is marked by shared 
confidence in the process and mutual trust among States involved, peer reviews tend to create 
‘through this reciprocal evaluation process, a system of accountability’ which contributes to their 
effectiveness (Pagani 2002). Furthermore, the literature on peer reviews in international 
organizations lacks a theoretically focused agenda that examines their organizational aspects. As 
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a result, current debates on peer reviews in international organizations are unable to fully account 
for the decision-making processes that guide their conduct.  
In pursuing this research, this study follows a number of research trajectories which are brought 
together in the following analyses. The dissertation focuses on research on the delegation of 
decision-making authority to independent agents in the organizational structure of an 
international organization, making specific reference to the African Peer Review Mechanism and 
the institutional incentives for making problem-adequate decisions in the governance of the 
review process. Secondly, this study develops well established theory-driven research to assess 
procedures to induce rationally motivated actors to make decisions that are not shaped by their 
parochial interests, but instead informed by externally-given decision criteria that better serve as 
the basis for making problem-adequate decisions (Gehring 2004). 
 
1.3. Argument in Brief 
This study contends that institutional arrangements within the decision-making system of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism can have an effect on the contents of final country review 
reports. I seek to account for the impact of delegating decision-making competencies to several 
committees within the operations of the decision-making process of the APRM. In this light, I 
utilize the theory of functional differentiation in decision-making processes in international 
organizations as a leverage to explain the emergence of the decision apparatus of the African 
Peer Review Mechanism. The core argument put forward is that, in contrast to power-based 
bargaining, the delegation of decision-making authority to subsidiary bodies within an institution 
can produce an entirely new situation where decisions follow a rule-based decision-making 
logic, even where the interests of powerful actors are at stake in various policy issues of concern. 
The argument is developed as follows. 
I start by making appeals to the theory of cooperation among self-interested actors on a given 
issue area of interest. Based on the tenets that States are rational and the central actors in 
international interactions, I draw on the theoretical debates on the incentives for cooperation 
among self-interested actors in issue areas defined by cooperation and collaboration problems. 
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The literature identifies two scenarios through which cooperation can be achieved even in the 
absence of any central authority. These are the presence of reciprocity and the presence of a 
shadow of the future in the interactions of actors. Given the nature of the decision process of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism with its multi-functional governance system, it remains 
puzzling why and if a voluntary and non-coercive decision process can produce any serious 
outcomes in the decision-making system. As a consequence the emergence of the decision 
system of the APRM is not fully explained by existing accounts informed by only power and 
material interest considerations. 
As a result, I develop a theory of multi-functionality based on the exiting works of Gehring on 
functional differentiation in decision-making processes. A multi-functional decision system 
operates just like a functionally differentiated decision system. It involves the emergence of 
several institutional bodies within a decision system with each subsidiary body guided by the 
presence of externally given rules. Just like a functionally differentiated decision-making 
process, a multi-functional decision system is separated between a rule-making and the 
application of norms to case specific situations by different entities in the decision-making 
process. As a consequence, institutional incentives are generated at both the rule-making and 
norm application stages of the decision process to make decisions that are merit-based. Merit-
based decisions are based on decision makers’ resort to existing guidelines and good practice as 
the basis for arriving at final decisions in case specific situations. Their efficacy is based on the 
potency of arguments adduced to support the particular course of action being pursued. As a 
result, the governance of a multi-functional decision system involves delegating decision 
competencies to various committees. The incentive for delegating any decision competencies is 
informed by the benefits that accrue to States involved in the review process. Since, I hold the 
assumption that States are rational and have an overriding tendency to pursue their parochial 
interest; I investigate if institutional arrangements in the APRM decision system provides any 
incentives for decision makers to operate based on their externally given rules.  
On a whole, the concept of functional differentiation which informs this study, demonstrate that 
the practice of delegating decision-making competencies to subsidiary bodies in the decision-
making processes of institutions generate incentives for actors to decide in favour of generally 
accepted rules as points of reference in a decision system. Its application is generally suitable for 
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the study of the decision processes of most international organizations and it is applicable to the 
decisions making processes of the African Peer Review Mechanism which delegates decision 
competencies to different organs in its institutional set-up.  
 
1.4. Existing Literature on Governance and the African Peer Review Mechanism    
The African Peer Review process and governance are among the most crucial topics in the 
consideration of African in world politics in the twenty-first century. However, few existing 
works in both democratic governance studies and the vast literatures on the African Peer Review 
process systematically explores the decision-making process of the APRM. Over the last couple 
of decades, research on governance and the APRM have focused on clarification of the 
operational process of the APRM in a descriptive manner. The literature on the African peer 
review mechanism has mostly been divided between scholars who tend to see restrictions in the 
value of a mechanism that is ‘too soft’ as a means of reforming governance practices, and those 
who give more approval, arguing that the mechanism is the most tangible move towards regional 
political accountability in Africa (Matholo 2003; Masterson 2005; Venter 2003). Criticism of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) revolves around the issues concerning the rationale 
and design of the mechanism, its process and organization, and the extent to which the 
implementation of the mechanism is transparent and legitimate. Some in particular have raised 
concerns about the transparency of the internal decision-making processes of the AU (Brosig 
2014: 231). This literature has, however, failed to take into account the motivations and 
expectations with which some States in Africa decide to participate in a non-sanctioning peer 
review mechanism. This study therefore departs from early literature which lacked a theoretical 
focus to build a theory driven research that seeks to explain the nature of decision-making within 
the governance structure of the review process, taking into account in a practical assessment of 
the full participation of its actors. 
An example of this limited focus in research, with a preponderance of negative judgments arising 
from the lack of a legally binding framework, can be found in that of Mathoho. His work 
explores the strengths and weaknesses of the APRM and its prospects of impacting positively on 
Africa’s governance challenges (Mathoho 2003). He rightly notes that the peer review process 
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had never been attempted in Africa before and that, unlike judicial proceedings, the final 
outcome of any review is not legally binding. He concludes that the impact from this process is 
likely to be limited. However, his work fails to acknowledge how organizations may be 
instrumental in the enforcement of the outcomes of the review, even without a legally binding 
imperative, and how this would help consolidate democracy. Although an attempt is made to 
elucidate the implementation of the programme of action of the APRM, his work fails to accept 
that a peer review which is legally non-binding could develop authority and make it worthwhile 
for States to submit to the procedures. This study intends to investigate how procedures in peer 
reviews gain authority and develop trust among actors who interact within their procedures. 
The critical role of civil society in the APRM process has also received scrutiny by scholars. 
Adotey (2007) argues that, despite the strong emphasis on civil society’s involvement in the 
APRM process, meaningful consultation was notably insufficient in the case of Ghana. He notes 
there were three main civil society consultation events constructed to consider or validate the 
country’s self-assessment report. However he describes how the way the meetings were 
conducted left many participants with the sense that, though those consultations may have been 
broad, they were not sufficiently deep. To establish itself, therefore, the review process will need 
to supplant such consultations and mobilise a critical mass of the population into sustained effort. 
This can be achieved conceptually, strategically and operationally. It involves opening the 
frontiers for better engagement with scientific experts and the general, interested public. The 
relevance of Adotey’s work to this study is that it emphasizes the role of civil society in the 
APRM process in Ghana. Therefore, showing the important of assessing the degree to which the 
public may become engaged in the process of producing review reports that can then appear 
more acceptable to participating States. 
It should be acknowledged that the APRM, for some commentators, is a major tool for 
democratic consolidation. In this respect, if efficient in its decision-making processes, it can off-
set the skepticism expressed by scholars exploring the conditions for democratic consolidation in 
the developing world (Bratton and van de Wall 1997; Diamond 1999; Rod 2004). For instance, 
Gruzd analyse the APRM as a conflict analysis tool, demonstrating how the responses 
characterized in the reports of Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda have articulated conflict issues, and 
conclude that therefore the APRM has a potential for conflict analysis (Gruzd 2007).  
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Another debate surrounds the fact, alluded to by Ross, that the APRM is clearly not designed to 
handle fast moving crisis (Ross 2004). This claim leads to the conclusion that such work is most 
appropriately dealt with through ad-hoc diplomacy and the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union. This dissertation makes the suggestion that there is an opportunity to use a 
theoretical analysis of the framework of the APRM to test this assumption. 
As none of the above, mostly skeptical commentaries by scholars has been grounded in any 
theoretically focused analysis of the decision-making process of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism as an organization, they represent, at best, an endeavor which has tended to be highly 
descriptive and with no theoretical basis. This study seeks to fill the gap by presenting a 
parsimonious theory on international organizations, and using it as a lever to explain the 
decision-making process of the APRM and the institutional incentive structures that might push 
rationally motivated actors in a decision process to forgo their individual interest in pursuit of the 
collective interest. The goals of democratization and the opportunity to forge a mechanism for 
conflict resolution are clearly worthy of further deliberation which might overcome the 
skepticism of the current literature. 
 
1.5. Research Design and Methodological Considerations 
A qualitative and case-oriented research approach is adopted in this study to address the research 
question posed.  It involves the use of qualitative case studies, in combination with interviews 
with experts, and process tracing. These techniques are chosen and applied as their design can 
produce evidence to explain the rationale for delegation in the African Peer Review Mechanism. 
These methods allows for an in-depth analysis of the processes and structure of any social 
phenomenon (George and Bennett 2005). While at the same time, it limits the potential for case-
based generalizations (Ragin 2000).  
These techniques are specified in their detailed approaches below, leading to a discussion of the 
strengths of their methods, as well as any inherent limitations that are likely to be encountered in 
their use. This empirical framework is applied to the operation of the decision-making process of 
the African Peer Review Mechanism. The cases empirically test whether members intervene at 
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any point in the decision-making process of the APRM committees as they come to a final 
decision on what policies and measures are to be taken by a State to address an identified 
problem. The decision to focus on the APRM and the pioneer States that participated in the 
review process, i.e Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, is based on the reasoning that those States 
are the most efficient in the African Union (AU) system, and therefore constitute the most 
unlikely cases to support the hypothesis. Therefore, I test fully the proposition that forms the 
basis of this research’s proposed hypotheses. If the proposition that functional differentiation 
may play a role in pushing rational actors to accept decisions that might not be in their best 
interest is upheld in the most unlikely scenario within the APRM, then one can be more 
confident that it may prevail in other peer review institutions that mostly lack hard enforcement 
mechanisms.  
The following sections provide an explication of the methodological considerations that underpin 
the research, providing the rationale, where necessary, of the logics and epistemological 
concerns that shape the various research tools adopted. 
 
1.5.1. Approach   
The research utilizes a qualitative case study approach to explain the role of delegation in the 
decision-making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism. It combined process tracing 
and elite interviews to explain the decision-making rationale of actors in the APRM. Both 
methods are seen to be extremely useful in unearthing and explaining the role of key actors in the 
APRM process, and also to explain the basis on which peer review decisions are arrived at. The 
qualitative case study approach allows for a deep examination of various cases, enabling one to 
theorize on the dynamics of decision-making in a ‘soft’ institution that delegates some decision-
making authority to the various sub-bodies of the institution. Based on the theoretical research 
question that is posed, a case study technique is seen to be capable of addressing the pertinent 
questions that the research seek to answer, using the example of various cases in the peer review 
process.  
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A comparative advantage of the case study research method that is often highlighted in the 
literature is its ability to contribute to the development of theories that can accommodate varied 
forms of complex causality (George and Bennett 2005: 5). This may be generated from the need 
to fashion a proper and adequate analysis of various hard or ‘deviant’ cases that fail to fit 
existing theories, and in doing so might result in providing significant theoretical insights.   
Case study approaches generally involves an expansive and detailed examination of an aspect of 
a phenomenon to develop and test explanations that might be generalizable to other events and 
situations (George and Bennett 2005). Following Eckstein (1975), this research defines a case as 
an instance of a class of events. The events are a social phenomenon of scientific interest that a 
researcher aims to study with the intention of developing a theory explaining the diversity of the 
whole class of events. Therefore, according to George and Bennett (2005), a case study is a well-
defined aspect of a historical episode that a researcher selects for analysis and is representative of 
the historical event itself. The selection of those aspects chosen to constitute a case is thus of 
fundamental importance to finding cases that are ideal for study, and is informed by the 
perceived general advantages that have been ascribed in the growing literature on qualitative 
case study approaches. Furthermore the decision to use a case study approach, and the design 
and implementation of research in such cases arises from an assessment of how the particular 
case can provide evidence to meet the research question, framed to create a specific answer 
through the mechanism of the research.  
In assessing the use of a variety of techniques in Social Science, George and Bennett highlight 
the strengths of case study methods. Their advantages include their usefulness in achieving high 
conceptual validity, the ability of case study methods to foster new hypotheses, their capacity for 
dealing with causal complexity in research, and their value in examining the hypothesized role of 
causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases (George and Bennett 2005: 19).  
These strengths notwithstanding, case studies have some limitations and pitfalls. This has led to 
telling critiques, especially from researchers coming from a statistical methods background. One 
common criticism that has been raised against case study methods is the issue of ‘selection bias’, 
which is of great concern to statistical researchers (Achen and Snidal 1989; Geddes 1990). 
Selection biases generally speaking have some potential consequences in case study research, but 
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not in the same vein as in statistical approaches. According to Collier and Mahoney, selection 
bias occurs when some form of selection processes in the design of the research or the 
phenomenon under study results in inferences that suffer from some form of systematic error 
(Collier and Mahoney 1996). Such biases may occur in instances where cases are self-selected, 
or as King et al suggest, when cases are selected that represent a truncated, and not fully 
representative sample along the dependent variable of the population of cases under 
consideration (King et al 1994: 60). This statistical notion of selection bias undermines the 
strength of the relation between the independent and the dependent variables (George and 
Bennett 2005: 23). In contrast to these concerns in statistical methods, another selection bias in 
case study research can sometimes occur when the researcher is inclined to deliberately choose 
cases that share a particular outcome. However, selection of cases based upon the dependent 
variable is not necessarily a flaw of case study practitioners, as such a judgment will depend on 
the purpose of such decisions. In some instances, selecting cases based on the dependent variable 
can help identify which variables do not afford a necessary or sufficient pre-condition for certain 
expected outcomes. Other considerations, such as the historical importance of some cases and 
the availability of accessible evidence could also legitimately play a key role in case selection in 
qualitative case studies.  
In other to derive a robust theoretical framework to investigate the theoretically derived research 
question in this research, an analytical inductive approach was utilized for the purpose of 
revealing the core of the question of interest. Analytic induction constructs a method that allows 
for the consideration of existing theories and the iterative back and forth between the literature 
and empirical data to refine existing theory (Manning 1982). In most instances, analytical 
induction involves an initial review of the literature and the derivation of some assumptions 
made. Based on these assumptions, a model is proposed and tested against empirical data to 
either confirm of reject already existing theories that form the basis for those initial assumptions. 
The analytical inductive approach thus has its main usefulness in its ability to refine existing 
theories and make contributions to the already existing literature in that area of study. 
Within this research, where applicable, the methods of elite interviews and process tracing are 
chosen and utilized to trace the decisions of various committees within the decision apparatus of 
the APRM system. Process tracing generally allows for detecting intervening causal mechanisms 
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between independent variable and dependent variables (George and Bennett 2005). The value of 
interviewing applied to this research is based on the positivist assumption that interview 
responses are to be valued primarily because of their accuracy as objective statements of sets of 
events. Following positivist assumptions, responses from experts are treated as being a direct 
representation of the bureaucratic culture of the institution that is being investigated. Positivists 
hold the view that interviews based on pre-tested, standardised questionnaires are a way of 
increasing the reliability of research. In this case that reliability is achieved by cross checking 
interview data with official documents that are produced.  
Elite interviews for process tracing have strengths and weaknesses that are discussed in the 
relevant literature in Political Science. George and Bennett outline a range of uses of process 
tracing data and interview data (George and Bennett 2005). The use of elite interviews has the 
following benefits. In the first place, elite interviews in most instances are used to corroborate 
information that has been established by other sources. When primary documents and secondary 
sources gives an initial clue to a phenomenon that is of interest to the researcher, interviews 
could be used to corroborate the phenomenon and facts that are already out there. Interview data 
in this sense contributes to the research goal of triangulation. Information collected is cross 
checked through multiple sources to increase the robustness of the findings. This contributes to 
the credibility of the findings of the research since information collected is supported across 
multiple sources, and can simultaneously reveal the weakness of other unsupported sources that 
might have been viewed as reliable at the initial stage of the research (Davies 2001).  
One danger of depending on interviews is that they might reflect an account that is determined 
by the social and psychological structures that govern the responses of the respondents, and will 
thus produce analysis that supports a preconceived argument. To overcome such dangers, two 
effective strategies suggested in the literature (Baruch 1982) are to tabulate many cases and to 
investigate deviant cases.  
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1.5.2. The Case Study Selection  
Case study based research is relevant for a research strategy aimed at theory building through a 
constant comparison of theory and data, and case based research can help to explain the 
dynamics present within single settings. This study therefore makes use of a small number of 
cases to allow for an in-depth study of their inherent dynamics, and to take into account any 
peculiar case characteristics and contextual factors. The universe of cases, from which selection 
has been made for this dissertation, are those States that have participated in the African Peer 
Review Mechanism from 2003 to 2017. As outlined above, there are factors concerning their 
effectiveness that has put them into this position, and since the dissertation aims at explaining 
why States in the APRM delegate decision-making authority to sub-committee and whether and 
how delegation impacts on the final decision that are made by the APRM panel of experts, the  
selection of these cases has been made to demonstrate that, under these least likely conditions, 
the outcome of States overriding the decision of the APRM will display increased significance. 
 
1.5.3. Data Sources 
Several data collection methods are used in this research to enable the proper construction of a 
theoretical framework, the specification of observable implications of theory, the derivation of 
some hypotheses, and the testing of the hypotheses empirically. The research relies on the theory 
of functional differentiation to deductively derive hypotheses to be tested empirically.  
Expert interviews will constitute a main data source for illustrating individual case studies which 
can supplement official reports and press statements of various committee meetings. Noaks and 
Wincup (2004: 80) have elaborated on the characteristics of different interview formats in social 
science research. Three different interview formats are sketched out in their work. These 
typologies of interview strategies include structured interview, semi-structured interview and the 
open-ended interview or focus groups. Each of these formats requires some skills to produce 
reliable and valid analysis of data gathered in the process. The choice of the structure of the 
interview questions aimed at the experts has been guided by my theoretical framework. This 
determines that open ended questions will be a highly useful source to generate information from 
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the experts. In the context of the need to generate wide-ranging and possibly unstructured 
information that can contrast and fill gaps that official reports on the decision process in the 
APRM may not be able to cover.  
 
1.6. Relevance of the Research  
This research is designed to explain the role of delegation in the decision-making process of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism. It does so through a theory-guided case study analysis of the 
decision-making system of the APRM. Although the empirical findings on the three case studies 
presented in this book cannot be broadly generalized, there is every reason to assert that the 
results are transferable to other cases in the APRM process. My claim hinges on the fact that, the 
selected cases in themselves represent a universe of unlikely cases where the theoretical 
assumption impugned were not expected to work. In this regard, this study makes both a 
theoretical and empirical contribution. 
First, the study contributes to ongoing academic debates on the functions and effects of 
international organizations in global politics. While research in this area has attempted to explain 
the autonomy of bureaucracies in international organizations, this study looks specifically on the 
organizational operations of the decision-making process of the APRM and makes reference to a 
hither to unaccounted mechanism, the separation of functions among decision makers in a 
decision-making process.  
In this regard, the study also contributes theoretically to recent debates on institutional 
mechanisms to produce problem adequate decisions in functionally differentiated decision 
systems (Gehring 2004; Gehring and Kerler 2008; Gehring and Ruffing 2008). The analysis of 
the decision-making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism shows that institutional 
arrangements are important at both the rule-making level and the application of norms to case 
specific situations in curtailing the tendencies of actors to resort to the pursuit of their parochial 
interest in the decision process.  
Secondly, the analysis makes an insightful empirical contribution to understanding the operations 
of the decision process of the African Peer Review Mechanism. Through the analysis of the 
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assignment of various competencies to different subsidiary bodies within the organizational 
structure of the review process, the analysis in this book is able to account for the patterns of 
final decision outcomes of the review process among African States.  Therefore, this study is the 
foremost to systematically scrutinize the effects of delegating decision-making competencies to 
various bodies within the operations of the APRM. Unlike other descriptive oriented studies on 
the APRM, this study provides a more theory-driven analysis of the APRM decision process, 
which makes it novel in this respect.   
Finally, the empirical findings of the study have broader policy implications for the enhancement 
of good governance practices among participating Member State of the APRM. The study 
contributes to debates on the APRM as a tool to effectively contribute to reforms in the 
governance processes of member States of the African Union. It makes a good case for the need 
to devolve the decision-making system of the APRM to enhance the quality of country review 
reports that are produced to serve as a blueprint in the implementation of various policy 
programmes.  
 
1.7. Structure of the Dissertation 
To address the research question, the analysis is structured in 7 chapters. The first chapter 
identifies the gaps in the literature on the African Peer Review Mechanism and proposes a 
methodological orientation to the study of the decision-making process of the APRM. It also 
makes a case for the theoretical and empirical relevance of the study. In the next step, I develop 
theoretical expectations based on the literature on delegation in international institutions and the 
literature on decision-making in functionally differentiated institutions (chapter 2). The third 
chapter focuses entirely on explicating the organizational structure of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism. The chapter identifies each of the organs and the incentives generated for each of 
the committees to make decisions that are ruled-based at each stage of the decision-making 
process. The next set of chapters (chapter 4, 5 and 6) investigate three case studies on the 
implementation of the review process with particular focus to the decision-making process. I 
investigate three review processes with differentiated decision-making systems to ascertain 
whether the postulated theoretical expectations are present or otherwise in each of the cases 
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under scrutiny. In the last chapter (chapter 7), the dissertation draws a conclusion from the 
analysis in the previous chapters. I present a summary of the theoretical and empirical findings as 
well as the policy implications for the operations of the African Peer Review process.   
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Chapter 2 
2.1. Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework 
In considering whether peer reviews by international organizations matter in global politics, 
scholars are confronted with key questions which require a close analysis of the nature of the 
governance structure which has been developed as a function of choice in institutional design. 
One such question asks whether delegation in peer review arrangements organized by 
international organizations facilitate the problem solving capability of the various sub-organs 
involved in the decision-making process. To respond to this question it is necessary to know to 
what extent review mechanisms, under the auspices of international organizations, place issues 
on the international political agenda, and how and with what consequences does the delegation 
of decision-authority to various bodies in peer reviews by international organizations shape the 
outcome of decisions and recommendations made by expert bodies. In each case the objective of 
these questions is to determine whether the practice of delegation in peer review arrangements in 
international organizations influences the politics of regulatory governance in an issue area of 
interest for States, especially in instances where States encounter with collaboration or 
cooperation problems within the organization.   
Any delegation of decision-making authority to sub-organs within international institutions 
would inevitably raise and define a Principal-Agent relationship between key actors, creating 
incentives at each stage of the decision process. In order to understand the role of delegation in 
the decision-making process of international institutions, whose decisions have vital implications 
and ramifications for the conduct of the behavior of States, it is important to understand how and 
why States decide to co-operate with institutional arrangements like peer reviews, and then 
delegate decision-making authority to a body of experts. Based on the micro foundations of the 
behavior of States in institutionalized settings, I turn to modern institutional theory and the 
literature on the evolution of cooperation to explain the emergence of the decision system of the 
APRM and the behavior of rational actors in an institutional decision-making arena.  
This chapter develops a concise framework of decision-making that assesses and explains the 
relative power of the twin mechanisms of expertise and of external expectations on member 
States of the APRM. Firstly a theory of cooperation is utilised to generate a discussion of the 
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debates in Realism and Liberal Institutionalism on the pros and cons of cooperating in a given 
issue area in international relations. This section sets the framework for establishing the general 
impetus for the theoretical framework adopted by this dissertation.  
The main proposition put forward is that delegation of decision-making competence to an 
independent agent in institutions creates demands for accountability measures to keep the agent 
in check. However, to ensure the proper functioning of the agent, there is a requirement to design 
proper accountability mechanisms while not jeopardizing the autonomy of the agent in the 
execution of its task. This means instituting proper institutional mechanisms which persuade 
rational actors in the decision-making process to forgo the pursuit of their parochial interest in 
lieu of the collective good of all the participants within a cooperative project surrounding an 
issue of common interest. The consequence of this requirement is the recognition of the need for 
horizontal governance mechanisms in the decision process which are able to find solutions to 
problems of common interest.  This therefore requires a new form of horizontal accountability of 
the involved actors towards other actors at the same level of the scrutinized State peers. The 
operation of these horizontal accountability structures, this research contends, will be superior to 
that of hierarchical bodies and judicial reviews. A non-hierarchical mechanism may well 
enhance compliance to agreed standards in a non-adversarial manner, without jeopardizing the 
benefits of delegation to sub-bodies of an international institution that is geared towards fostering 
a credible commitment. This general model of decision-making and accountability, developed 
through horizontal compliance, is applied in this research to the study of peer reviews in 
international regimes, with a focus on the African Peer Review Mechanism, in order to derive 
testable hypotheses in relation to the role of delegation of decision-making, in precisely such a 
context as that of an appropriate, horizontal peer review within an relevant international 
organization.  
 
2.2. Research on International Cooperation and Institutions 
The cooperation problem in International Relations has long been linked to situations where 
rational actors intend to cooperate for their own good in a particular issue area of interest, with 
each actor potentially possessing alternative incentives not to cooperate. The long-standing 
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question is how, in a situation where each actor has the incentive to be selfish, cooperation can 
be developed. Two propositions have been highlighted in the literature to define some of the 
strategies through which cooperation is achieved, even in a situation without any central 
authority. These two scenarios are, firstly, the presence of reciprocity in the interactions of 
actors, and, secondly, the presence of an unknown future for the interaction among actors. These 
factors would, to a large extent, shape the nature of any such cooperation, achieved among actors 
who are motivated to act rationally in a ubiquitous collective action problem situation. Axelrod 
(1984) has elaborated on how the use of ‘tit for tat’, and the informal development of ties among 
adversaries, can lead to the likelihood or even certainty of successful cooperation, as these 
responses determine how, in a real event, key actors reciprocate the gesture of their partners to 
form an alliance based upon cooperation. Based on insights from this literature, this section 
delves into debates within International Relations concerning the theoretical foundations of 
cooperation in any issue area which is of interest to self-interested actors. The application and 
usefulness of these debates to the questions raised in the dissertation provides the micro 
foundation from which is built a conceptualization of the cooperation patterns in the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM).  
Accordingly, international institutional cooperation among rational actors is laden with 
numerous intricacies and complex interactional effects on the institutional structures on which 
they are built. The starting point in the enterprise of defining those dimensions has to be in a 
functional account of why States cooperate in a given issue area in international politics. I 
contend that a functional theory of cooperation in International Relations provides a good 
starting point to nuance our understanding of the origin of institutions, but falls short in 
accounting for the incentives that may play a role in influencing the outcome of the final 
decisions in a decision-making system that is characterized by multi-functionality among actors.  
The extensive literature on cooperation among self-interested States in international politics 
gives a strong foundation for explaining actor interests and preferences. The assumption is 
always made that most issues pertaining to coordination of policies between States can be 
understood in terms of a collective action problem. While States in a cooperative arrangement 
stand to reap the benefits that come with it, there are prevailing incentives for individual States to 
defect and renege on their side of a contract. In the usual two game prison’s dilemma situation, 
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these incentives may be mitigated where the interactions between the players are repeated, where 
the utility of mutual cooperation is high, or when the time horizons of participating States are 
long (Krasner 1983, Oye 1986). Importantly, international institutions, as is widely agreed in the 
literature, help overcome any informational problems often associated with collective 
cooperative solutions to a given issue area by monitoring the behavior of States and identifying 
lapses and noncompliance to agreed principles and norms (Keohane 1984).  
International cooperation, conceptualized as the mutual adjustment of governments’ policies 
through a process of policy coordination (Krieger 2001), could, at the basic level, presuppose the 
inherent anticipation of mutual gains by States through a deliberate and coordinated adjustment 
of policies in attempting to solve a mutual problem (Milner 1992). Cooperation comprises 
iterated processes which continue beyond initial agreements, and can result in complex and 
enduring governance orders with a potential for social change and a change in the behavior of 
actors (O’Neill, Jorg and Stacy 2004). International cooperation occurs when States adjust their 
behavior to anticipated preferences through a process of policy shift and coordination. 
Cooperation is sometimes characterized by widespread participation, ongoing assessments and 
experimentation and a process that may drive broader transformation of the international system. 
Tellingly, however, Keohane distinguishes cooperation from harmony, an atypical state of such 
mutual accord this dissertation does not address. Keohane defines harmony as a situation in 
which unilateral pursuit of self-interest automatically facilitates the ability of other actors to 
achieve their goals (Keohane 1984). Harmony, at its best, is illustrated by a situation in which 
the pursuit of self-interest by all actors in a given issue area automatically leads to the 
achievement of all participant’s goals. Pfaltzgraff and Dougherty argue that harmony brings 
about a situation where rational self-interested actors achieve their mutual interest through a 
narrow pursuit of their self-interest (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001). In contrast, the essence of 
cooperation does not connote the non-existence of conflicts between and among States in their 
interactions in the pursuit of their interest and preferences, but looks at how they may overcome 
these conflicts for the mutual benefits of all actors.  
States create mutual rules, expectations and institutions to promote behavior that enhances the 
possibility of mutual gains (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2010). Sadly, however, interactions among 
States in international affairs have been, historically, plagued by huge conflicts and 
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disagreements, especially on issues pertaining to the core interests of States. It is, however, clear 
that, despite the numerous sources of conflicts in International Relations, States cooperate most 
of the time (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2010). Neoliberal scholars have shown that, even in a 
world of unitary rational States, the Neorealist’s pessimism about international cooperation is not 
valid.   
The central question in the cooperation theory of international politics was initially concerned 
with why States, existing in an atomistic, anarchic, international system, will cooperate with each 
other in the first place (Waltz 1979). The metaphor of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game captured 
this view well. In a one-off game between rational actors, defection can become the dominant 
strategy. States may then be deterred from long-term cooperation, thus failing to realize their 
potential gains, because of the possibility of defection by partners in the first round which could 
lead them to be far worse off than before (Oye 1986). This view reflects certain underlying 
assumptions by Realist and Neorealist theorists on cooperation among actors in international 
politics. States, conceived of as rational, unitary actors, are primarily concerned with their own 
survival and the pursuit of their narrow interest. Anarchy, the absence of a sovereign global 
government, then represents a key ordering principle that structures the behavior of such self-
interested States.  
In the Realist tradition, the anarchical nature of the system inhibits cooperation among States, 
eventually promoting competition since the system is described as a ‘self-help system’. This 
reading of the nature of world politics contends that international institutions do not have the 
capacity to promote cooperation, and consequently the constraining effect of anarchy on 
cooperation is emphasized. Nevertheless, in a situation of competition and cooperation under 
anarchy, States may still wish to pursue relative gains. Thus there are reasons to join or 
participate in international institutions for self-serving gains which may not be enshrined in the 
objectives of such institutions. Using this paradigm, States are assumed to be preoccupied with 
power and security, and are consequently predisposed to intractable disagreements concerning 
issues of common interest. International organizations and institutions are thus seen to affect the 
prospects for cooperation only marginally, as States will still protect their interest over each 
prevailing circumstance, giving salience to the notion that decisions within international 
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institutions are the  result of the outcome of the great power politics that characterizes those 
institutions.  
Liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, hold a strong view on the important role of 
institutions in world politics. They argue that even if anarchy constrains the willingness of States 
to cooperate, States may still work together purposefully, particularly with the help of 
international institutions. The existence of international organizations is viewed as an ample 
demonstration of the ability of States to cooperate in international politics. Free-riding and self-
interest is acknowledged as a fundamental obstacle to cooperation at all levels, but Liberal 
institutionalists project the important role of international institutions to overcome these 
problems. States may thus seek to maximize their individual absolute gains, rather than relative 
gains, in an institutional decision-making process where there is a categorical differentiation of 
roles among different institutional actors, and the inhibiting presence of a minimal degree of 
decision-making criteria to guide institutional actors on their behavior.  
 The debates between these Realists and Liberal instititionalists on the discourse of international 
cooperation, especially from proponents like Robert Axelrod, demonstrate beyond reasonable 
doubt that States, though instinctively rational egoists, do cooperate under conditions of anarchy 
and support conditions that may facilitate cooperation. These include the presence of a common 
interest, the participation of a small number of actors and a perception of the implications of a 
long shadow of the future.  
Firstly, Axelrod sees cooperation as necessarily difficult to achieve unless States perceive some 
common interest in cooperation. But it is likely that common and conflicting interests will 
mostly exist side by side in international relations. As a result, States may see gains from 
cooperation while finding it continually difficult to take the risk of pursuing the benefits that 
exist for all. Domestic political pressures and the constraints of the self-help anarchical 
international system serve to deter governments away from risky cooperative endeavors, even if 
the benefits of such endeavors are large. However, the larger the level of common interest, the 
higher the tendency for cooperation.  
Secondly, Axelrod maintains that the involvement of a relatively small number of actors can 
provide better conditions to propel the need for international cooperation. If the numbers of 
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States involved in an issue area are few, negotiating mutually acceptable agreements and 
monitoring compliance with such agreements becomes easier. Therefore, cooperation may be 
easier when few States need to coordinate their policies to achieve outcomes.  
Thirdly, the presence of a future goal to pursue is one that encourages international cooperation. 
To the extent that States perceive future benefits relative to immediate gains, the more they will 
be willing to cooperate within a given issue area. A State that is mindful of the future will forgo 
present benefits in order to gain future benefits from cooperation.  
Lastly, Game theory also provides a justification for the need for international cooperation. The 
most commonly drawn preliminary distinction in game theory is that between a zero-sum game 
where one party wins at the expense of the other party, and a positive sum game whereby all 
participants are winners. Game theorists have justified the need for cooperation by emphasizing 
that the outcome of cooperation is a positive sum game as against a zero sum game. The ‘Stag 
Hunt’ model presented by Jean Jacques Rousseau, where the stag is most likely to be captured if 
all the participants in the chase work as a team in pursuit of their common goal, is often used as a 
good example for the need for cooperation in game theory. While this influential argument 
within the literature accounts for the conditions under which States may cooperate in a given 
issue area, the theory of cooperation tells little about the institutional incentives that may be at 
play in influencing decisions of various organs in an institution that is functionally differentiated 
in the decision-making process, and therefore fails to account for why rational actors may 
delegate to a decision-making apparatus to govern an issue of concern in their interactions.  
 
2.3. Institutionalized Cooperation and Collective Decision-Making 
This failure in theory leads to a theoretical interrogation of the reasons why States or actors need 
an institutionalized apparatus for collective-decision-making to govern an issue area of common 
interest in international relations. This research argues that such actors are forced by the 
problems of conducting ad hoc negotiations to establish an institution capable of adopting 
collectively accepted decisions where they have a common interest in a particular issue area 
(Gehring and Dorsch 2010). The consequence is for actors to accept the constraints duly imposed 
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by the framework of the institution in respect of decision rules, norms and the practicing 
procedures.  This to a large extent may create a situation where actors do not need to routinely 
look into the possibility of negotiating possible solution to recurrent problems. In an attempt to 
reduce cost and time in negotiating for a common position at every stage of the decision process, 
it may be prudent for actors to appeal to institutionally ascribed values for the proper functioning 
of a system.  Institutions to a large extent reduce certain types of uncertainties and transactional 
costs. According to Keohane (1984), even in the absence of hierarchical authority and power, 
institutions provide information and stabilize expectations among actors. This institutional 
context to a large degree shapes the transactional and informational flow, as institutions also 
make enforcement of rules feasible, especially at the decentralized level of policy 
implementation.     
Thus, international organizations are undoubtedly important to understanding the emergence of 
cooperation among actors in international relations. Cooperation however may conceivably 
emerge among actors without any collective-decision-making apparatus. As illustrated by 
Axelrod (1984), cooperation can evolve from repeated interactions among a group of actors. In a 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma situation a strategy of punishing defection and positively rewarding 
cooperation may induce actors to turn to cooperation and refrain from free riding.   
A distinction between the processes through which institutions emerge could be useful to 
elucidate the fundamental functions of international organizations. Young (1983) differentiates 
between institutions that emerge spontaneously and those that arise as a result of a negotiated 
outcome to handle a particular issue area in international affairs. Whatever the process through 
which a particular institution emerges, it is likely to install technical cooperative arrangements 
that direct the activities and behavior of relevant actors. Whether institutions emerge 
spontaneously or are purposively established, they consist of social norms, in the form of 
institutionalized normative expectations that indicate an accepted socially desired behavior 
(Gehring and Dorsch 2010). Though this assertion is viable, it is nevertheless problematic 
because it hardly defines or takes into account the level or extent of cooperation achieved in a 
particular institutional arrangement. It retains some usefulness as a thorough account of the 
process of institutionalization which might serve a useful category in explaining relevant 
institutional developments within an area of cooperation.  
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It has long been observed that rules regulating human action can systematically evolve without 
conscious human design, and may even have the potential to maintain themselves without any 
formal machinery for enforcing such rules (Sugden 1989). Spontaneously emerging patterns may 
then reinforce their efficacy through interactions among participants in a given accepted situation 
where actors accept conventions and do not appeal to a higher authority for enforcement. The 
conceptual problem with this spontaneity is that rationality always assumes a well-informed 
position on the part of actors in any given issue under consideration, and the utility function of 
any such structure, which is absent in a spontaneous arrangement, is always promoted in a cost 
benefit analysis output. The rational choice theorist may still ask why an experience of this 
nature may be relevant to arriving at a convergence even when the actors involved have not 
communicated sufficiently to arrive at the most common rule to guide their behavior. Schelling’s 
theory of prominence, sometimes called the idea of a ‘focal point’, may be useful to explain such 
rationality. As has been argued by Sugden (1989) cooperation can arise spontaneously in the 
form of accepted conventions in human affairs. These patterns of behavior tend to be self-
perpetuating and replicate themselves in social norms that are practiced over time. The norms or 
rules need not be the result of any process of collective choice, but emerge directly from 
interactions among relevant and qualified participants in the subject matter in question. However, 
the emergence of any spontaneous institution may not prove to be appropriate to govern an issue 
area where the pay-off structure assigns high benefits to defectors and high costs to cooperators.  
Spontaneously emerged institutions are therefore not seen as suitable for complex multilateral 
settings, and become hardly able to ensure a change in behavior among rational actors. 
Consequently, a group of actors, coordinating amongst themselves to achieve an improved sub-
optimal outcome through the establishment of an institution, need to acquire the capacity to 
adopt collectively binding decisions on the particularities of the arrangement, envisaged 
separately from the ongoing interactions to be governed by the future institution (Gehring 1994). 
Separate arenas of interactions are required in a coordinated collective policy making process. 
Where one sphere is fully dedicated to negotiating the process and procedures that should shape 
the decision-making system, another can be dedicated to taking action and implementing 
decisions. The separation of these functions allows actors to fully specialize in one arena and 
also relieves principals, especially in a Principal-Agent relationship, from interfering in the work 
of the agent and other actors who may be empowered to seek the welfare of all actors by making 
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the most problem-adequate decisions. While a spontaneously emerging cooperation system may 
not require collective decisions, a purposively negotiated institution may require the 
establishment of some preconditions even before any negotiation may take place.   
It is thus necessary for actors to adopt convergence criteria in making collective decisions if 
there are to overcome arbitrary decisions, when there is a desire to govern an issue area of 
importance to all relevant actors. The need to find an appropriate point to coordinate collective 
decisions will therefore force actors to accept the institutional constraints that are imposed on 
them, in the form of rules of procedures and norms as they emanate from their interactions. This 
may also force actors to delegate decision-making authority to sub-organs in the organization to 
ensure efficiency. Delegation of decision-making authority to sub-organs within an international 
organization creates a Principal-Agent constellation. The theoretical conundrum in any such 
relation remains in explaining why States may choose to delegate decision-making authority to 
any particular agent, and how best do principals monitor the activities of their assigned agents 
without jeopardizing the benefits of the delegation contract. The ensuing section looks at how 
this challenge is presented in the literature.  
 
2.4. Delegation and Principal-Agent Relations in International Institutions  
A principal-agent relationship arises when a principal contracts an agent to execute a task on 
their behalf. In performing the task, the agent chooses an action which has certain consequences, 
through an outcome that has the overall effect of affecting the welfare of both the principal and 
the agent (Petersen 1993, 277). The decision to delegate to an agent is mostly informed by the 
benefits that may accrue to the principal. Principal-Agent theory therefore assumes actors are 
rational and that cost-benefit calculations inform their decision to delegate a task to agents. 
Actors in a given issue area may therefore be more willing to delegate substantial tasks to agents, 
if the outcome of delegation will result in more benefit than cost to themselves. 
In Hawkins’ conceptualization of delegation, States acting as principals, in most cases, grant 
conditional authority to agents to enable the agent to act on their behalf (Hawkins 2006). The 
principal, in empowering the agent, puts in place measures to control the autonomy and level of 
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discretion that may be entrusted to an agent. The overarching question that arises in Principal-
Agent theory is why States delegate or empower agents with decision-making authority and how 
can principals ensure that agents are properly kept in check to perform the task for which they 
have been chosen.  
The existing literature, inspired largely by Hawkins (2006), Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), 
Alter (2008) and Majone (2001), suggests a cost-benefit analysis can explain fundamental 
considerations by States to delegate decision-making authority to agents. The reason for which 
States may delegate to agents in this perspective is when the benefits of delegating outweigh the 
costs. This analysis is premised on the principle of the division of labor between principal and 
agent, and recognizes the accrued gains from specialization (Hawkins 2006, 13). Incentives to 
delegate to international organizations are seen as rationally oriented and, other things being 
equal, as the benefits of delegation increase, principals become willing to delegate decision-
making authority to agents.  
The gains in these situations of delegation, however, interact with other benefits that might be as 
a result of delegation. Hawkins identifies the heterogeneity of preferences that different States 
display, and the power balances that exist between them, as mitigating factors that can interact 
with the benefits of delegation to affect the decision to delegate to an international organization. 
He argues that, though benefits may motivate States to delegate, they do not determine the 
outcome, and proposes that the preferences and power capabilities of States to a large extent 
shape and affect their likelihood of granting a conditional authority to international 
organizations. In the first place, all States do not share the same policy preferences, and are 
likely to have different strategies for achieving them. In situations where States have to 
overcome collective decision dilemmas, the decision to delegate will need to be preceded by a 
resolution of the policy conflicts of States. The level and degree of preference heterogeneity 
among a group of States deciding to cooperate in a given issue area is likely to affect the 
willingness of States to delegate to an international organization. Nielson and Tierney (2003) and 
Lyne, Nielson and Tierney (2006) postulate that the more dissimilar the preferences of States in a 
given policy area, the less likely States will be willing to revise an already existing delegation 
relationship. Greater preference heterogeneity within a group of States will be likely to lead 
some members to prefer the maintenance of the status quo in a delegation relationship rather than 
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revising the relationship to produce a policy change. States almost always weigh their capacity 
and ability to act alone. Realization of their goals vis-à-vis action through international 
organizations raises concerns of power, policy preferences and institutional rules which will 
always interact to influence the delegation outcome (Hawkins 2006). 
The need to delegate is however framed in a context influenced by the prospect of reaping the 
gains of specialization. Principals may decide to delegate to specialized agents with expertise and 
the resources to perform a particular task. Where gains from specialization are greater, Hawkins 
argues there will be greater incentives to delegate and principals may be willing to face greater 
agency losses so as to capture the gains from specialization. The benefits from specialization are 
likely to be profuse in instances where the tasks to be performed are repetitive and requires 
expert knowledge (Hawkins 2006). Tasks that do not require recurring decision situations and 
are performed singly are not likely to generate such a need for delegation. The principal may 
decide to incur the opportunity cost of having to perform the task themselves in preference to the 
cost that will be incurred in creating and putting in place control measures for an agent. It 
follows, then, that tasks that depend on highly skilled and expert interventions will yield greater 
benefits if they are delegated.   
Delegation for the purpose of benefiting from specialization can be seen in most international 
organizations where expertise is needed in the day-to-day activities. Organizations such as the 
International Criminal Court and the International Monetary Fund perform tasks that are of a 
specialized nature, and delegations to such institutions are intended to take advantage of their 
huge expert knowledge and skills that abound in those institutions. The African Peer Review 
Mechanism, to a large extent, also relies on expert bodies at each stage of the peer review 
process to benefit from the specialized knowledge of such institutions. At the national level, 
research institutions with expertise in the key areas of political and democratic governance, 
economic governance, cooperate governance and socio-economic development are normally 
each delegated the task of oversight in a particular area of focus. This produces expert 
recommendations of the current state of affairs as it pertains to each country under review. 
Specialization also gives States the opportunity to take advantage of services that they are unable 
to provide as a result of a lack of expertise and the resources to make policy on their own 
(Hawkins 2006: 15).  
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States may also choose to delegate to an international organization in order to mitigate large 
policy externalities (Milner 1997, Lake 1999). These are problem areas concerning policy, which 
may occur as unintended consequences which arise in their practical application, and negating 
the fact that principals generally benefit from cooperation. The solution to these externalities is 
enhanced by delegating to an agent who can insist on the general application of rules in all 
eventualities. Where externalities appear to be large, States are more likely to engage in mutually 
coordinated action (Hawkins 2006). Policy externalities may well arise under the conditions 
where there may be dilemmas of coordination and collaboration between States. In situations of 
coordination dilemma, agents act as a conduit to overcome mutually distasteful outcomes by 
enhancing the confidence of actors to settle on a mutually desired outcome. Lake and 
McCubbins (2006) point out the need to delegate to agents to monitor the behavior of States and 
provide information about various policy options, since cooperation may fail due to 
informational problems. In situations of coordination dilemmas, delegating to a neutral third 
party with wide margins of discretion could help in reducing transaction cost as agents can assess 
‘alternatives on more technical’ or other ‘social welfare criteria’ (Hawkins 2006).  
With collaboration problems between States, any equilibrium outcome is suboptimal, and needs 
to be addressed to progress. To realize a mutual outcome and gain from cooperation in such 
circumstances, States must bind themselves to act against their usual tendencies. As noted above, 
States will naturally have an incentive to defect from cooperation in the medium to short term, as 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This can be seen in the provision of public goods, which is a 
constant factor in providing a major category of collaboration problems. The main problem has 
to do with free riders, who know that they are able to benefit from a particular public good 
whether they contribute to it or not. In such dilemmas, principals may benefit from delegation by 
granting conditional authority to an international organization to make such public goods 
available to all at a cost. Alternatively States could pool individual resources together to provide 
the public good, and then create an agent to monitor individual contributions by collecting 
information on each member (Abbot and Snidal 1998). The APRM serves as a good example of 
this, as, among African States, the APR Panel monitors the performance of each member State 
on key issues of governance.  
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 In addition, States may also delegate agenda-setting authority to an international organization 
when the problems of collective decision-making arise. In many situations States have divergent 
preferences which make it difficult to agree on policies, and create divergence in priorities, 
which can be reflected in separate demands over agenda-setting. The literature suggests 
delegating powers to an agenda-setting agent to induce stability. It is, however, certainly not a 
given that merely delegating agenda setting to an agent will be a foolproof method of 
overcoming this collective dilemma, as the very selection of an institution to set the agenda may 
in itself be subject to such divergence.  
States may delegate authority to agents to provide help in the specific resolution of clear disputes 
as they arise in their international interactions. As a result of an increase in international 
interactions among States there has been an increasing use of third parties to resolve disputes, 
securing the social benefits of cooperation using agents of arbitration. In a situation where an 
agent serves as the arbiter in the dispute, the delegation contract is designed to grant a great deal 
of independence to the agent, since principals themselves have accepted the fact that they cannot 
come to a mutual resolution. Alter (2008) suggests that principals, in agreeing that the functions 
of a dispute settlement be referred to an arbitrating agent, may create and empower agents who 
are seen to be impartial with a high degree of autonomy. However, those agents will almost 
always be constrained by some decision-making criteria which have been designed by their 
principals.   
A theoretical question that arises in almost every situation of delegation is whether, and how, 
principals may motivate agents to act on their behalf to minimize negative effects upon the 
agency. Principal-Agent models typically assume that agents may have dissimilar interests to 
that of their principals, and for mutual exchange to be possible, a proposal may be adopted where 
the principal designs a contract that will align the interests of the principal and the agent (Huber 
2000, 6). Some typical hierarchical control measures, suggested in the literature, include cutting 
budgets, re-contracting agents, using ‘fire- alarms’ or ‘police patrols’, and screening. In most 
instances these tools of hierarchical controls are counter-productive when the purpose of 
delegation is to demonstrate a credible commitment by the State to long-term collective policy 
objectives. The logic of delegation, in a case where principals need to demonstrate to third 
parties their commitment, is to select an agent whose preferences are different from that of the 
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principal. Re-contracting tools are thus not suitable in those situations where the purpose of 
delegation is to enhance the credible commitment of the principal.  
Principal-Agent theory generally suggests that the principal is conferred with exclusive 
privileges and hierarchical sources of leverage over the agent (Alter 2008) because the principal 
has the power to appoint, rewrite the contract, fire or cut the budget of the agent. Although 
hidden actions and information are central to the problem of any delegation, employing strict 
hierarchical control measures on independent agents, where the aim of delegation is to enhance a 
credible commitment, may be counter-productive. 
A crucial insight of credible commitment theory is that the reason that actors have great 
difficulty cooperating on a common solution in their mutual relationship is because they are 
mostly unable to commit themselves credibly in advance to act in agreed or specified ways. This 
proposal is predicated on the assumption that a credible commitment to institutional 
arrangements makes it unattractive or costly for States to renege on promises, and therefore ties 
the hands of principals to certain policy objectives. This is most appropriately achieved through 
an act of delegation of decision-making authority to an agent which States have little control 
over.  
There are a number of reasons why an actor’s promise to behave cooperatively in a given 
situation might not be believed by other actors. The problem of cynical commitments, and of 
time-inconsistent preferences are among the strongest reasons why an actor’s promise to 
cooperate in a joint issue area might not be believed by other participants. Where cynical 
commitments are made by actors, they are made with no intention of living up to the promises 
made. Inevitably this leads to negative perceptions which have a tendency to make cooperation 
among actors difficult. A time inconsistency problem arises where an actor may genuinely 
promise to cooperate in the present, but in the future may see it as rational and beneficial to 
renege opportunistically. According to Majone (2001) time inconsistency occurs when the 
optimal long-run policy of a government differs from its optimal short-run policy, creating a 
situation where, in the short term, actors have incentives to renege on their long term 
commitments. Kydland and Prescott (1977) argue in favour of rules which increase the 
possibility of policy credibility in opposing the discretion which can lead to time inconsistency. 
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Without binding rules holding actors to the long term policy commitments, rational actors may 
be free to use their discretion to switch to actions that may appear in the short run to be 
beneficial, though opposed to their long term goal. Where promises and agreements among 
actors cannot be enforced as a result of the institutional arrangements in place, actors will find it 
difficult to convince each other that they can willingly behave in a way that seems costly in the 
short term, even if doing so will promise benefits to all actors concerned (Simmons 2008).  
To ensure that actors who are willing to commit to a particular course gain the possible long term 
benefits at hand, the theory of credible commitment emphasizes the need to raise the cost of 
defection ex-post (Simmons2008). In economic transactions, this will always amount to a case of 
surrendering some form of bond entrusted to a third party. The viable alternative is to delegate or 
empower an independent agent to make and carry out policy decisions on behalf of the principal, 
which, effectively, removes the decisions from the challenges to credibility that may exist if 
actors are to think of their short term interest.  
For this reason, Fearon (1997) has defined ‘audience costs’ as a set of political costs that a 
government risks facing if it reneges on a commitment. Since it is impossible for any sovereign 
body to completely tie the hands of another actor to a particular commitment, this strategy makes 
efforts to raise the political cost of defection so as to make it unattractive for actors to renege on 
their commitments. Audience costs are defined as those emanating from the negative reactions of 
a particular group, leading it to inflict costs on actors who renege on their commitment 
(Simmons 2008). For example, the withdrawal of aid or economic cooperation by third parties 
might well force African States to follow through with their commitment to policies of good 
governance, notwithstanding the fact that this could have highly negative consequences for all 
concerned in the long term. Rational States make their commitments more credible by raising the 
anticipated audience cost associated with their defection. This idea of tying their hands, inferred 
in the attempt to raise audience costs, is in itself a costly option to reinforce the credibility of a 
commitment being showed by an actor. When an actor typically accepts the tying of their hands 
when making a credible commitment, it shows a manifest willingness of the actor to forgo 
certain policy competences. In most cases making a commitment involves a sovereign cost, by 
giving up decision-making authority to an agent. The sovereign cost, relative to the gains and 
benefits that are likely to result, may determine the degree of credibility commitment and tying 
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of hands pertinent to a particular issue area. Where the benefits exceed the sovereign cost, a state 
is more likely to rationally commit by hand-tying.   
 
2.5. The Logic of Delegating to Trustee-Agents as a Solution to the Credible Commitment 
Problem  
Delegation to independent agents raises the problem of accountability in international institutions 
(Grant and Keohane 2005). The issue of accountability manifests itself whenever member States 
establish an institution to perform a particular function on their behalf. Control arrangements are 
intended to curtail the discretion and autonomy of the power-wielding agent (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003), and to also avoid the negative consequences of dysfunctional behaviours that 
Barnett and Finnemore (2004) refer to as cooperation pathologies. Therefore, independent agents 
are established as a response to the cooperation problems faced by principals, and to also help 
enhance the credible commitment of member States towards long-term policy objectives. Their 
establishment is a tacit response to the tendency of their principals to behave opportunistically in 
specific decision situations. Accountability mechanisms, in this situation, need to be well 
measured to make sure that agents can be made accountable for their decisions, without severing 
or jeopardizing their proper functioning (Gehring and Plocher 2009). Monitoring tools and re-
contracting threats (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1993), as suggested in the standard Principal-Agent 
literature, undermine the ability of independent agents to properly perform their functions 
without the reintroduction of the specific interest of the principals.  
A fundamental requirement for any well-designed accountability mechanism in principal-trustee 
agent relations is a clear definition of the decision criteria to act as a point of reference for all 
actors (Gehring and Plocher 2009). Decision criteria form the basis on which the long term 
interests of the principal are defined, and serve as the reference against which the actions of the 
empowered agent can be assessed. Without a set of substantive decision criteria, the trustee-
agent will lack guidance on how to proceed in taking decision when confronted with a variety of 
situations. The presence of substantive decision criteria may then facilitate the transformation of 
interactions among actors into a discourse, where the actors argue about validity claims in the 
application of those criteria (Krapohl 2004). Binding rules create an important ex ante 
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accountability mechanism (Huber 2000) and commit all other actors involved to the same sets of 
standards. The establishment of substantive decision criteria also diminishes the tendency of 
principals to seek their short term parochial interest, and helps in preserving the autonomy of the 
agent in case a conflict arises.  
Substantive decision criteria in any delegation relationship mostly emerge from negotiations 
among States cooperating in a given issue area. This may have the potential of introducing the 
parochial interest of member States but, as has been argued, the division of labour between 
principals and their trustee agents, which is then established, limits the space for power-based 
manoeuvering among the principals (Gehring and Plocher 2009). The internal arrangements in a 
division of labor will help commit the agent to the existing decision criteria and also decrease the 
degree of arbitrary decisions. In most cases of delegated decision-making in international 
organizations, the practice is always to assign to a committee rather than to individuals. This 
leads to a situation of committee governance where members are faced with a stream of parallel 
decisions of relatively limited scope (Gehring and Plocher 2009).  Committee decision-making 
will become jeopardised if any member tries to seek the parochial interest of any actor or 
constituency, and this can ultimately affect the cooperation project altogether.  To hedge against 
the consequences of intergovernmental negotiations that might not lead to the general good of all 
actors, especially because of the distributive interest of the negotiating actors, rational actors may 
delegate decision-making to an agent to limit the room for pursuing pure preference aggregation. 
In specific cases, if actors genuinely want to prevent a situation where they have an influence on 
decisions, they can craft general rules that promise consistent application across all situations of 
decision-making. Actors will then be obliged to search for the common good instead of their own 
preferences.  
In addition to ensuring that trustee agents are guided by external decision criteria, trustee agents 
can be made accountable through a number of interrelated measures, which need to work in 
tandem with other incentives, to ensure that agents produce decisions that represent the long term 
interest of the principals, against the background of the externally given decision criteria. The 
accountability arrangements embedded in the design of this arrangement must ensure both the 
autonomy of the trustee agent and the denial of any unnecessary interference of the principal in 
specific decision situations. As much as possible the design must limit the agent’s ability to 
 53 
 
deviate from the agreed decision criteria provided by the principal. The requirement of 
accountability from the agent will help in ensuring that agents take decisions that are well 
reasoned and fulfill the long term interests of the principals. According to Gehring and Krapohl 
accountability measures may necessitate specific forms of divided labor that split decision-
making functions among several actors, and, in such a functional differentiated system, 
institutional structures are made available to keep each actor in check in order to produce reason 
adequate decisions (Gehring and Krapohl 2007).  
Furthermore, trustee agents could be held externally accountable by the public for their decisions 
at each stage of the decision-making process. Interested actors, including civil society groups and 
non-governmental organizations, can be given the opportunity to actively participate in decision-
making procedures. This creates the opportunity for them to intervene with information to shape 
the quality of decisions. The involvement of the public who are then placed in the position of 
observing and validating decisions may well have the positive effect of contributing to increasing 
the cost of having to adopt decisions that are not convincing.  
Decisions and recommendations made by trustee agents could also be published and deposited in 
regional parliaments and courts. Making such decisions available in regional institutions will 
give an incentive to empowered agents to give their sole consideration to delivering decisions 
that are reason adequate. Knowing that decisions will be published, and that the general public 
and interested partners will have access to the decisions arrived at, will in all likelihood limit 
attempts to put forward obviously problematic decisions in given situations.   
Lastly, principals can always revoke the decision-making authority of the agent. Though the 
principals would have re-contracting tools at their disposal, this should be used sparingly and as 
a last resort. Using re-contracting powers drastically affects the proper functioning of the trustee 
agent, since the underlying rationale for delegating decision-making authority to the trustee is to 
keep the principal away from interfering in day-to-day decisions. Thus the range of control 
measures discussed above can be seen as interrelated and working together to reduce the 
tendency of both the principal and the trustee agent from abusing their authority.  
In the next section of the dissertation, the concept of functional differentiation is elucidated, 
supporting the proposition that functional differentiation in a decision process provides 
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institutional incentives to close down the opportunities for power-based decisions and to reorient 
actors towards decisions that are based on the validity or merit of the arguments advance by 
actors in the decision-making process.  
 
2.6. Functional Differentiation and the Promise of Merit-Based Decision-Making 
Functional differentiation, unlike Principal-Agent theory, is not concerned with hierarchical 
control. It is preoccupied with the operations of a functionally differentiated system. In this 
regard, a functionally differentiated system has to do with separation of powers between sub-
systems in an organizational environment. Drawing on social systems theory by Luhmann 
(1984), Gehring observes that a social system emerges out of communication between actors in a 
social environment to form an entirely new entity (Gehring 2004: 683). Within its 
communication system, this body has its own boundaries and divides itself to form its own 
internal operations according to the attention it accords actors and other aspects of its 
environment. A defining feature of this engineering is the establishment of boundaries between 
different sub-systems.  As a consequence, the emergence of a new system is separated from its 
environment by the existence of boundaries which delineate each sub-system from the other and 
shows where the responsibility of each terminates. However, the survival and efficiency of the 
system to some degree depends on the ability to extract information across boundaries within its 
environment. In this respect, information extracted from the environment is processed for the 
purposes of enhancing the functioning of its internal programs.  
A social system therefore reduces complexity in its environment by functioning as a selector in 
the environment in which it operates, defining itself as the arbiter of any form of complexity 
(Gehring 2003: 94). In this light, it is almost impossible to preconceive the spectrum of issues 
and the variety of actors to include in discussions prior to the emergence of a system. The ability 
of the system to demonstrate a high sense of selectivity can contribute to its relevance. By 
focusing widely on many aspects of its outside world, the system creates an opportunity to have 
control over many important issues, as opposed to being overly selective and ignoring important 
functions that require attention. However, too wide a focus on the outside world limits the ability 
of the social systems to process the information that is important to its own operations.  
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In the context of social systems theory, an organization can augment its efficiency through the 
formation of sub-systems that specialize in the execution of specific tasks. Each sub-system thus 
specializes in a domain of functions relevant to the larger social system, with each sub-system 
focusing on a different task and therefore fulfilling functions that are complementary to each 
other (Gehring 2004: 683; Gehring 2003: 94). As a result, each sub-system operates in the 
context that is akin to a firm organized on the basis of a division of labour. From a functional 
perspective, as put forward by Gehring (2004), each stage of the differentiated decision process 
attains equity in the performance of their assign tasks, and none is recognized as being more 
important than another in the production process. The fundamental essence of a differentiated 
decision processes is that it delivers the promise of efficient performance in the entire decision 
system. Therefore, as a result of its sub-systems, a complex governance structure has the 
capacity to respond to many aspects of a decision process, contrasted to an unresponsive system 
that has no sub-bodies. Just as in the case of a firm organized on the principles of a division of 
labour, functional differentiation in a decision process may increase the rate of productivity and 
enhance the quality and output of the decision-making process for efficiency gains. 
Gehring (2004: 683-684) draws attention to three aspects of a functionally differentiated decision 
process, informed by analytic perspectives based on systems theory. Firstly, the idea of the 
existence of boundaries between sub-systems in a social system is crucial to the concept of 
functional differentiation. The presence of boundaries between sub-units in the governance 
structure of a decision system can reinforce the organizational independence of the various sub-
systems operating within the larger decision-making process. A boundary between sub-units in 
the larger decision system gives an indication of where the functions of each unit end. It is that 
very clear delineation of the functional roles that are assigned to various units in the decision-
making process which identifies the actors whose participation in the negotiation process matters 
for the emergence of the system. In this way boundaries help divide the world into its internal 
operations, and define the relevant actors and any other factor that is of essence to its 
environment.   
Secondly, a complete separation of functional roles between a rule making body and another 
body charged with the implementation of rules can change the rationale of actors when seeking 
the most problem-adequate solutions to issues (Gehring and Kerler 2008).  In the event of a clear 
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separation of functions between sub-systems in a decision process, each component of the 
decision apparatus concentrates on its assigned task to foster specialization. This can lead to 
better performance among the various sub-systems in the decision system if every unit in the 
decision process operates exclusively according to its rationale (Gehring 2004: 684).  
Finally, the mechanisms through which the operations of autonomous sub-systems in a decision 
process are integrated into a meaningful whole is important for a functionally differentiated 
decision system (Gehring 2004: 684). If various sub-systems are not integrated by hierarchical 
control measures, each sub-system operates by way of its defined roles. In a sense, the 
operational autonomy of each unit in the decision process is thereby respected, and furthers the 
opportunity for each to be concerned with its assigned task in the decision-making process. 
These aspects of a differentiated decision process indicate a situation where autonomy and non-
hierarchical relations exist between sub-systems in a decision process, and suggest how this 
institutional arrangement can contribute to encourage rational actors away from pursuing their 
self-interests. The conceptual core of a differentiated decision-making process is therefore a 
distinction between the separation of rule-making functions and rule application in the 
governance structure of a decision process, and this is relevant to a situation where decision-
making authority is bequeathed to independent agents.   
In the ensuing sections, this dissertation demonstrates how institutionalized arrangements that 
divide labour among decision makers in a decision-making process can create incentives for the 
actors involved to deliberately arrive at merit-based decisions. Institutional arrangements 
premised on the principles of a division of labour have a functional rationale. In international 
organization like the African Peer Review Mechanism, such arrangements assign essential 
functions to the powerful political actors, for example in the APR Forum of Heads of 
Participating States, while at the same time drawing on specialized expertise from stakeholders, 
institutions, civil society groups and the general public for effective and efficient decision-
making. In this way, the institutional arrangements in the resulting division of labour can prevent 
actors involved in the decision-making process from pursuing their parochial self-interest. As 
argued by Gehring and Kerler, decision-making processes, characterized by the separation of 
functions to different bodies, mobilize a form of democratic legitimacy that originates from the 
involvement of broad active stakeholders and the public, allied to the technocratic legitimacy that 
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emanates from expert deliberations (Gehring and Kerler 2008: 1003). The influences of expertise 
and technocratic legitimacy thus serve as a potent force to marshal resources for the production 
of problem-adequate decisions in institutions characterized by a separation of decision functions.  
 
2.7. The Need for the Separation of the Functions of Rule-Making and Rule Application in 
a Decision Process 
A decision-making process which is characterized by a systemic separation of legislative 
functions and the application of rules by different bodies operates in the light of a functionally 
differentiated decision system. The separation of specific decision functions among actors in 
such a decision process may systematically deprive actors of the opportunity to influence the 
decision-making process through bargaining (Gehring and Kerler 2008: 1006). As a result, the 
rule making functions usually tend to deal with enacting general rules designed to serve the long 
term purpose of the decision process, and are meant to be applicable to several other possible 
cases (Gehring 2004: 685). Often legally binding rules that emanate from a rule-making body are 
susceptible to amendments at any point in time, if this is deemed as appropriate in the operations 
of the decision-making process. Actors working in the arena of enacting general rules for their 
application to specific situations mostly execute their responsibilities within the competences 
bequeathed to them through the institutional set up. In most cases the activities of actors, making 
rules for the operation of the decision apparatus, are limited to providing generally applicable 
rules that are deemed detailed enough to serve as points of reference in a wider range of 
situations fostered by novel or unknown cases. This task, in some institutions, is carried by actors 
who may be deemed as the political arm of the organization.   
In contrast to the rule-making functions, an executive arm may be established to take over the 
tasks of decision-making, based on the rules enacted by the legislative body in charge of rule-
making. By assigning executive functions to a sub-system in the decision-making process, the 
agency performing the executive functions can specialize in case-by-case decision-making on the 
various issue areas of concern to the decision-making process. The agency responsible for 
applying rules to case specific situations may be entrusted with wide discretionary powers that 
allow it to interpret those general rules, where there is ambiguity in the meaning of specific 
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situations. The agency may also be granted the authority to independently institute investigative 
procedures in situations where it suspects inappropriate behaviour by participating actors in the 
issue areas of interests in the decision-making process. In some decision-making processes, 
interested actors may trigger the decision-making process (Gehring 2004: 686) by making a 
formal complaint to the executive body responsible for making decisions. In this way the agency 
responsible for making decisions may respond to externally driven incentives to make decisions 
that are in the best interest of the objectives of the issues under consideration.  
A fundamental question that arises, in a decision process with detailed separation of rule-making 
functions and the application of rules to specific decision situations, is how the decision-making 
chamber of the decision process may gain relevance to all actors in the process. If the general 
rules set by the legislative rule-making body are incomplete or require elaboration or 
interpretation, then the decision-making sub-system can set a precedent in deciding cases which 
eventually create further rules for the decisions making process (Gehring 2004: 686). In any case 
the precedent that might be set through the interpretation of cases must be synchronised with the 
original general rules that have been agreed upon as the reference point for collective decision-
making for all actors.   
If the operations of a decision system clearly delineate functions between various sub-systems, 
and each specializes in case-by-case decisions, then political actors can be deprived of the 
opportunity of introducing conflicts at the decision-making level of the process through 
systematic institutionalized mechanisms. By so doing, such a decision system may be 
characterized by the fact that, in no specific situation, can the decision process be held to ransom 
by either the rule-making sub-system or the rule application body. In this regard, functional 
differentiation can create institutionalized opportunity structures that systematically guide actors 
towards deliberation, while discouraging power-based decision-making or bargaining (Gehring 
and Kerler 2008: 1002). Even in more complex decision bodies like the European Union, it has 
been observed that institutionalized decision-making processes, designed to allow ample 
communication between actors, can systematically induce actors to deliberate and produce more 
reasonable decision outcomes than traditional bargaining schemes (Gehring 2003: 57; Joerges 
and Neyer 1997; Joerges 2006; Eriksenand Fossum 2002).  
 59 
 
An important first order theoretical question, with some contradictory implications, is raised 
within this perspective by enquiring exactly why a rule-making function separates a decision-
making function in the design of a decision process. To answer this question, it is instructive to 
systematically analyze the situation that can give rise to the delegation of the decision-making 
authority to an agency that is expected to be independent in its activities in a decision process. To 
explore this question theoretically we follow the path indicated by Gehring (2004: 687) to find a 
plausible method to find the conditions where it makes sense for a rule-making body within a 
decision process to refrain from adopting case specific decisions on the implementation of policy 
issues and rather delegate the task to a body clad in the cloak of independence. Following a 
rational argument, it has been observed that actors will be motivated to delegate this way if it is 
anticipated that subsequent interventions in decision-making might counteract their interests in 
the near future (Gehring 2004: 687). If we accept received knowledge of the cost-benefit 
calculation behind such a decision that is made by principals in order to delegate some sort of 
decision-making authority to an agent, then this reason for choosing to delegate does make sense 
to actors who we assume to be rational in their motives. This is so because principals will mostly 
weigh the potential benefits that might accrue for any decision to delegate powers to an agent to 
make decisions on their behalf.  Such benefits must be anticipated to outweigh the potential costs 
that are inherent in delegating such authority to an agent.   
However, this analysis needs to recognize that there are instances where the long term interests 
of an actor might contradict their short term interests in a given situation. In such a conflicting 
scenario, the actor’s order of preferences are said to be inconsistent (Keech 1995: 38), as a 
situation specific interest can override their long term interests. A common example, often used 
to illustrate this point, is the case of a government that is faced with the difficult situation of 
hostage taking. To all intents and purposes, it will be in the long term interests of a State to 
develop a reputation for not negotiating with any taker of hostages in such a situation, so as to 
eliminate the incentives of further crimes by others. The dilemma imposed by such a stance, 
though, is the distinct possibility to loss the life of those taken hostage at that particular point in 
time. As a result, a government may well opt to negotiate with hostage takers, within a particular 
real-life scenario, with the purpose of saving the lives of citizens involved, even though it well 
knows the negative implications of emboldening criminals. This kind of situation presents the 
theorist with a classical time inconsistent problem, in which, as a result of the inconsistent order 
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of preferences, an actor may pursue a short term interest at the detriment of long term 
preferences. In a decision situation where the problem at hand has to do with overcoming 
problems of this nature, actors are clearly faced with the conundrum of balancing the tendency to 
forgo their long term interests for short term ones.   
For a very good reason, the problem of the order of inconsistent preferences over time is relevant 
to the study of any decision-making processes that are faced with dilemmas of this nature. The 
conundrum appears equally tricky in situations where the issue areas of cooperation have to do 
with policies of governments that might have a positive impact on public welfare. It is generally 
acknowledged that it is difficult for most in democratic governments to implement policies that 
have an overwhelming impact on the welfare of their citizens, because elected governments have 
incentives to calculate in respect of seeking reelection. With a short term time horizon (Shepsle 
1992: 251), elected politicians may look at the possibility of increasing their reelection prospects 
in an election period with handouts to the members of the electorate. This may be the case 
because; at that moment their preoccupation is to be elected into office. As a consequence, they 
are inclined to ignore the future dangers that accrue from expensive reforms relative to the 
immediate costs. The problem is exacerbated where there exists a general interest in the issues of 
concern in a particular policy area, especially if it has to do with reforms in policy areas that are 
characterized by huge capital expenditure. If such reforms are carried out to the letter, there may 
exist the possibility of recognizable benefits to the private sector or to the general public. 
Although the stream of decisions that emanate from the decision process necessarily places 
demands on interested actors, it is still in their interest to prevent case specific intervention in the 
decision process by actors who might be pursuing their parochial interests to the detriment of the 
general benefits for the general public.  
However, the conundrum of inconsistent preferences that arises in such situations may diminish 
in time if the time horizon of the decision apparatus is mitigated by appropriate institutional 
arrangements (Gehring 2004: 688; Gehring 2003: 102). To ensure that the long term interests of 
actors are preserved, without the temptation of pursuing a case specific interest, some form of 
credible commitment will be required to insulate tendencies of pursing the short term interests or 
vice versa (Shepsle 1992: 115). A concrete theoretical approach to preserve the long term 
interests of actors entangled in the inconsistent preference dilemma, is for actors to sacrifice their 
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margin of choice in a case specific situation (Elster 2000: 65). In making this sacrifice, they then 
bind themselves to resisting the temptation of being ‘bewitched’ to intervene in concrete 
situations, somewhat in the manner of Ulysses requesting of his crew that they tie him up to face 
the enchantment of the Sirens. In most modern decision-making processes, there are viable 
means to prevent a palpable risk of intervention in the decision process through the use of an 
appropriate institutional restraint (Gehring 2004: 688; Gehring 2003). Any principal delegating 
the implementation of decisions to an actor who is not expected to behave like that principal, in 
that they do not have the temptation of intervening in case specific situations, will credibly bind 
themselves to avoid the ever present situation of the temptation to forgo their long term interests 
for a short term preference and vice versa. If the institutional restraint is endowed with authority 
to operate as an independent entity then the institutional basis for separation of decision-making 
between actors is set.  
To sum up, where delegation of the implementation of decisions to independent agents brings 
about the differentiation of a rule-making function and the application of decisions by another, 
then an institutional incentive becomes available for making decisions that are merit-based and 
not dependent of the power resources of actors involved in the decision process. In this respect, 
an appreciation of the nature of potentially clashing long-term interests and situation-specific 
interests of actors explains the reason for deciding to separate and assign different tasks to 
different bodies in a decision process. As a result, the separate tasks of making rules and 
implementing decisions require different institutional arrangements, and each must operate 
differently from the other with its own criteria and issues of competence. Therefore the 
separation of functions in decision process matters, for the very reason that it modifies the 
interaction among participating actors in a decision process (Gehring 2003: 96).  
These insights generate a number of empirical predictions and expectations that can be tested in 
respect of the governance structure of a decision-making process involving actors with different 
preferences. This dissertation makes the following empirical proposal: that it is expected that the 
more a differentiated decision system closes down opportunities for power-based decisions, the 
more it promotes merit-based decisions. 
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2.8. The Consequences of an Institutionalized Division of Labour of Rule-Making 
Functions and Decision Implementation Functions in a Decision Process  
I proceed with the assumption that the emergence of a governance system may institutionally 
assign separate functions of rule-making and the application of rules to decision to different 
bodies. I then make conjectures of how institutional arrangements, at both the rule-making level 
and the rule implementation stage can have implications for the behaviour of actors and the 
outcome of decisions in a complex decision-making process.  
If the institutional arrangement of a decision process is characterized by the preparation and 
adoption of general rules by a rule-making body and their application to case-specific situations, 
no matter how detailed the general operating rules might be, they will without doubt always 
remain incomplete (Williamson 1987). This leads to the likely situation that the general rules put 
forward may not cover all possible eventualities that may emerge in the process of decision-
making. The incomplete nature of the generally agreed rules therefore requires the 
implementation body to exercise discretion in interpreting the rules, in the light of specific 
situations where the general rules do not cover the issue under focus. As has been pointed out 
earlier, this will be done while paying close attention to the criteria set by the rule making body. 
In a decision-making process where political actions are limited to the adoption of general rules 
and standards, it may be extremely difficult to entertain individual parochial interests among any 
members involved in the decision-making process. This will be so because the making of general 
rules to serve as the basis for assessing unknown future case-specific situations makes it difficult 
to pursue individual interests (Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 29). The general logic here is that, 
in most decisions making processes, rules about the operations of the decision process are 
established before actors become aware of their individual case-specific parochial interests and 
preferences. At this stage of the process, political actors are concerned with abstract formulations 
that serve as a boundary for deciding future cases that fall within the remit of the defined criteria. 
It is therefore impossible at this stage for actors to become aware of their exact case-specific 
individual interests, as the purpose is to formulate general rules that might sustain the decision-
making system for a long period of time.  
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To put it differently, a deliberative decision process consists of two different stages of decision-
making. These include the elaboration of general criteria for decision-making, and then the 
application of these criteria in case-specific situations. If each of these tasks is performed at 
different levels by different bodies in the decision process it allows each forum to concentrate on 
its task and not become overstretched with other issues. The functional division of labour 
between various sub-systems in an institutional arrangement separates these two functions and 
may enable an expert committee to enhance efficiency gains and increase the potential for 
problem-adequate solutions. The stage of elaborating decision criteria may facilitate argument 
among rational actors if it tends to prevent actors from pursuing their interests. Elaborating 
criteria for decision-making is a general task, and does not easily lend to envisaging future 
specific cases that may arise. Unlike simple negotiation situations, the decision situation is 
different. Actors are generally forced to be consistent in respect of producing standards that can 
be implemented by a different body within the decision-making process. It becomes difficult 
therefore for actors to calculate their overall interest in all cases that may arise in the future. 
Under such conditions, rational actors have no other option than to transform their perceived 
future interest into coherent principles that serve as a yardstick against which all other future 
cases will be appraised.  
Since actors develop general criteria before becoming aware of their case-specific interest, they 
behave under a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 1971). Rational egoistic actors, under this 
Rawlsian veil, may formulate criteria which produce acceptable decisions in theory, 
notwithstanding the fact that there may arise unfortunate outcomes in practice in the distributive 
effects of their application. The mutual search for common criteria, and an analysis of the effects 
of the application of the different options available, is more a matter for deliberation than 
bargaining. As a consequence, even those who wish to maximize rational utility, by making 
general rules for the purpose of being applied to future unknown cases, will operate under the 
‘veil of ignorance’, not knowing exactly what their preferences might be in a yet unknown 
specific case. It is also clear that, even in situations where rational actors are able to anticipate 
what their interests might be in specific situations, they are forced to take a median position that 
is an aggregate of their overall interests (Gehring 2004: 690). In such a situation, political actors 
are pushed to adopt a consistent general interest that takes into consideration the effect of 
extreme situations.  
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When the decision environment only can enable actors to stipulate general rules, without much 
sense of what their anticipated case-specific preferences might be, Gehring suggests actors are 
forced to search for and formulate rules that have the promise of giving the best outcomes to all 
participating actors in the decision process (Gehring 2004: 690). In the same light, political 
actors who cannot anticipate their case-specific interests are forced to search for general rules 
that ensure effective implementation of the decisions at the application stage, irrespective of their 
unknown parochial interests (Tsebelis 1990: 117). The mechanism that might strengthen the 
convergence of actors on the continuum of full knowledge of their preferences or otherwise is 
the existence of an institutional arrangement that allows actors to search for the most appropriate 
general rules to guide the conduct of other bodies in the decision making process. The idea 
behind this is that, outside of the institutional arena where political actors have the opportunity to 
agree on what should serve as the baseline for all implementation decisions, there might not be 
any other institutional arena for such rule making activity.   
In a hypothetical decision situation where political actors, with anticipated case-specific 
interests, search for a median position, while actors, who may be unaware of their preferences, 
are involved in looking for the best rules to be applied to unknown future cases, those who wish 
to maximize rational utility are forced to engage in a discursive interaction based on the 
exchange of reasonable arguments (Elster 1998).  In such an environment, the general search for 
rules to govern an issue area of interest is expected to be characterized by the exchange of 
reasons rather than by power-based bargaining.  
According to Gehring (2003), the deliberations between actors to arrive at general rules 
approaches a Habermasian discourse (Habermas 1992), so that reasoning, rather than the power 
resources of actors, dominate and influence collective decision-making. Risse, for instance, 
claims that argument, as a form of social action, has an impact on world politics (Risse 2000). In 
his application of Habermas’ discourse theory, Risse points to three forms of communicative 
behaviour relevant to communicative action. The first is bargaining based on fixed preferences. 
The second is strategic argumentation, which utilizes arguments to justify positions held by 
actors and strives to persuade other actors to change their minds. The third he sees as true 
reasoning, where actors deliberate to seek a reasoned consensus on the basis of shared 
understanding. Actors, in such reasoned based deliberations, not only attempt to persuade but are 
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prepared to be persuaded by other actors with better and superior arguments. The last is 
recognized as the ideal form of communicative action by Habermas. According to Risse (2000), 
central to the theory of communicative action is the notion of an ‘ideal speech situation’, where 
discourse is based on openness and equality, and is devoid of coercion. The ultimate aim of 
discourse in a Habermasian sense is for mutual understanding, with the absence of power 
relationships or any external factors that affects the power of the better argument. 
Johnstone (2003) observes that distinguishing true reasoning from strategic argumentation in 
world politics is challenging since it is so difficult to determine in practice. A distinction between 
the two is analytically useful, but is not necessary, in order to support a case that deliberative 
discourse may take place in a functionally differentiated decision-making process. For actors to 
appear convincing and persuasive they are expected to justify their positions with reasons other 
than that of self-interest. Some scholars have posited that, in public settings, unbiased arguments 
and appeals to the collective interest succeed far better than self-serving and partial arguments 
(Elster 1995).  In this regard, it is observed that a view that maximizes rational utility, in some 
instances, may resort to the exchange and common appraisal of rational arguments to arrive at 
the most problem-adequate solution. According to Elster, public observation and involvement in 
the political decision process, through transparent and open settings of decision-making, may 
deprive actors of the opportunity to pursue their parochial interest openly.  
Elster offers five reasons why this may be so. Firstly, the belief that others are arguing from 
principle may make others more willing to back down. Secondly, impartial arguments may 
actually persuade rational actors. Thirdly, there appear to be social constraints against taking 
positions that do not meet the collective goal or have benefit for all participating actors. Fourthly 
he notes, when dealing with special interests, that public language can be used as a stratagem. 
Lastly, arguments grounded on principles rather than bargaining power may be useful in helping 
actors with different positions to agree on common criteria. A point worth noting is that 
arguments can be used hypocritically, but, even where that happens, the discourse may lead to a 
situation where there are concessions towards the general good. This may be so because, in an 
institutional environment where the main purpose of deliberations is aimed at handling specific 
policy problems of a state, arguments are not likely to correspond directly with self-interest, as 
actors may act form an awareness of how the national interest in furthered by other actors 
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through their engagements. Seeking partial and unjustified grounds may therefore be greeted 
with suspicion and may mean a specific argument has less chance to survive.  
In a situation where arguments arise over issues of self-interest, they are less likely to see the 
light of day if actors dilute their narrow self-interest and argue for the collective interest. If actors 
are expected to make arguments for the collective interest, and engage in paying lip service to 
shared principles and codes, or automatically to seeking the collective interest, circumstances 
force self-interested actors to moderate the rhetorical positions they take (Johnstone 2003). This 
can result in a situation which Risse refers to as argumentative self-entrapment (Risse 2000). 
Once actors accept the importance of a norm in their interactions, they argue about the 
interpretation and application of the norms or shared standards to a particular case at hand, and 
not the validity of the standards of behavior agreed upon. According to Risse this creates a 
discursive acknowledgement for critics or upholders of the norms of the common practices 
which may eventually induce governments to match their professed words with deeds. These 
altered behaviours are then the result of concessions to more superior arguments promoting the 
propriety of other policy options. 
In this case, therefore, whether actors are oriented towards strategic argumentation or the logic of 
true reasoning and mutual persuasion, any arguments based on agreed norms and standards may 
have an independent impact on the behavior of rational actors. Firstly, by this logic, impartial 
arguments may advance interests in the sense that, both the actor making an argument and the 
actor the argument is targeted towards, see ‘instrumental benefits from preserving reputation for 
norm guided behavior’ (Johnstone 2003). Secondly the logic promotes the idea that actors are 
open to persuasion and ready to change the positions they advance in the light of new, 
convincing information that is in the collective interest.  
Any limited conception of argument will not throw much light on the theoretical conception of 
deliberation or discursive decision-making which this dissertation claims can be induced as a 
result of the separation of decision functions in a complex decision process. This concept of 
deliberation focuses on speech acts by actors in their interactions in institutional settings. 
Deliberation involves a process of reaching decisions through reason-giving (Eriksen, 2003). 
Usually it takes places among actors before an audience, and may involve higher order 
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discussions aimed towards solving matters of principles or standards. Such a process may end up 
with agreement, or in other instances with disagreement on the possible options available which 
may then lead to bargaining. Most of the literature is silent on the causal influence of 
deliberation on the final decisions produced in multilateral settings. Deliberation through 
argument is diametrically opposed to bargaining, which utilizes power resources, instead 
reflecting the coordination logic of deliberation (Neyer, 2003).  
Bargaining characterizes most collective decision-making in negotiations. Bargaining reflects 
strategic action to maximize rational utility in communicative processes. Actors in negotiation 
situations generally have an interest in reaching an agreement but competing interests in the 
gains afforded by distribution of cooperation can affect a smooth outcome (Scharpf, 1997). 
Bargaining generally relies on the power resources available to actors, and, in some instances, 
bargaining actors may utilize threats and promises that may have to be executed outside of the 
bargaining assembly. According to Elster (1989), bargaining outcomes are represented by the 
distribution of gains, which to a large extent reflects the distribution of power among actors. In a 
decision process where actors decide by a majority, bargaining will lack consensus among those 
actors, particularly in the minority faction. 
Bargaining outcomes are thus one sided, and may in most instances be problem-inadequate, 
because they rest on the existing power distribution among actors. Bargaining falls short of 
ensuring that the most legitimate, collective solutions are identified. As a consequence, 
bargaining outcomes may not improve Pareto-efficiency, because they achieve cooperative gains 
for parties involved compared to the status quo. In any bargaining situation, any outcome will 
tend to be legitimate in so far as other parties accept the outcome, so it is common that the 
legitimacy of negotiated outcomes is prone to suffer some legitimacy deficit when the 
underlining distribution of power among the actors changes significantly.  
Patterns of communication, as promoted by the modes of argument adapted from Habermas’ 
discourse, are exclusively based on the expression of convincing reasoning. The processes of 
argument are characterized by competing validity claims which are appraised against commonly 
accepted criteria (Gehring 2003). Every position being advocated by an actor must be 
accompanied by reasons that take into account the accepted criteria that have been agreed upon. 
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Decision-making procedures characterized by argument are triadic and are built on two different 
stages of deciding. The first step involves identifying general criteria that all actors collectively 
accept as reference for appraising future cases. The second step then explores case-specific 
disputes. Following from this, in the third stage, decisions are made concerning the application 
of the collectively identified criteria. Therefore, reasoning serves as the most important resource 
in deliberation processes. 
Coordination in the mode of argument demands that participants assume an ‘ideal speech 
situation’ (Risse 2000), which makes it a more demanding proposition than coordination through 
bargaining. In the arguing mode participants are expected not to resort to power resources 
outside of the negotiations. Arguments will fail the litmus test if they are based on the power 
resources of participants. In the Habermasian perspective, collective decisions that are the 
product of argument are better reasoned and convincing since they have been collectively agreed 
upon and approved by participants. In that case, decisions arrived at through processes of 
deliberation are expected to enjoy greater legitimacy than decisions that emanate from a 
bargaining process. One of the prevailing and important features of deliberation processes is the 
need for participation by various interested members of the public, and this creates an arena 
where the legitimacy of decisions reached is felt more widely. Legitimacy in this regard, 
however, is not confined to issues of the transparency of the discourse, as deliberation among 
expert groups could even take place behind closed doors. What matter most is the ability of 
actors to sincerely consider all arguments on the table and consider the merits thereof.  
As pointed out earlier, the claim that actors may have reached an agreement discursively, 
Gehring (2003: 98-111) means that two interrelated complementary functions need to be fulfilled 
in the arrangement of the decision process. The first phase of the decision process deals with the 
abstract development of criteria for an unknown number of case-specific situations. These 
criteria must be agreed upon by all participating actors to gain legitimacy in their application to 
subsequent case-specific situations. The second phase gives decision makers the chance to judge 
individual claims against the previously agreed criteria.  
The main claim made here is that the separation of decision functions provides strong incentives 
for even the economically oriented maximizers of rationality to adopt a discursive strategy in 
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search of general rules that are enduring and capable of dealing with non-specific case situation 
preferences. The separation aids the facilitation of the process of coming to agreement on general 
rules and criteria that might serve as a yardstick to judge the action of actors in future cases. It is 
not argued here that a division of labour in a decision process automatically dissolves the 
parochial interests of political actors. Functional differentiation, in the estimation of this 
dissertation, serves as another mobilizing force that pushes rational actors to refrain from the use 
of their power-based resources to bargain over the rule making stage of a decision process. It 
helps in increasing performance based on the search for a common acceptable position for 
participating actors in a decision process independent of their power and interest constellations 
(Gehring 2004: 690).  
At the end of the two stages of rule-application, as indicated above, decisions are expected to be 
made on a case-by-case basis with reference to the established standard criteria. This makes it 
impossible for actors to be aware of their interests in each case-specific situation. As a 
consequence, rational actors are more inclined to resort to power-based bargaining to protect 
their parochial preferences in such specific situations. Participating actors at this stage are also 
faced with the typical problem of having to ensure that the agents who implement decisions, 
based on the criteria agreed, are accountable for their decisions. It is established that this 
delegation of decision-making authority always entails the danger of abuse by the power 
wielding agent.  As a result, it introduces the issue of putting in place appropriate incentives to 
prevent abuse by the agency (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). However, close oversight, as 
suggested by traditional Principal-Agent theory, is not appropriate, especially if the 
institutionalized separation of tasks in the decision-making process is a response to the problem 
of inconsistent preferences. In particular, proposals of budget cuts and threats of dismissals of 
officials (Huber 2000) tend to be counterproductive, and in a way represent an inappropriate 
intervention into the decision-making rationale of the agent. In any case, any attempt to intervene 
in the decision process reverses the benefits for functional differentiation since a prerequisite for 
the agency to discharge its functions properly requires a wide margin of autonomy (Majone 
2001). Therefore, suitable institutional arrangements must be put in place to provide incentives 
to ensure a candid application of the criteria. This entails, providing general norms that have 
been agreed upon by the rule-making body of the decision process. This prerequisite requires 
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decision makers to resort to the general rules and be forced to argue about their case-specific 
concerns.  
Since it is apparent that rational utility maximizers at this stage may attempt to pursue their 
individual parochial interests on case-by-case bases, I argue that institutional arrangements may 
induce rational actors to prefer merit-based arguments to power-based bargaining. It is therefore 
imperative to look at some related institutional incentives that might motivate rational actors to 
deliberate in favour of better solutions to problems, rather than bargain with their power 
resources.  
 
2.9. Institutional Incentives for Deliberative Decision-Making at the Rule Application Level 
of a Decision Process 
A key question that ultimately arises from this analysis of processes of deliberation over 
decisions is to determine which institutional arrangements induce appropriate deliberation among 
rational actors. Any theoretical exploration of deliberation-inducing incentives in the institutional 
setting must be premised against a background which recognizes that cost-benefit analysis 
underlines the motivation for actors’ behavior in a setting with diverse interest constellations. It 
should not be assumed that actors are prepared to sacrifice the pursuit of their parochial interests 
merely because of the availability of agreed general rules. This dissertation therefore sets out to 
outline some basic institutional incentives that can push rational actors towards deliberative 
problem solving decision-making. The processes of decision-making through deliberation 
present a picture of actors in the decision process acting as if there is an automatic recourse to 
their parochial interests. This appears quite unrealistic because it is usually assumed that even the 
most powerful actors within such situations are expected to accept reasoned outcomes, even if 
they are not compatible with their interests. In what follows I discuss a number of different 
institutional arrangements that have been proposed as a means to drive rational actors closer to 
reason-based decision-making rather than resorting to the opportunity to bargain. 
A first step to institutionally push rational economic actors towards discursive decision-making 
at the rule application level is to limit the chances for bargaining at this stage (Gehring 2003: 
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107-108). Unlike in a simple negotiation, decision makers in a functionally differentiated system 
operate in a distinct, well defined setting. Decisions on rule application are made in the confines 
of general criteria that serve as a reference to limit the degree of arbitrariness by the agency 
implementing general rules against situation-specific cases. Any opportunity for the arbitrary 
application of agreed general rules opens the floodgates for opportunistic bargaining over the 
implementation of decisions. To narrow the chances for this, the application of norms are limited 
to individual cases at a time and dealt with separately so as not to broaden the scope of issues to 
be considered to allow actors the opportunity to pursue their parochial interests. Meanwhile at 
the rule formulation stage it is expected that the scope of issues will be enlarged as much as 
possible to consider the possible cases that might arise at the application level. As a result of the 
narrow focus at the rule application stage the opportunity for bargaining may systematically 
disappear if actors focus on a single case. If procedures at this stage are bases on consensus 
decision-making, then actors are presented with the option of either accepting a decision or 
rejecting the outcome of a single case. If an actor for any reason decides to reject a reason based 
on their parochial interests, then the consequences for the efficient function of the decision 
process is in jeopardy. In that case the capacity of a decision system in terms of the production of 
many streams of decision is greatly affected as the process is encountered with conflicts as a 
result of the pursuit of parochial interests by self-seeking actors.  
However, a situation in which actors cooperate on a single case under consideration, gives an 
indication of the sustaining nature of the norms agreed upon at the rule making stage. Where 
actors are met with the options of either cooperating or not on a case-specific situation, they will 
take into consideration the benefits that might accrue for future cases. Insights from game theory 
demonstrate that the existence of the long shadow of the future may induce maximizers of 
rational utility to cooperate, when faced with the tradition conundrum of the Prison’s Dilemma 
(Axelrod 1984). The potential for actors to refrain from bargaining to seek appropriate reasons in 
case-specific situations can induce rational actors to resort to discourse in applying the rules to 
individual cases.  
This mechanism, which helps push rational actors into discourse, is based on the idea that 
decision makers handle cases separately. This becomes necessary because rational actors might 
be tempted to seek to put together ‘package deals’, based on the constellation of their interests, if 
 72 
 
each case is not assessed based on its merits and facts. If each decision on a single case becomes 
established without any contestation, then actors can have a reference point to decide other 
similar cases that are separated from each other. If, over time, it is established that each case is 
decided by discursively exploring the most problem-adequate solutions from available option, 
even maximizers of rational utility will, in the future, prevent other actors who attempt to 
stampede the decision process through power-based bargaining.  
Another means of mobilizing rational actors to make problem-adequate decisions is to assign the 
task of rule application to different bodies rather than to a sole independent agency. Assigning 
decision-making functions to different bodies within the rule application procedure leads to a 
restructuring of the decision process horizontally (Gehring 2003: 111). Complex decision-
making systems that are characterized by the separation of specific decision functions may also 
deprive participating actors in the decision process the opportunity to influence decisions through 
bargaining. Functional division of labour emerges from the collaboration of different decision-
making bodies (Gehring 2003). Decision-making processes that consist of numerous sub-systems 
at the rule application level lead to a mutual interdependence and control among the sub-systems 
involved in the performance of particular functions within the broader decision process (Kiewiet 
and McCubbins 1991). In this regard, stalemates in the decision process can be avoided if other 
units of the decision process discharge their functions without controversy, and in tune with the 
production criteria agreed for all decision situations. If the desire to avoid stalemate by sub-
systems within the decision process is rooted in the need to produce problem-adequate decisions, 
then mutual interdependence and control between the horizontally structured sub-systems 
provides incentives for actors to seek common decision criteria that are in the interest of all 
participants in the decision process. Over time it is expected that various agreements and 
directives, issued as a panacea to avoid decision stalemates at each level of the decision process, 
become a point of reference in subsequent decision situations to forestall any major conflicts in 
their application to future cases. If this mechanism is properly instituted and works properly, the 
expectation is that the sub-systems at the rule application level will constantly refer to the 
decision criteria as an external point of reference, when faced with separate cases that are a novel 
and present new challenges in the decision-making process.  
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In addition, horizontal differentiation of the decision process may also enhance the sincerity of 
commitment to the implementation of the decision criteria. A decision process consists of two 
distinct components. The initial component deals with the appraisal by independent research 
institutions of the relevant facts of issues of interest to member States involved in the decision 
process. The second component may make decisions based on the appraisal by those research 
institutions in consultation with various sectors of relevant actors. The first component deals with 
issues of knowing the truth. Institutional settings can strengthen deliberative decision-making on 
matters of fact finding if issues of this nature are delegated to specialized forums (Gehring 1999). 
The research and expert assessment panels within the decision system may establish a mode for 
deliberative validation of relevant issues of truth, based on shared standards for appraising 
competing propositions among actors. These research and expert bodies can set the tone for 
recommendations made by decision makers in the application of general norms. To further 
strengthen a commitment to the decision criteria, the decision-making body could be made 
accountable to other entities. This forces the various decision organs to be guided by the decision 
criteria that are set out. 
Further to the above reasons, Shapiro (1992) argues that decision makers, when required to 
elucidate their reasoning, are more likely to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a 
particular decision situation before arriving at a conclusion. Importantly, mandating agents to 
give reasons at every stage of the decision-making process can increase incentives to adopt well-
reasoned decisions, rather than those based on the aggregated preferences of actors. The 
requirement to giving reasons also helps in making decision-making transparent and devoid of 
any undemocratic tendencies.  Where agents are expected to give reasons to justify the decision 
they have made, it compels a commitment from them to stick to the decision criteria that have 
been agreed upon at the rule making stage. The requirement to give reasons thus serves as a mild 
self-enforcing mechanism to control discretion and assist subjecting decision makers to public 
surveillance (Shapiro 1992). If the structure of the decision system makes it a feature for decision 
makers to give reasons for their decisions, actors will generally avoid the situation where they 
are unable to justify the decisions they have made. This also makes it possible for interested 
individual participants, who actively get involved in the proceedings of the decision process, to 
challenge inappropriate decisions that are made and found to be outside of the remit of the 
decision criteria provided as a guide to the decision makers.  
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This brings us to the final, and perhaps the most effective institutional arrangement that can 
curtail the tendencies of rational actors to resort to the pursuit of their parochial interests and 
facilitate reasoned arguments. An institutional arrangement which comprises the possibility for 
judicial review of decisions can play a major role in forcing decision makers to produce 
problem-adequate administrative decisions. The idea of judicial review is rooted in a tradition of 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the rule of law. Judicial reviews therefore ensure that 
administrative agents make decisions that are rationally reasonable and fair with regard to the 
procedures established in carrying out their mandate. As a result, institutions that make 
provisions for court-like bodies typically specialize in the application of generally agreed norms 
to case specific situations (Shapiro 1981). The purpose of a judicial review is to assess the 
legality of the actions and decisions made by administrative agents who are endowed with the 
authority to make decisions that reflect the general goals of actors cooperating in an issue area of 
interest. Through these means, agents are pushed to act in a manner that is never in variance with 
the rules and norms that govern the application of decisions to contentious issues. The potential 
for a review of badly reasoned decisions can be an incentive for decisions makers to strive for 
the most problem-adequate decisions, knowing that their actions could be subjected to judicial 
review.  
In institutional arrangements where clear provisions are made for the possibility of resorting to 
the courts, the judicial process is always structured to sharply reduce the self-interested 
motivations that are common among political actors (Shapiro and Levy 1995: 1054). The 
presence of a threat of a judicial review of inconsistent and badly reasoned decisions to a large 
extent provides incentives for decision makers to relate the rationale of their decisions to the 
established principles and norms which guide the behavior of participants in the decision 
process. If this system works with a complementary regard for other institutional incentives, then 
the need for intervention in the decision process, or for power-based bargaining, may diminish 
considerably and decision makers will be incentivized to pursue a path that remains tied to the 
task of providing justifiable reasons for their decisions.  
These institutionalized arrangements may create sufficient incentives for deliberative decision-
making to take place at the rule application level and affect the behavior of rational actors to 
engage in merit-based arguments. Deliberation in this light will mobilize different sorts of 
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legitimacy, from the scrutiny and involvement of the public to the involvement of experts in the 
decision-making process. It is important to note that the institutional incentives discussed above 
do not operate in isolation. They are interrelated and depend on each other to effect a change in 
the behavior of rational actors in order to forgo their tendency to bargain and resort to the search 
for reasoned arguments to make decisions that are problem-adequate for the issues identified in 
various policy areas of interest. Altogether it is expected that these theoretical institutional 
arrangements generate strong incentives for actors involved in a decision process to arrive at 
decision outcomes that reflect the general norms and standards expected of decision makers. 
These theoretical insights lead this dissertation to the formulation of a second empirical 
expectation: that the more a differentiated decision system provides strong incentives for 
discursive decision-making, the better its ability to prevent arbitrary application of general 
norms at the decision-making level. 
 
2.10. Conclusion and Implications of our Basic Model for the Empirical Cases  
Theoretically, delegation follows two different logics (Majon 2001). On one hand a principal 
may choose to delegate with the desire to reduce transaction costs and mobilize expertise so that 
the agent is able to make decisions as the principal would have done in the absence of the 
delegation contract (Hawkins et al 2006: 20; Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal 2001: 766). On the 
other hand, delegation of decision-making competence to an agent may be for the sole purpose of 
enhancing the credibility of policy commitments, so that the agent generally is expected to 
decide differently from how the principal would have done, for reasons, among which, include 
the time inconsistent preference of actors. While in the former approach the control and 
oversight of the agent is presented as a theoretical dilemma, the latter emphasises the 
independence of the agent. Unlike principal agent theory, an analysis based upon ideas of 
functional differentiation sheds light on how the various systems of an organization can be 
governed without being preoccupied with hierarchical control (Gehring 1999). It draws on social 
systems theory to elucidate the emergence of new entities arising from communication between 
actors in a cooperation project.  
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In a delegation situation where the purpose of delegating decision-making authority is to commit 
to future unknown cases, it is possible to protect the agent against the power and interest of the 
powerful principals by delegating decision-making authority to several committees to monitor 
the activities of the agent and shape its decision on a given issue. The agent is thus entrusted with 
the power to take decisions that are in the best interest of all the participating members in a 
decision-making process. To prevent members from intervening in the day to day work of the 
agents, various institutional mechanisms could be installed in the decision-making system to 
push the agent towards making decisions that represents the best interest of the principals, 
without necessarily using hierarchical control mechanism. Accountability mechanisms which are 
useful in this governance systems, as discussed above among others, include defining proper 
decision criteria to serve as an external source of reference to the agents, and the establishment 
of checks and balances among different agents to make them horizontally accountable to each 
other (O’Donnell 1999). Others include the involvement of the wider public in the decision-
making system to hold decision makers accountable for their actions, giving reasons at each 
stage of the decision stage, and the possibility of using judicial reviews where necessary.  
These mechanisms help reduce the tendency of principals to intervene in case-specific decisions 
and also reduce the margin of opportunity for the agent to abuse their competencies. As a result, 
decision makers, within a decision system that has these inbuilt features, are systematically 
deprived of their ability to bargain or pursue their individual partisan interest. This is so because 
badly reasoned decisions may not pass the litmus test of these safeguards, and may be detected 
by other agents within the decision process. If the decision system is well designed to avoid any 
distortions in the decision process by powerful stakeholders, these accountability mechanisms 
would happily be incorporated in the decision environment to enable the principals to abstain 
from the day-to-day monitoring of their agents (Gehring and Plocher 2009). In this respect, a 
decision system whose institutional design allows for internal accountability mechanisms which 
make decision makers accountable to other actors ensures that the decisions taken are in line 
with the long term interests of the principals, as prescribed in the substantive rules that guide the 
agents in the decision-making process.   
Therefore, in contrast to dominant Principal-Agent approaches, the approach of this dissertation 
relies on institutional theory to present a model that can address both the independence and 
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oversight of agents without interfering in their day to day decisions. Literature emphasising 
social choice reveals that a tension exists among actors at both the rule-making and norm 
application stages of a decision-making process when involved in discursive decision-making. 
This tension can be relieved by adopting institutional arrangements that create incentives for 
rational actors to abandon the pursuit of their parochial interest and resort to merit-based 
arguments for problem-adequate decisions.  
The act of assigning decision-making competencies to an independent agent automatically 
separates the functions of norm formulation from the application of those formulated norms to 
case specific situations. The core argument emerges that, with the separation of a rule-making 
function from the application of rules to decisions, an institutionalized division of labour is 
created. In an institutionalized differentiated decision system, complementary functions are 
performed by different sub-bodies within the decision-making process. With the presence of 
different sub-systems performing complementary functions within the same decision apparatus, a 
multi-functional decision system emerges. The features and characteristics of a multi-functional 
decision system are akin to the emergence of a division of labour in a decision-making process, 
as it assigns several functional components to different sub-bodies, working interdependently but 
with different decision rules. In all, the autonomy of each sub-organ in the decision process is 
important for the decision outcomes produced, which can mean that the presence of tight 
oversight measures could seriously derail the autonomy of sub-systems and undermine the 
purpose for which they are established. In the light of this, any dilemma in instituting an 
independent agent in practice, ensuring their autonomy without any manifest interventions in 
their activities, should not be a matter of strict control. The issue is more concerned with putting 
in place institutional measures that ensures the independence of the decision-making agent while 
hedging against the unlimited autonomy of the decision maker to adopt arbitrary decisions.  
To establish the relevance of functional differentiation in a decision-making process, this 
dissertation will observe the internal operations of the decision system, characterized by an 
interaction between independent and autonomous units in the decision system, each operating 
according to its own decision rationale. An important aspect of the design of such a decision 
system is a systematic delineation of the decision system between a rule-making component and 
a rule application stage. The rule-making stage of the decision process reflects a need to create 
 78 
 
an arena to agree on general principles that might help dissipate power-based bargaining in the 
decision process. The rule application stage, on the other hand, is supposed to present a test for 
the application of the general principles and norms agreed upon at the norm application stage. 
This provides a virtual separation of the political task of having to arrive at a set of general rules 
that reflects the long term interests of all participating actors in the decision-making process. The 
tacit separation of functions serves as a response to the problem of inconsistency of preferences 
among actors who have long-term interests and are likely to be distracted from their short term 
preferences.  
Also it is important to note that the establishment of an independent agent in a decision-making 
process not only serves as a response to the problem of inconsistent preferences, but can also 
institutionally create incentives for discursive decision-making at all levels of the decision-
making process. Decisions at the rule-making stage would be taken under a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
that can push even rational economic actors to deliberate, rather than bargain, as a result of their 
limited awareness of their future preferences in case specific situations. Decisions at the rule 
application stage mobilize the influence of interrelated institutional arrangements to generate 
reasonable decision outcomes that are not tainted by the power resources of the participating 
actors in the decision-making process.  
The consequences of the institutional separation of functions in a decision-making system could 
even have implications for institutional settings that are not characterized by issues of high 
politics, such as in an international peer review process. These conditions should operate in the 
decision-making process to enable the mechanism of an institutionalized division of labour to 
transform the interests of rational utility maximizers into a discursive behavior to gain influence. 
Firstly, each sub-system in a functionally differentiated decision system must have a clearly 
defined task, and be effectively separated in its decision rationale from any others sub-systems. 
This condition can be fulfilled based on the degree of institutional autonomy of various sub-
systems in the execution of their day-to-day activities. Secondly, deliberative decision-making at 
the rule formulation stage will depend on the inability of political actors to identify their case 
specific interests in individual cases. This condition can be observed in a decision process by 
looking at conflicts that arise at that level of decision-making and how they get resolved. 
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Thirdly, it is expected that decision competence at the rule application level will be diversified 
and organized horizontally among sub-systems that operate at that stage of decision-making. The 
observable implication for this condition is for decision makers to be accountable for their 
decisions through various institutionalized arrangements. 
This dissertation applies the theoretical framework developed above to cases in the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) to determine the extent to which member States show a credible 
commitment to the goals of the APRM process. It empirically examines cases across member 
States and various policy fields to see if member States intervene or attempt to do so in the 
process of arriving at the final decisions of the APRM. Furthermore, the application of the theory 
of functional differentiation to decision-making in the APRM generates insightful arguments for 
the operations of the peer review process. The division of labour in decision-making is seen to 
create sub-systems, with their own specialized functions and decision criteria, which serve as a 
yardstick to appraise case specific issues. The presence of a functionally differentiated system is 
seen to introduce standards and decision criteria into the decision process which may affect 
decision outcomes devoid of any power-based politics.  
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Chapter 3 
3.1. The Governance Structure of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): 
Unpacking the Institutional Design and Functional Differentiation in the Review Process 
The governance structure of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is characterized by a 
differentiation of functions, and relies on a division of labour in the decision-making process. 
Several committees within the decision system perform complementary functions to facilitate 
decision outcomes. Within these committees, experts are expected to impartially discuss sensible 
policy options available to identified problems of member States, within the policy areas of the 
review process. The governance system of the review process can be described as an 
amalgamation of national and supranational resources with the intention of augmenting the 
political problem-solving capacity of member States without undermining their sovereign 
authority.  
The task of this chapter is to unpack the institutional design of the review process and to answer 
the question of how and why national and supranational actors must work together in a 
functionally differentiated decision-making system in the African peer review mechanism. The 
chapter sets the stage for explicating the functional components of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism. It points to the general organization of the APRM and the functions assigned to 
various actors actively involved in the decision-making process. Through this, it proceeds in 
subsequent chapters to test the claims of functional differentiation as an alternative source of 
inducing reason-based decisions. That is, that institutional arrangements can serve as strong 
incentives to push rational self-interested actors from pursuing their parochial interests in favour 
of making decisions that are problem-adequate in a decision system. 
The central argument in this chapter is that the governance system of the APRM is 
systematically functionally differentiated with various sub-systems, each performing 
complementary functions for efficient decision-making. The chapter is organized as follows. 
Firstly the background of the African Peer Review Mechanism is traced with emphasis on its 
origin and the use of reporting and reviewing tools as means of engendering cooperation among 
participating member States. In the next section, a critical perspective on the emergence of the 
governance system of the APRM and the division of labour in the decision-making process is put 
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forward. This section places emphasis on the organization of the review process. It generally 
identifies the differentiation of a rule-making function, performed by political actors, from a rule 
implementation stage, delegated to various sub-bodies in the institutional design of the peer 
review process. Subsequently, this institutional arrangement is related to the theory of functional 
differentiation in order to argue that the establishment of sub-systems in the decision process 
follows distinct decision rationales at both levels of the decision system. This is followed by a 
description of the functions performed by each of the sub-systems in the decision-making 
process of the review. In the following section, the discussion is then focused on the nature of the 
decision process in the African Peer Review Mechanism. It describes the purpose of the review 
mechanism and the nature decision problems that are faced by members participating in the 
review process. The final section looks at the stages of the peer review process, noting the 
incentive structure created for actors within the division of labour in the institutional set-up to 
impact upon the final recommendations of the review process. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the implications of the institutional structure of the review process as they apply to 
decision outcomes. 
 
3.2. Background to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM): Explaining the Origin, 
Formal Processes and the Institution  
As a first step to unpacking the significance of the African Peer Review Mechanism, this section 
gives insights into peer-reviewing in the African Union, entailing a general description of the 
purpose of the review process. It sets out to explain the objectives and reasons for which the 
Heads of State and Government of the African Union established the institution. Through this 
background information on the APRM, the section puts in perspective the primary goals of the 
review process and what it aims to achieve for member States of the African Union. It is argued 
in this section that the APRM relies on monitoring, reporting and reviewing tools that can serve 
as a means of supporting interstate cooperation among participating member States, in finding 
solutions to their common policy issues.  
The APRM is an instrument created to monitor and evaluate the political, economic, and 
corporate governance of African States. It therefore is involved in a close examination of the 
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governance systems of participating member States (Corrigan 2015a: 8). Its envisaged aim is to 
find and promote workable solutions to challenges that are identified through its review process. 
In this sense, the process aims at solving the Continent’s broad challenges by improving the 
political economic and corporate governance of member States (Letsholo 2014: 299; Reitmaier 
2012: 148). Against these normative ideals, the review process is embedded in the broader 
framework of the African Union in order to enhance the capacity of member States to overcome 
policy challenges that hinder the realization of better economic and political governance on the 
Continent.    
In this respect, the idea of establishing a peer-review mechanism came as a response to 
challenges of governance in the Continent as well as its poor economic performance on the 
global stage. As a result, the African Union initiated a development plan in 2001 called the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD aimed to deliver the Continent out of a 
cycle of poverty, political instability, and marginalization in the global system. The NEPAD 
framework underlines the need to defend and advance the interests of Africa in the global arena 
(Malcomson 2009: 11; Bama 2010: 300; Bach 2013: 7). From a business and corporate 
perspective, a cardinal objective of NEPAD is to promote, in all the participating countries, a set 
of concrete and time-bound programmes that are targeted at enhancing corporate governance 
practices (Khoza 2009: 101). In this respect, NEPAD recognizes good governance as a 
prerequisite for development in the Continent. At the first meeting of the Heads of State and 
Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of the NEPAD in Abuja in 2001, the HSGIC 
agreed to set up parameters to regulate the conduct of member States in good governance 
practices. These parameters were envisaged to serve as a guide to the political and economic 
goals of members of the African Union, in order to achieve the objectives that are set in the 
NEPAD programme (Communique of HSGIC, para 6, 2001). As a follow up to the HSGIC 
decision in Abuja in 2001, the third meeting of the HSGIC approved a code of good governance 
in June 2002. The code adopted included the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic 
and Corporate Governance, which, in combination with the African Peer Review Mechanism, 
were made available as instruments to lead African countries to good governance and economic 
development (Resolution AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I). The APRM, through this declaration, 
commits African countries to exercise true democracy, respect for human rights, peace, and good 
governance. This commitment appears to be informed by the realization that development is 
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impossible without an accompanying alignment with policies and practices that conform to the 
agreed declarations of the African Union on democracy, political, economic and corporate 
governance, through the adoption of  socio economic development objectives, values, standards, 
and codes (Waal 2002: 464; Chabal 2002: 448). The APRM, in this normative orientation, 
desires to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that would lead to political 
stability, high economic growth, sustainable development, and accelerated sub-regional and 
Continental economic integration (CRR of Ghana 2005: 1). This goal is expected to be achieved 
through the sharing of experience and best practice, as well as identifying deficiencies and 
assessing the need for capacity building in various African countries.  
Certainly, there is no shortage of criticism on the NEPAD initiative. Chabal (2002) takes a 
critical, somewhat pessimistic perspective and casts doubt on the potential for any wave of 
change in the governance landscape as heralded by the NEPAD programme’s intention to 
enhance accountability or the quality of governments. Chabal argues that, where the State is 
improperly institutionalized and judicial systems are deficient, it is likely to fall into an exercise 
of governance through informal means. Chabal characterizes contemporary African politics as it 
is understood through the exercise of neo-patrimonial power (Chabal 2002: 450). What this 
means in concrete terms is that, the exercise of bureaucratic power in Africa is performed 
through informal means, notwithstanding the existence of the formal political structures. As a 
consequence, Chabal claims that African political systems rest on personalized power that is 
ingrained in forms of political reciprocity that links patrons with their clients. This logic of the 
political system, according to Chabal, does not correspond to the Western model of modern 
democracy and the exercise of power. This dissertation sees this argument of Chabal as 
erroneous, as it promotes a misleading representation of the nature of politics in most African 
countries.  It argues that these countries, on the contrary, are firmly rooted in the rule of law and 
the respect for the fundamental rights of citizens. Chabal’s negative focus also would have the 
reader believe that western bureaucracies are neutral in their exercise of their mandate. However, 
this is not the case. It has been empirically proven that institutional arrangements can influence 
decision-making process independent of the individuals involved (Knott and Miller 1987). 
Institutions, if purposively crafted, can shape outcomes by creating incentives that can affect the 
final decision outcome in a decision process. As a result it seems misleading to make 
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generalizations concerning all political systems in Africa without any analysis of the institutional 
structures of all political systems across the Continent.    
While proponents of the NEPAD would often point to the APRM process as a milestone that 
would police standards of democratic governance and sound economic management, some 
scholars have equally expressed concerned about the band-wagoning effect where countries 
scramble to get reviewed without meeting the basic governance standards and norms 
(Khadiagala 2010: 382). According to this thought, if a situation is created where States get 
reviewed for the sake of being recognized as having signed to the review mechanism, there exist 
a tendency where the peer review can degenerate into an exercise where countries with dubious 
governance records sign up for the sake of doing so. If such a situation is created, the peer review 
mechanism, instead of rewarding reformers becomes a haven for rogues.  
To attempt to overcome some of these criticisms, the African Peer Review Mechanism was 
formulated as a voluntary self-monitoring tool. It was hoped that the voluntary instincts of the 
APRM can lead to a situation where countries could mutually encourage each other to adopt 
policies that could engender the principles enshrined in the standards and objectives underlining 
the peer-review process (Bama 2010: 300; Corrigan 2015b). This hopeful outcome emphasises 
how the APRM relies on a perception of credibility of its processes and reports as a means to 
attract member States who may not be inclined to participate in a process that does not reflect 
their desired policy orientation (Corrigan 2015b). In this light, the voluntary aspect of 
participation in the review process gives credence to the willingness of participating States to 
accept recommendations and decisions emanating from the process to correct deficiencies that 
are identified.  
Related to the voluntary nature of the mechanism is the need to allow open access to membership 
for all members of the African Union. In this regard, participation in the process is not restricted 
to any group of countries in the AU. Accession to the review mechanism entails undertaking to 
submit to periodic reviews, and to be guided by agreed parameters for political and economic 
governance, socio-economic development and corporate governance (CCR of Ghana 2005: 2).  
The APRM Base Document outlines the interrelated stages of the peer-review process. The stages 
consist of elaborate and interconnected activities of self-reporting, evaluation of information, 
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cross-examination, report drafting and consultations with interested observers. The first stage of 
the process of review is the preparatory phase, both at the national level and in the APRM 
Continental Secretariat. The process is triggered when a country that has acceded to the review 
mechanism gives indication to the Secretariat of its preparedness to be reviewed. Following this 
expression of interest, the APR Secretariat forwards to the country to be reviewed a 
questionnaire covering the four areas of focus in the review process. This is done under the 
direction of the APR Panel which oversees the review process. The country under review at this 
stage conducts a self-assessment based on the questionnaire. The APR Secretariat and other 
partner institutions can assist in the self-assessment exercise if there is the need. The country’s 
self-assessment then results in the drafting of a Country Self-Assessment Report (CSAR) and a 
preliminary programme of action (PoA). The preliminary programme of action (PoA) builds on 
existing policies and frames projects to respond to the findings in the CSAR that can be enacted 
by the country under review. While the country’s self-assesment is being undertaken by the 
country under review, the APR Secretariat independently commissions a background study of 
the country based on materials provided by national, regional and international institutions 
(APRM Base Doc. Para. 18, 2003). The CSAR and the preliminary programme of action 
prepared by the country under review are then presented to the APR Secretariat for further 
deliberation and action, while the APR Secretariat also develops a background paper on the 
current state of the issues of concern to the review process. 
In the second phase, a Review Team (RT) visits the country under review to consult with 
relevant stakeholders and interest groups on the issues contained in the Country Self-Assessment 
Report, and to assess with them the preliminary programme of action and the background paper 
drafted by the APR Secretariat. According to the APR Base document, consultations of the 
Review Team should be as broad as possible to include government officials, parliament, the 
judiciary, civil society organizations, trade unions, professional bodies and the business 
community (APR Base Doc. para. 19, 2003). The Country Review Mission (CRM), which is led 
by a member of the APR Panel, is given access to relevant information that can lead to a smooth 
and timely verification of the issues contained in the reports produced by the country under 
review.  
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During the third stage of the APRM process, as stipulated in the founding documents, the 
Country Review Mission drafts the Team’s report. This report is produced on the basis of the 
background information provided by the APR Secretariat and the information received during 
the country visit and from the consultations with stakeholders in the country. The draft Country 
Review Report takes into consideration the progamme of action and the self-assessment reports 
that are drafted by the country under review. At this stage, the country is given the opportunity to 
respond to the issues raised by the country review mission, and the responses of the country 
under review are attached to the final Country Review Report. The country’s reaction to the 
Team’s report is an opportunity to clearly outline how any deficiencies identified may be 
rectified with a clear plan of action.  
The presentation of the final report of the Country Review Mission and the final programme of 
actions to the APR Secretariat and the APR Panel marks the fourth stage of the review process. 
The APR Panel, on receipt of the final report, forwards it to the APR Forum for deliberation and 
adoption by the Heads of State and government of participating member States. At this level, the 
process is preoccupied with discussing the issues raised in the Country Review Report and, as far 
as possible, makes suggestions on the possible ways of mitigating any deficiencies.  
The APR Base document makes it mandatory for the Country Review Report to be formally and 
publicly tabled in regional and sub-regional institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament, the 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
(ECOSOCC) of the African Union (Base Doc. para.25). This is expected to be completed within 
six months of when the APR Forum considers a country’s review report. To a large extent, this 
final stage is expected to create incentives for transparency and accountability in the review 
process. The duration of the review process, per country, is envisaged to be completed in not 
more than six months from the date of inception of the first stage. The insistence on this 
timetable appears to be a strategy to facilitate the review process in as many countries as 
possible, given the limited resources at the disposal of the review process.  
The formal processes of the ARPM at each stage of the review process depend on monitoring 
and reporting tools which provide a means of gathering adequate information on the policies of 
member States participating in the review mechanism. From the use of self-reporting instruments 
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to the final publication of Country Review Reports, the system supports mutual cooperation of 
States in policy areas of relevance to all member States of the APRM.  
 
3.3. The Emergence of the Governance System and Division of Labour in the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM)  
This section offers an explanation of the emergence of the governance system of the APRM, and 
the impact of functional differentiation in the decision-making process of the review process. It 
argues that the existence of a division of labour among several sub-bodies in the governance 
structure of the APRM can have an independent impact on the contents of final review decisions. 
The section also gives insights into the functions assigned to each of the sub-systems in the 
APRM decision process. By providing a detailed description of each of the bodies involved in 
the APR process, the section hopes to clarify how various sub-bodies are organized and the 
incentives created at each stage of the process to promote merit-based decisions.  
The presence and creation of various committees to facilitate the process of the APRM 
establishes a complex governance system, and introduces a functional division of labour among 
the various sub-bodies that work to achieve the ultimate goal of the process. Within the APRM 
decision apparatus, the APR Panel is constituted in order to overcome any credible commitment 
problems of their principals and aim at producing reason-based decisions. Unlike traditional 
Principal-Agent relations, the delegation setting in the APRM is anchored in a division of labour 
that relies on defined principles for decision-making. Besides the interests of the principals and 
the agents, general decision criteria serve as an external point of reference that is distinct from 
the parochial interests of the principals in specific decision situations (Gehring and Plocher 2009: 
670) . These decision criteria, in the form of guidelines, generally reflect the long term interests 
of the principals. They also give an idea of the decision rationale of the agents. This delegation 
structure enables the autonomy of the agent while at the same time making it accountable for its 
decisions. 
Since its creation in 2003, the African Peer Review Mechanism has been dominated by the 
encompassing authority of the APR Panel and the APR Forum. While the APR Forum has the 
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authority to appoint members of the APR Panel and supervise the activities of the APRM 
process, the Panel is envisaged as an independent agent with the authority to make 
recommendations that are binding for the principals of the organization (Base Doc. par. 7). The 
authority afforded to the APR Panel makes it possible for it to take control of its own activities, 
and assume the power to direct, as it sees proper, the manner in which its administrative 
procedures should proceed in the process of the peer review process.  
The operation of the APRM system is characterized by the interaction of a number of 
autonomous units, each of which operates according to its rationale in taking decisions. The 
institutional structure of the African Peer Review Mechanism is largely differentiated. The 
complex APRM system is made up of both Continental and national APRM structures that work 
in tandem to produce the final decisions and recommendations of the APRM process. At the 
Continental level it comprises four bodies. These are the APR Forum, the APR Focal Points 
Committee, the APR Panel and the APRM Continental Secretariat. At the national level four 
bodies coordinate the activities of the APRM, comprising the focal points, the national 
commission/ national governing councils, national APRM Secretariat and technical research 
institutions (TRIs). Each of these bodies perform distinct functions that together work for the 
proper functioning of the APRM system. Each body works in its own capacity with the authority 
to produce authoritative and legitimate knowledge to inform the process. The distinct status and 
authority accorded each of the bodies at the national level differs from State to State. The wide 
variations in the special recognition and level of autonomy invested to national bodies may be 
important to explain the extent of the seriousness or importance placed on the review process in 
the development planning of each of the participating States.   
The level of independence enjoyed by each of these bodies, especially at the State level, is 
contingent on the kind of task that it is assigned. Most of the bodies in the APRM process 
produce expert knowledge to serve as a basis for the final recommendations and the work of the 
other committees. The APR Panel, which has oversight of the process, makes its decisions based 
on information provided by the research bodies and the initial self-assessment reports that are 
produced by officials of the state under review. The process of decision-making, to a large 
extent, may be understood within the paradigms of Principal-Agent theory. This promotes the 
idea that the task of decision-making concerning the propriety of policy decisions and programs 
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of a State should be delegated to an agent by the contracting States. This is illustrated in the 
establishment of various bodies at the Continental level which further assign various roles to 
other sub-bodies within the institutional structure. This arrangement is geared at producing the 
best recommendations for the improvement of the policies of States participating in the review 
process.  
The governance system of the APRM distributes these distinct functions to the various bodies of 
the APRM to enhance the capacity of the system to produce the most adequate solutions for any 
deficiencies that might be identified in the process of the peer review. From its design and 
conception, the African Peer Review Mechanism appears to have been made operational to act as 
an appropriate tool to mitigate policy deficits in member States of the African Union.  
Chikwanha (2007), for instance, argues that the central aim of the review mechanism is to 
encourage the adherence to adopted policies, principles and proposed practices that enhance the 
economic growth and facilitate the transition to democracy by identifying capacity gaps and 
proposing alternative courses of action (Chikwanha, 2007). In this way, member States 
participating in the review process have an obligation, in respect of issues that might be 
identified, to require the attention of governments to get them resolved. Adherence to policies 
and principles, as enshrined in the founding documents of the review process, are guided by the 
established norms in the APRM statue. Since the first peer reviews, starting with Ghana in 2003, 
various guiding rules have been elaborated upon and more guidelines have been produced by the 
APR Panel and the Forum to enhance the efficiency of the process.  
Different institutions and activities are identified in the key documents which established the 
APRM to define how the process of a peer review of a country is to be organized. At both the 
Continental and national level, a variety of activities and institutions are engaged in the process 
of evaluating and assessing the range of proposals that lead up to the final drafting of reports and 
decisions on how the deficiencies identified are to be rectified by a member State. The interest 
constellations of actors may play out at the national level when the APR Panel and members of 
the government under review, engage in various consultations to agree on the policy issues 
contained in initial APR reports. However, to minimize the possibility of power politics among 
the Panel, different tasks are then delegated to other sub-bodies in the decision process, 
 91 
 
providing incentives for making appropriate decisions that are in the best interest of the 
objectives of the review process. 
Until 2012, the peer review process of the African Union was dominated by the encompassing 
authority of the APR Forum, the Panel and the Continental Secretariat. The powers supplied the 
APR Panel gave it the authority to supervise the activities of the Secretariat while simultaneously 
taking charge of the administrative issues related to the entire peer review process. At its 
inception in 2003, the APR Panel was mandated to direct the operations and management of the 
review process (APRM Base Document, para 6, 2003). The intention was to create an 
independent and autonomous entity that produces credible and impartial decisions on the policies 
of participating States in the review process, while at the same time ensuring that the Panel is 
responsible and reporting directly to the APR Forum. The APR Forum acts as supervisor of the 
Panel and the Secretariat and is the supreme decision-making body of the review process (APRM 
Organization and Process Doc. para 1.1(a), 2003; Article 9 (2) of the APRM Statue, 2016). 
Based on the chain of command that is established in the institutional design of the APRM, all 
decisions and proposals of the Panel and the Secretariat were subject to the oversight of the APR 
Forum.  
As early as November 2004, the Heads of State participating in the review process made 
attempts to review the progress in the implementation of the APRM (Communiqué of APR 
Forum, 4 November 2004). At the second summit of the committee of participating Heads of 
state, the chairman of the Forum called on members to engage with the peer review process with 
utmost commitment, and recognised a need to re-examine the implementation of the process in 
countries where it had already been started (Communique of APR Forum November 2004, para 
9). The main issues of concern in this self-assessment centred around establishing an enduring 
relevance of the APRM as an undertaking, to mitigate the political and economic quagmire faced 
by member States. A major issue of concern, in the organization of the process, was the tenure of 
the chairperson of the APR Panel of eminent persons. The Forum resolved at the summit that the 
base rules be amended to allow for the rotation of the chairmanship of the Panel every year 
(Communique of Second APR Forum summit, para 15, November 2004).  As a result, the APR 
Forum, at its fifth summit in Banjul, Gambia in 2006, acting in conformity with the decision to 
rotate the chair of the APR panel, appointed Prof. Dorothy Njeuma as the new chairperson of the 
 92 
 
APR Panel (Communique of the fifth summit if the APR Forum, para 17, 30 June 2006). 
Through this change, the Forum demonstrated its authority to have the operations of the review 
process under its guidance. Furthermore, the Forum was optimistic that the idea to have the 
position of chairperson rotated among the Panel members would optimize the pool of talents 
available at every moment for the benefit of the decision-making process.   
After the years of implementation of the peer review process by the first pioneer countries to 
accede, some amendments have been made to the original structure. The initial structure and 
authority of the APR Panel, for instance, came to be seen to be undermined by a number of 
factors that some scholars have attributed to seemingly candid and credible judgments that have 
emanated from the Country Review Reports produced (interview with Joseph Tsang, member of 
the APR Panel 08.09.2015). At the inception of the review process, the leadership and 
management structure of the review process was to be directed by a Panel of between five and 
seven members (APRM Base Document para 6, 2003). The size of the Panel and its oversight 
responsibilities over the review process over the years have changed slightly. Amendments to the 
APRM Base Document adopted by the APR Forum titled Statue of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism agreed to a Panel composed of a maximum of nine members (Article 11 (2)a of the 
Statue of the APRM, 2016). Not only has the size of the Panel been modified, but some 
responsibilities hitherto performed by the Panel have been scrapped, or delegated to another sub-
body within the organizational structure of the review process.  
 As a first step towards reorganizing the review process, and galvanizing the needed support for 
the proper operations of its systems, a review of the implementation of the peer review process 
was initiated as early as July 2007 to realign and synthesise the operations of the process for 
effective and efficient decision-making. For instance, the 7th summit of the Committee of Heads 
of state and government participating in the APRM had, as its agenda, a consideration of the 
status of the implementation of the review process in member countries (Communique of the 
seventh summit of seventh APR Forum in Accra-Ghana, 1 July 2007). Two related issues in this 
regard were of prime concern to the APR Forum. These were the establishment of enduring 
national structures, and a commitment to the funding obligations of members.  
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In the first case, since the APRM Base Document at best leaves open the question of the kind of 
national structures required to support the process and implementation the review process, the 
Forum sought to give a clear direction in this respect. However, the decision of the seventh 
summit did not give a definitive answer to the exact organizational structure at the national level. 
The decision of the summit vaguely called on ‘all participating countries to fast-track their 
review process by putting in place the necessary national structures as soon as possible’ 
(Communique of 7th Summit of APR Forum, page 2, 1 July 2007: Communique of 8th Summit of 
the APR Forum, 30 January 2008; Communique of 9th Summit of the APR Forum para 2.2, 30 
June 2008). The decision of the summit still left open the precise and detailed requirements for 
the organizational structure at the national level. The general nature of the directive from the 
Forum still left its implementation open to different interpretations. The relevant issue at hand, at 
this particular time during this process, however, was a firm attempt, made by the Forum, to 
recalibrate processes at the national level to generate outcomes that advanced the envisaged 
objectives of the review process.  
The second issue, dealing with funding of the APRM process, has always been at the heart of the 
philosophy underpinning the origination of the entire review program. The idea behind this has 
always been stressed by stakeholders to be to ‘maintain the African ownership of the process’ 
(Communique of seventh summit of the APR Panel page 2, 1 July 2007). To many 
commentators, taking the responsibility to ensure that the review process is funded by African 
countries would preserve independence and ensure non-interference by external actors acting in 
their own interests. Yes, beyond the call for members to honour their obligations, nothing 
substantive was decided on the modalities for negligence and punitive measures concerning 
failure to pay.  
Other activities, as captured in the 2007 work-plan of the APR Panel, demonstrate an attempt to 
revise some aspects of the review process to meet the exigencies of time. Targets for reform 
were found in the master questionnaire and other base documents, the establishment of 
appropriate monitoring and evaluation frameworks, the fine-tuning of the APRM methodology 
and improvements in institutions related to the review process (Communique of the Seventh 
Summit of the APR Forum, July 2007; Communique of the 12th Summit of the APR Forum, 
page 2, para 11, January 2010).  
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In the first stage of the post-2008 reforms, the APR Forum took a decision to resolve the issue of 
the legal status of the APRM Secretariat as an ‘autonomous institution’ of the African Union 
(Communique of the 8th Summit of the APR Forum, page 2, January 2008; Communique of the 
9th Summit of the APR Panel, page 2, para 2.3; Communique of the 11th Summit of the APR 
Forum, page 2, para 12). This phase is perhaps the first restructuring of the APRM organizational 
structure. To achieve the goal of making the APRM an integral arm of the African Union, the 
proposal was to have the AU general assembly debate on its statutes. The need for reforms was 
propelled by the administrative and institutional challenges, encountered in the five year period 
of the implementation of the review process across the 28 member States that had acceded to the 
process at the time (Communique of the 8th Summit of the APR Forum, page 2). Among other 
problems, the host country agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the APRM 
Secretariat remained outstanding, and concrete measures had not been taken to settle the matter. 
In addition, the term of office for the first batch of members of the APR Panel was set to expire, 
and no new appointments were made in that regard.  
The decision of the Forum, regarding the processes and procedures for the appointment of the 
members of a new Panel, was to deviate from the original rules and rather allow for a two-stage 
change in the membership of the Panel of eminent persons, in order to retain some sort of 
institutional memory (Communique of the 8th Summit of the APR Forum, page 3; Communique 
of the 10th Summit of the APR Forum, page 4, para 22). Consequently the Forum appointed three 
new members in the first stage, allowing for four members of the Panel to continue to serve. In 
the second stage, the remaining four members retired after handing over to the next batch of 
members appointed by the Forum. This paved the way to ensure continuity within changes in the 
institutional operations of the review process, and enabled the APR Panel to sustain institutional 
memory of the founding principles that had served as the bedrock of the review process.  
A fundamentally important organizational issue that emerged in 2009 entailed a refinement of 
the ‘peer’ component of the review process. Hitherto, it was only the Heads of State and 
Government of participating member countries that were allowed to sit in on the discussions of 
the final ‘peer’ review sessions. This was a reflection of the notion that, the ‘peer’ component 
was literally preserved when Heads of State passed judgment on the reviewed report and offered 
their recommendations for tackling the deficiencies identified in the reports. From this position, a 
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change came when two key decisions by the Forum in June 2009 made it possible for partner 
institutions and representatives of Governments to participate in the proceedings of the Forum in 
the ‘peer review sessions.’ These actors were enabled to participate as observers without any 
voting rights. The decisions as expressed in the Communique of the 11th Summit of the Heads of 
State and Government of the APRM were as follows: firstly, ‘representatives of Heads of State 
and Government may attend peer review sessions but they cannot participate in the discussions 
that are held among the peers’, and secondly, ‘Heads of the APRM strategic partner institutions- 
AFDB, UNDP, UNECA- are allowed to attend APR Forum meetings but they cannot participate 
in the deliberations of the Heads of State and Government’ (Communique of 11th Summit of 
APR Forum, page 3, para 15). 
The involvement of strategic partners and other representatives of Governments in the peer 
sessions of the Heads of State give an indication of an attempt to introduce further accountability 
measures for the deliberations of the Heads of State. By making the peer sessions of the review 
process open to the involvement of other stakeholders, an institutional incentive was created to 
push decision makers towards making decisions that are based on the merits of the issues as 
presented in the Country Review Reports. Even if decision makers were thought to have some 
parochial interests in the issue areas of the review mechanism, under these arrangements it 
becomes difficult for them to make the choice to rely on their power resources to bargain on the 
recommendation presented by the APR Panel, since their actions are being observed by 
stakeholders in the review process. This organizational change in the peer sessions makes it 
possible for stakeholders to hold the Heads of State accountable for the final recommendations 
and decisions contained in the Country Review Reports.  
This first phase of reforms consequently made the APRM operationally autonomous from the 
African Union, yet the APRM remained constitutionally integrated in the AU operational 
structures (Communique of the 11th Summit of the APR Forum, page 3). Financially, the APRM 
gained autonomy in financing its budget without resort to the African Union. However, the 
States that made up its membership an exact parallel to those of the African Union. The 
operational separation of the APRM from the AU over the years did not prove to be fully 
beneficial in terms of the operational costs that had been a huge challenge to the management 
and operations of the review process. As a consequence, the second and third stages of reforms 
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in the operations of the review process involved the systematic integration of the APRM into the 
AU structures, and an enlargement of the mandate of the APRM to monitor the activities and 
programmes of the African Union.  
Up until 2012, the operation and management of the APRM’s institutional set-up was completely 
independent from the AU structures. The APRM had its own Secretariat and was headed by a 
chief executive officer. With the adoption of a revised APRM questionnaire and APRM 
operating procedures by the Forum in 2012, the stage was set for further reforms that would see 
the APRM process integrated into the AU system and endowed with enlarged authority to 
monitor the policies and programmes of the AU (see Communique of the 17th Summit of the 
APR Forum, para 21, 40, 42 and 44). 
This phase of reforms merely created another entity, the Focal Points Committee, with a specific 
mandate of oversight of the administrative and operational duties of the APRM Secretariat. With 
the creation of this committee, the regulatory functions of the APR Panel changed once again. 
The brief of the Panel was curtailed to only perform activities related to country peer reviews. In 
this way the original mandate of the APR Panel, to have oversight responsibility of the 
administrative and operations issues of the review process, was abolished (APR Base Doc. para 
6). According to the new changes that were made, decisions of the Panel were still subject to 
general directives issued by the APR Forum, the highest decision-making organ of the APRM 
(Communique of the 11th Summit of the APR Forum, para 15). The new system assigned the 
newly created Focal Points Committee with the responsibility of making recommendations for 
consideration by the Forum on issues related to the operations of the APRM Secretariat. This 
committee had the statute of a ministerial body that served as an intermediary between the APR 
Forum and the APR Secretariat (Statue of the APRM, Article 10). This system makes it possible 
for the APR Panel to concentrate on Country Review Reports and to have its programmes and 
budgets approved by the committee, before they are given consideration by the highest decision-
making authority. Though both the Panel and the Focal Points Committee enjoy much freedom 
in the operation of their mandates, both are subject to the directives of the Forum. 
In the final phase, the operational activities of the review process were restructured and 
integrated into the AU system (Communique of 17th Summit of the APR Forum, page 5, para 44; 
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Communique of the 18th Summit of the APR Forum, page 4, para 42; Communique of the 19th 
Summit of the APR Forum, page 4, para 24; Communique of 20th Summit of the APR Forum, 
page 5, para 33, Communique of the 22nd Summit of the APR Forum, page 2, para 12; 
Communique of the 23rd Summit of the APR Forum, page 2, para 12 and 22a). A decision in the 
twenty-third ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union unanimously decided that 
the APRM be integrated into the AU organizational structure as an autonomous entity 
(Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec. 527(XXIII)). This decision basically reaffirmed the exercise of 
financial and budgetary independence in the process of the APRM, as originally envisioned. The 
most important aspect of the decision was for the administrative structures, management and 
legal personality of the APRM to be modeled on the standard procedures of the African Union.  
As a result, the APRM became a specialized agency of the African Union, broadly mandated to 
monitor and evaluate the policies and programmes of the AU (APRM communications, poste on 
10th March 2017; APRM Communications, 9th February 2017). The decision of the African 
Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government, to extend the mandate of the APRM to 
track the implementation and oversee the monitoring of Continental-wide policies on 
governance, follows an expert report on recommendations for reforms in the African Union. The 
decision of the general assembly of the AU basically expanded the mandate of the APRM to 
include the monitoring and evaluation of the African Union agenda 2063 and the United Nations 
sustainable development goals agenda 2030 (Eddy Maloka, City Press 02.04.2017; APRM 
Communications, 2nd February 2017).  
This expanded mandate, on the other hand, has no direct effect on the organizational structures 
of the APRM process as it stands. No entity has been created to take up the role envisaged in the 
general directives of the AU assembly. The general rules of procedure makes it possible for 
committees to be created when the need arise. As a consequence, decisions of the agency are 
now subject to oversight by the APR Forum and the Focal Points Committee of the APR. The 
independence of the Panel then relies much on its ability to proceed with its activities without 
any interference from other entities in the review process. 
To conclude, the three stage reform process, identified above, led not only to a complete 
separation of functions between the APR Panel and other entities, but also a reinforcement of the 
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oversight role of the APR Forum in the review process. The legal persona of the APR Secretariat 
was transformed into a wholly autonomous entity, integrated in the African Union organizational 
structures. In this context a largely independent APR Panel emerged with the specialized task of 
concentrating solely on peer review reports and the processes that leads up to the country review 
missions. At the same time, the Focal Points Committee, which emerged out of the reforms, 
plays an intermediary role between the Heads of State and the APRM Secretariat. Therefore, the 
various reforms and restructuring of the organizational structure over the years created a gradual 
differentiation of functions among the various entities in the organizational structure of the APR 
process. In order to grasp the operational duties and the presence of functional differentiation in 
the organizational operations of the review process, the ensuing sections give a detailed 
description of each of the entities involved in the decision-making process of the review process.         
 
3.4. The Separation of Functions in the Organizational Structure of the APRM 
In order to explain how functional differentiation can serve as an independent factor to impact 
the outcome of decisions in the review process, this section gives insight into the various 
functions assigned to each of the sub-bodies within the institutional operations of the review 
process. The section makes a claim that, by assigning complementary roles to each of the sub-
systems, incentives are created for each body to be accountable. In that light, a dichotomy 
between a rule making and rule implementation function by the APR Forum and the other sub-
systems is established. The discussion that follows looks at each of the APR institutional bodies 
in detail. 
 
3.4.1. APR Forum (Committee of Heads of State and Government) 
The APR Forum consists of the Heads of State of participating countries in the APRM process. It 
serves as the supreme decision-making body of the APRM process. The overall responsibility of 
the APRM is vested with the Forum (Article 2.1, NEPAD/HSGIC-3-
2003/APRM/Guideline/O&P March 2003). The Committee of Heads of State has overall 
oversight and authority over the APRM. The APR Forum, as the hierarchical superior body of 
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the governance system of the APRM process, sets the scope, mandate, objectives and structure of 
the APRM regime under its protocol and a document that emerged out of the sixth summit of the 
Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of the NEPAD in March 
2003 (APRM Guidelines, 2003). The guidelines serve as the guiding framework for the 
operation of the various bodies that are created within the institutional setting of the APRM.  
In the absence of any specific or particular provisions in the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, the APR Forum broadly enjoys a large amount of discretion in the design of the peer 
review process. The Heads of State and Government of participating countries have the power to 
create institutions and delegate functions to them, when the Forum considers it appropriate, as 
the plenary body with the ultimate responsibility of defining the objectives of the review process 
(Chukwumerije, 2006:79). The overall responsibility of the APRM is thus vested in the APR 
Forum. The Forum is entrusted with the ultimate responsibility for mutual learning and capacity 
building, and to exercise constructive peer dialogue and the practice of persuasion of members to 
the policies and programmes of member States (APRM Organization and process doc. para 
2.2d). The APR Forum serves as the avenue through which peer learning may take place through 
the sharing of best practices among member States (Grimm et al 2009). Among other things the 
APR Forum appoints members of the APR Panel. The APR Forum therefore delegates decision-
making authority to the APR Panel to oversee the peer review process.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
The Forum directs the activities of the other bodies under the APRM through the adoption of 
protocols at their annual meetings, which mostly take place on the sidelines at the AU Heads of 
State and Government Summits. Over the course of time, then, the role of directing the activities 
of the various subsidiary organs of the APRM has been shifted to the APR Panel. The guidelines, 
which were adopted by the HSGIC, delegated the task of producing guidelines for the conduct of 
country review visits to the Secretariat and Panel, subject to the approval of the committee of 
Participating Heads of State and Government of the APRM (APRM Guidelines para. 2).  
The Forum has adopted an increasing dense set of procedural and substantive provisions that 
govern the conduct of the peer review process. The Forum retains the right to approve any 
guidelines and rules that are set out by, any of the organs, to give direction to how their activities 
are conducted. In general, procedural rules that are elaborated and adopted by the Forum are 
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broad in perspective and may apply to unknown future situations, taking into consideration 
individual country differences. The Forum also serves as a platform, where dialogue is generated 
among States participating in the APRM, to reason for common and amicable policy options to 
address lapses that are identified in the process of the peer review. Final recommendations are 
adopted at the APR Forum before they are published and made public at various regional 
institutions, including the African Parliament and other sub-regional bodies and institutions.  
The code of conduct and the rules of procedure for both the APR Panels are approved by the 
Forum. It has the mandate to ensure that the various sub organs within the institutional setting of 
the APRM are adequately resourced in order to manage the process of producing effective and 
efficient outcomes. All components of the APRM organization which set its code of conduct also 
need approval from the Heads of State and Government Committee. To ensure that reports and 
recommendations are communicated to the general public and other institutions of relevance, the 
APR Panel, according to the guidelines, must make public all such reports pertaining to the 
review of a member State (Article 2f&g, NEPAD/HSGIC-3-2003/APRM/Guideline/O&P March 
2003).  
In a sense, the task of enacting binding and general rules is within the purview of the APR 
Forum. It performs a task that can be liken to a legislative function, enacting legally binding 
rules that serve as a guide to the operations of other committees in the APR process. The 
intentions of such general rules are to serve as a point of reference for each agency, and are 
constructed to hopefully last for a long period of time. By limiting the functions of the Forum to 
formulating general rules to be applied on specific cases by other bodies, a loop is created, 
enabling the decisions of the Forum to strive to represent the median interests of all member 
States in the review process. As a consequence, members in the Forum act can be unaware of the 
implication of specific rules to future cases, enabling them bargain over the options available for 
the pursuit of their parochial interests.  
For instance, in 2009, the APR Forum gave a general directive to the Panel to formulate 
transparent procedures for the appointment of members into the Panel, as well as modalities of 
designating the chairperson of the APR Panel (Communique of the 10th Summit of the APR 
Forum, page 4, para 22). The directive, at best, can be described as vague. As a result it gives the 
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Panel a considerable margin of choice in formulating procedures that they feel are in the best 
interest of the review process. The general directives to a large extent are incomplete, and their 
implementation is mostly left to the discretion of the implementation body. Since general 
directives emanating from the APR Forum are blind to the specific situation of their 
implementation, it forces decision makers at the highest level to deliberate over the 
reasonableness of options available. Thus this measure creates an incentive to prevent members 
of the Forum resorting to their power resources in taking decisions that are geared towards the 
operations of the review process. In a nutshell, the exclusive assignment of a rule making 
function to the Forum contributes to inducing members of the Forum to deliberate on the most 
appropriate options in given decision situations. By being unaware of the future case specific 
situations and how general directives may be applied they are pushed to make decisions that are 
in the best interest of the review process.   
 
3.4.2. APR Panel (Panel of Eminent Persons) 
The APR Panel derives its mandate from the African Peer Review Mechanism base document 
(AHG/235(XXXVIII, 2003). The document was endorsed by the African Union Summit in 
Durban, South Africa in July 2002. The Panel supplements the governance system with its 
distinct and diverse expertise. The APR Panel is appointed by the Heads of State and 
Government committee of the APRM. It is an independent body of the APRM charged with the 
responsibility of organizing the peer reviews of member States. It engages in a rule-application 
function alongside the APR Forum which engages in rule making. The Panel develops its own 
rules of procedure (APRM Organization and Process doc. 2003, Para. 3.1g) that specify and 
elaborate on the more general directives enshrined in the APRM Organization and Procedure 
document. Rules and guidelines developed by the Panel need the approval of the Forum. The 
Panel is also responsible for approving any guidelines developed by the APR Secretariat and the 
APR Teams. As the main body that regulates the APRM process, it relieves the Heads of State 
and Government Committee of the need to provide comprehensive rules to ensure the proper 
functioning of the review process without undermining the oversight function of the Forum.  It 
constitutes the main body set up by the Heads of State and Government Committee to exercise 
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oversight on the review component of the APR process, with a view to ensuring the credibility of 
the process (APRM Organization and Process doc. 2003, Para. 3.1). 
The APR Panel consists of up to nine members, appointed by the APR Forum. The chairperson 
of the Panel, appointed from the members of the Panel, serves for a period of up to five years 
while other Eminent Persons each serve for a period of up to four years, renewable once. 
Members of the Panel do not represent their individual countries, but are appointed to protect the 
long term interest all the Principals (States participating in the APRM process). Though the 
Panel reports to the Heads of State and Government Committee, the APRM base document 
anticipates that the general mandate of the APR Panel will be defined in a Charter. By shifting 
the role of making rules and guidelines to the APR Panel and the Secretariat, the Forum hedges 
itself against any tense political situations which may entail a deadlock in elaborating any rules 
and guidelines that take into account the future success of the process. By extricating the APR 
Forum from most political tensions that are inherent in creating such guidelines and rules, 
delegating to the APR Panel and the Secretariat, the option of strictly regulating the Panel 
becomes non-existent. The absence of a regulator, in the strict sense of the word, in the APRM 
governance system prevents a situation where specific opportunity structures prevail for any 
other bodies that have their decisions blocked, to search for alternative forums to advance their 
interests. 
Members of the Panel of Eminent Persons are expected to be distinguished, and experienced in 
careers that are relevant to the work of the APRM. Among some professionals who have served 
on the Panel are diplomats, academics and professional experts in the various areas of focus in 
the APRM. The APRM Organization and Process document is clear on the need for the 
composition of the Panel to reflect broad regional balance, gender and cultural diversity (APRM 
Organization and Process doc. 2003, para.3.6). The decision rationale for delegating decision-
making authority of the APRM process to the APR Panel is to ensure that the long term interests 
of States participating in the APRM are achieved, by depriving States of the opportunity to 
pursue short term interests in lieu of the long term collective interests of members.  
An important role played by the Panel is to oversee the overall APRM process, and to guarantee 
the integrity, independence and professionalism of the peer review process. To preserve the 
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credibility of the process, the Panel oversees the selection of APR Teams and the process of 
conducting country reviews (APRM organization and process doc. 2003, para. 3). In this way an 
organizational incentive is put in place to deprive the APR Forum of the opportunity to introduce 
their parochial interest into the decision-making process of the review. In most instances, the 
Panel recommends appropriate African institutions or individuals should conduct the technical 
assessments that are required to produce the most informed Country Review Reports, enabling 
the Panel to make the most problem-adequate recommendation to the APR Forum (APRM 
organization and process doc. 2003, para.3.1c). The Panel develops tools, instruments, codes of 
conduct and guidelines to govern the country review process with approval from the APR 
Forum, having set the guiding rules on how each country review process must proceed in 
accordance with the guiding principles of the APRM documents.  
The Panel therefore plays a crucial role in the country review process and serves as the main 
anchor when the process proceeds from the signing of the base documents to the final 
submission of the Country Review Report, and then to the enactment of the program of action 
which is expected to be implemented by the country to realize the objectives emerging from the 
peer review process. The Panel, as an agent of the States participating in the APRM, works to 
realize the long term policy goals of the member States, by making sure that States do not take 
short cuts to formulate policies that may not be to the long term benefit of all actors involved. It 
is also expected of the Panel that it coordinates visits by the support missions to countries that 
are to undertake a peer review process. Support missions generally assist a State preparing to go 
through the peer review by putting into place necessary structures and institutions at the national 
level for a smooth take-off of the process. This usually involves giving technical and 
administrative support to officials in a member State in getting the process started.  
For each country review, there is one Panel member appointed by the APR Panel to coordinate 
the activities of the process. The Panel selects the country review team that will support the APR 
Panel member that is appointed to lead the process in a member country.  They make an 
assessment of, and give recommendations on Country Review Reports, with a program of action 
on how to fix deficiencies that are identified. These final decisions are presented to the APR 
Forum, made-up of the Heads of State of participating countries, for adoption and 
implementation.  
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The APR Panel has thus been described as a ‘credibility buffer’ between the country review and 
the APR Forum (Grimm and Mashele 2006). The Panel is expected to mediate and filter any 
tendencies by member States to insist on having their parochial interest highlighted in the 
production of the final recommendations and programme of action made to the APR Forum. This 
role may thus help in preserving the immunity of the process to any political manipulations, and 
may discourage any tendency by member States to introduce their preferences in the decision 
rationale of the Panel. The Panel of Eminent Persons therefore engages in rule-making alongside 
the Heads of State and Government Committee. The Panel sets the guidelines, and the Forum 
approves or adopts them to become operational, submitting recommendations to the APR Forum 
on measures that could be taken to assist the country in the improvement of socio-economic 
development and governance performance (APRM organization and process. doc. 2003, 
para.3.1f).  
 
3.4.3. The Focal Points Committee 
Another important sub-system in the APRM Continental structure is the Focal Points Committee. 
It is composed of national focal points of participating countries. It has the status of a ministerial 
body and serves as an intermediary between the APR Forum and the Continental Secretariat 
(APRM Statue, Article 10 (1)). In effect, it comprises the focal points of participating countries 
who are the representatives of the Heads of State and Government participating in the APRM.  
The Focal Points Committee is led by a troika comprising a chairman, assisted by the immediate 
predecessor and successor for that position. Working in this administrative capacity, the troika is 
expected to lead the committee in managing the activities of the review process at the Secretariat. 
In a sense the Focal Points Committee performs a coordinating role between the Heads of State 
and Government participating in the review process and other bodies in the operational system of 
the review mechanism. By entrusting the leadership of the Focal Points Committee to a troika 
which is constituted from present, past and future leaders, the opportunity structure is created for 
members to harness the experience of past members for the proper direction of the activities of 
the review process.  
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The responsibilities bestowed on the Focal Points Committee are, to a large extent, 
administrative in nature. Article 10 (4) of the APRM Statue defines its general obligations. The 
Committee is entrusted with the responsibility of making recommendations to the APR Forum 
on appointments to the Secretariat. For instance, in the appointment of the CEO of the APRM 
Secretariat, the Committee makes recommendations to the Forum on the candidate best suited for 
the job, based on the recruitment modality it operates. The general rules that guide the conduct of 
the Committee in making recommendations to the Forum are incomplete, and demand that 
further guidelines be produced. As a consequence, the Committee develops further guidelines to 
serve as a guide to their operations in specific situations. The Focal Points Committee also has 
the responsibility to review the annual budget and work programme of the APRM, submitted by 
the CEO of the APRM Continental Secretariat, making recommendations and submitting them to 
the APR Forum for adoption (APRM Statue, Article 10(4b)). The Forum, as the highest 
decision-making organ, therefore relieves itself of involvement in issues relating to the day-to-
day administrative operations of the review process. As a consequence, it provides institutional 
incentives to deny the pursuit of parochial interests or power-based bargaining among the 
political decision makers. The presence of the Focal Points Committee in the institutional 
structure of the decision-making process of the APRM helps deal with the possibility of rolling 
back the decision process, by providing incentives for members at the committee level to 
deliberate on issues and provide problem-adequate solutions for the adoption of the Forum. 
In contrast to other expert committees that are involved in the operations of the review process, 
the Focal Points Committee serves as the managerial hub for the decision-making process of the 
review. It is within the mandate of the committee to manage the APRM trust fund and see to the 
proper monitoring and audit of APR reports (Statue of APRM, Article 10(4e)). By assigning the 
Committee with the responsibility of monitoring and evaluating the activities of the Secretariat, 
the highest decision-making body creates an institutional incentive structure for the CEO of the 
Secretariat and other staff to make decisions that are in the best interests of the review process. 
The Committee thus becomes an extra institutional means of expecting other committees within 
the institutional operations of the review process to be accountable for their decisions at each 
stage of the review process.  
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In order to make it flexible for the Focal Points Committee to manage the administrative duties at 
the Secretariat, it is further empowered with the authority to establish sub-committees with 
specific mandates, as may be deemed necessary for a given duration (Statue of APRM, Article 
10 (6,7&8). Having the power to create sub-committees with specific mandates, in effect, grants 
the committee a version of executive power. This empowerment came about as a tacit response 
to the demand to curtail the initial powers that were bequeathed to the APR Panel. The Panel, in 
the exercise of its duties, has shown a candid approach in their Country Review Reports.  The 
fact that an intermediary body was needed appears to show the Reports, over the years, have 
challenged the authority of the Forum in respect of its approach to policy issues in some States.  
To sum up, the Focal Points Committee, as the body with oversight responsibility over 
administrative issues in the review process, is given powers that are akin to the powers of an 
independent administrative agent. The rationale for its operation is based on the general mandate 
codified in the Statue of the APRM. In order to function without administrative bottlenecks, the 
committee sets out to determine guidelines for any decision situation. The Focal Points 
Committee represents the interests of the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
review process, and, in this sense, could become entangled with the power dynamics that may be 
at play at the Heads of State Forum. On the other hand, the Focal Points Committee acts as an 
agent of the Forum, with the mandate of making decisions in the best interests of the operations 
of the review process. The institutional incentives created for merit-based decision-making, at 
the APR Forum level, is based on the ability of the Focal Points Committee to absorb all political 
debates that might arise in the decision-making process. The Forum therefore does not usually 
tend to debate issues that are brought before it by the Focal Points Committee, and almost all 
recommendations from the Focal Points Committee get the approval of the Forum. As a 
consequence, the committee insulates the decision-making process from power-based decision-
making.    
 
3.4.4. The APRM Continental Secretariat 
The APRM Continental Secretariat is led by a Chief Executive Officer, appointed by the APR 
Forum. The Forum adopts regulations and conditions that sets out the powers and duties of the 
 107 
 
CEO’s office. This appointment is at the rank of a commissioner of the African Union, which 
therefore entails conferring executive powers as the CEO of the Secretariat.  
The Secretariat supports the APR Panel and the country review teams in accessing information 
on a participating country undergoing the review process. It gathers background information on 
the political and socio-economic development in a participating country, and coordinates the 
administrative and technical exigencies of the peer review process in participating States. In this 
respect the Secretariat, together with the APR Panel, is responsible for implementing general 
directives on the detailed criteria that are used as indicators for country assessments.  Rules 
based upon the criteria are issued at the beginning of each process of the review, to serve as a 
guide to the country on how data and information at the county level is expected to be organized. 
A variety of documents serve to construct the guidelines for the conduct of a peer review among 
member States. The APRM base document, which has been adopted by the Heads of State of 
participating countries, serves as the main document that gives directions on how the process 
must proceed. Other documents emerge in the course of the process, with some directives issued 
by the APRM Panel and Secretariat serving as a guide to most member States in their country 
review process.  
To effectively carry out the mandate of providing technical, advisory, coordination and 
administrative support functions to the various organs, the Secretariat is tasked with undertaking 
and managing research activities that underpin the APRM process (Statue of APRM, Article 
12(1a)). This involves preparing the necessary background work to facilitate the country review 
processes. It also entails undertaking to support country review missions and publishing reports, 
monitoring papers and follow-ups.  
 
3.4.5. APR Partner Institutions 
The APRM works in collaboration with institutions with knowledge and expertise in various 
areas of interest to the APRM process. Each peer review sees the composition of a country 
review team which encompasses the recruitment of strategic partners of the APRM. The country 
review teams inspect the proceedings of countries during the peer review. Each country review 
 108 
 
team, led by a member of the APR Panel, writes the reports that form the basis for the 
deliberative review of the Heads of State Committee. The country review teams are specifically 
assembled for each review process by the APR Panel and their task usually takes three to five 
weeks. The APRM base document calls for the composition of a balanced, integrated and 
technically competent country review team, that is professional in all aspects of the conduct of 
the country review process (APRM base doc. para 11).  
Partner institutions play a major role in assessing the technical viability of the programme of 
action that is compiled at the end of the process. They give expert advice on the modalities of 
planning and implementing the PoA at the end of the peer review process. Members of the 
partner institutions participate in deliberations of the country review teams, and they also take 
part in the meetings of the APR Forum (the Heads of State of Participating Countries) which 
meets to adopt the final reports. The involvement of the partner institutions meets the need for 
competent expertise to be at the forefront of the peer review process, giving the work of the 
institution more credibility. The presence of the partner institutions mediates any attempt by 
States to pursue their self-interest or not to work to achieve the general objective of the peer 
review process to enhance the governance process in the country under review. It is also 
important to note that the APR partner institutions are actually involved in the review missions, 
advising and offering the best possible policy options in the various areas of the review process.  
 
3.4.6. APRM Institutions at the National Level 
Participating countries in the APRM process, beyond their role in Continental structures, set up 
additional coordinating institutions at the national level. The official APRM base document does 
not categorically specify which structures are to be established at the national level, so 
participating States are largely left to their own devices in defining which institutions to set up at 
the national level to coordinate the process of the peer review (Herbert 2006). However, the 
common feature among all States participating in the process is the creation of similar 
coordinating institutions at the national level. The difference in institutional structure from one 
country to another is in the operational capacity of the institutions established. While in some 
countries these institutions operate as independent departments, in others they are under the 
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oversight of a government ministry. These differences could well account for the level of 
independence and efficiency of the structures at the national level. 
One key institutional structure, common to member States of the APRM, is created by the 
establishment of a Focal Point. The Focal Point serves as a crucial interface and coordinating 
vehicle among various stakeholders in the APRM. The base document of the APRM defines the 
Focal Point as either an institution at ministerial level, or an independent individual, who reports 
the activities of the peer review process directly to the government. Most Focal Points have 
technical committees supporting the work of the national APRM process, which assist in the 
coordination of the peer review process at the national level. The Focal Point serves as the link 
between the APR Forum and APR Panel on the one hand, and national institutions on the other. 
Nomination of personnel to the focal point is made by each government, and the process varies 
from country to country. While in some countries the Focal Point reports directly to the Head of 
State or Cabinet, in other countries the Focal point reports to a Minister. Herbert and Gruzd 
(2008) argue that the appointment and composition of the focal points in some countries is an 
issue of debate, and that an understanding of the independent role of the focal point might raise 
some contention. As a result they propose a situation where the Focal Point would be 
independent and out of the reach of governmental influence in reporting the true situation in any 
particular State.  The practice of setting-up Focal Points, and their composition in various 
countries may partly explain the level of commitment of various countries and governments to 
the APRM process.  
National governing councils and steering commissions are also common institutional features at 
the national level in most participating States. At the start of the peer review process in 2003, 
there were no templates for the pioneer States on how to model the steering commissions and the 
governing councils. Besides the Focal Point, which had an individual appointed by the 
government to coordinate the APRM process at the national level, the governing councils were 
created by some countries to serve as a buffer from the political maneuvering in a country. The 
governing council in most countries managed the process and reported to the Focal Point. In such 
instances, it helped to disentangle the whole process from the trappings of any parochial political 
interests that were likely to be generated at the national level. This process has the capability of 
preventing any stage-managed, and therefore damaging, reports and decisions. The relationship 
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and composition of the governing councils to the Focal Points generally touches on the question 
of the independence and autonomy of these institutions at the national level, and how far they 
function to produce recommendations and decisions that do not reintroduce the short term 
interest of member States.  
 
3.4.7. Technical Research Institutes 
Another key structure in the process of the review is the Technical Research Institutes (TRIs). 
The TRIs are tasked with developing instruments to collect information on key areas of the peer 
review process. This involves extensive consultation within various relevant sectors of society, 
making their information gathering task as wide and practicable as is possible (Statute of the 
APRM, Article 18 (2), pg 21). These technical institutions are appointed by the national 
governing council, with the key point of reference for their appointment being the competence 
and expertise of the institution with respect to the main issues of interest in the APRM. They 
administer peer review questionnaires on various aspects of the process. The work of the 
technical research institutions serve as the basis on which the country self-assessment report is 
drafted and then forwarded to the APRM Continental Secretariat and the APR Panel for the 
country visits to take place.  
 
3.5. Decision Stages of the African Peer Review Mechanism  
Functional differentiation within the decision-making system of the APRM developed and 
crystallized over time. With the creation of the current system in 2003, several modifications 
were made to the APRM machinery in the light of difficulties that were faced by the first group 
of countries that went through the peer review process. Three considerably overlapping decision 
stages of the APRM process can be identified. These stages of the peer review provide distinct 
opportunity structures for shaping the outcome of decisions that are made by the Panel. In each 
of the stages a key APRM institution assists and monitors the progress of the process, and offers 
needed advice.  
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This process leads to the production of two important reports which serve as the main documents 
for the entire process of the peer review. A self-assessment report is completed by the country 
under review in a thorough participatory process that is led by the government (Akoth Ouma, 
2007). Each stage of the process involves the active involvement of members of the various sub-
organs.  
The first stage of the decision-making involves a self-assessment that is initiated through the 
Secretariat. The second stage involves an evaluation of reports that are submitted by the country 
under review, led by the country review mission. The country reports that emanate from the 
country visit are validated by a country support team that is chaired by a member of the Panel. 
The final decisions on a State are made when the participating Heads of State meet at the APR 
Forum to discuss the final recommendations that are made by the APR Panel. 
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 
adopted by the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of the 
NEPAD, reflects the intentions of the APRM parties to produce decisions that are not dominated 
by partisan power-based bargaining. The process is envisaged to be guided by the sharing of 
experiences, and the reinforcement of best practice in participating countries (Article 8, APRM 
MoU, NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003). Decisions on adherence to the set standards are fully assigned 
to the APR Panel, which is composed of up to nine experts in various fields relevant to the peer 
review process.  
The next section establishes a discussion of the stages of a typical review of a country. It 
identifies various institutional incentive structures that might exist at each stage to promote 
deliberation among decision makers. It the contentions of this dissertation, that member States 
generally sacrifice the power to influence the content of decisions if they resort to power-based 
bargaining. Through various institutional accountability mechanisms, it is expected that, to a 
large extent, the decision-making process produces accepted and appropriate results, as actors 
seek to ensure that power-based interventions by States are systematically dealt with so that the 
peer review process is consistent with their general intentions.  
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3.5.1. First Stage: Decision Criteria as Accepted Points of Reference 
As part of their policy regarding a the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the 
Heads of State and Government of the African Union adopted a set of detailed general provisions 
establishing the procedures and processes of the APRM process. These rules and guidelines 
define the responsibilities of the actors involved in the process. Over time, most of the guiding 
documents have been refined to meet further exigencies. The standards and codes approved by 
the countries participating in the APRM serve as a yardstick against which individual member 
States are measured. The standards and criteria are formulated to give guidance to the key actors 
and reference points to parameters of assessment in the process.  The first stage of decision-
making has to do with deciding on the key issues that would be the focus of the review process 
after a country undertakes a self-assessment report. The APR Secretariat plays an important role 
at this stage of the process.  
An important established criterion is in the requirement that any review process must be free 
from political manipulation, and technically competent. Deficiencies identified therein are to be 
systematically fixed through a comprehensive program of action that also commits to a time 
frame for addressing any issues (Article 3 and 4, APRM Overview Document, June 2002). This 
criterion is indispensable to the operations of the APRM, since the process relies on securing the 
commitment of member States to achieve the long term interest of all member States involved in 
the process. Notwithstanding the fact that the operations of the APRM process occur in a 
political space, its ability to insulate itself from political interference and manipulation is key to 
achieving the appropriateness and legitimacy of the decisions that are made by the various bodies 
in the peer review process. If the process did not highlight an identification of any deficiencies 
which prevent the process being devoid of any political manipulation, APRM projects would 
inevitably undermine the general aim of the NEPAD project, since they would have perpetrated a 
wrong diagnosis of the problems the project aims at achieving.  
A country under review is expected to create a national Focal Point to coordinate activities 
between the Secretariat and the State. After initial consultation with a country that agrees to be 
peer reviewed, an overview of the process is discussed with the country on modalities and 
particularities of importance. The national Focal Point has the responsibility of sending the Self-
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Assessment Questionnaire to wide variety of stakeholders. The questionnaire solicits opinions 
and facts about issues of relevance to the peer review, and the particular needs of the country are 
contextualized to meet the general objectives of the process.  
Once the ground-level structures are established in a country, the APR Secretariat and the 
country under review simultaneously, but independently, compile preliminary documents. A 
background paper is prepared by the Secretariat aimed at bringing up to speed the information 
gathering of the country through national, regional and international organizations. This paper 
gives an idea of the various international regimes and protocols the country is party to, and the 
extent of its adherence to the principles enshrined in those organizations. Based on information 
received from the Focal Point on relevant laws, treaty ratifications, budgets and development 
plans, the APR Secretariat prepares a document outlining the nation’s major issues (Herbert 
2007, atkt/Herbert/apr overview 2007). This document is intended to further guide the country 
on the program of action that it drafts to tackle any outstanding important issues. The national 
program of action, drafted by the government in response to the major issues identified, should 
contain clear steps and guidelines on the how the country under review intends to bring itself into 
conformity with APRM codes and standards, the African Union Charter, and UN and other 
international obligations. The national program of action therefore generally contains the 
commitments made by the State to achieving the goals of the APR project.  
The APR Panel, over the years, has tried to clarify and make as precise as possible some of the 
speculative and vague rules and directives that were issued arising from the initial reviews in 
2003. The original questionnaire, which outlines the major issues of interest and the means 
available to judge adherence to established standards, has been revised. Most countries had 
complained of its vagueness and repetitive nature. The revised questionnaire, which was 
introduced in 2012, addresses this problem as, for example, it has a glossary of terms that clearly 
defines what it means by some words and phrases as they appear in the documents.  
Other general substantive criteria commit the decision makers to specific guidelines in respect of 
the standards and codes that are associated with each thematic area. The guidelines for 
democracy and good political governance, for instance, are clear on the specific laws and 
international protocols to be assessed. Decision makers have the option of indicating if and when 
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a particular international treaty of interest has been adopted, ratified or enacted. There is however 
a column that allows for reservation notes and comments by the assessors. The specific 
guidelines, to some extent, limit the discretion of the decision apparatus, but this is obviated by 
the fact that, at the national level, the system is still prone to political compromise and some 
questionable interventions by the States. To prevent unnecessary interventions that might roll 
back or slow down the decision process, the presence of clear standards and codes which guide 
each of the issue areas makes it possible to prevent a possible conflict between the government 
and other civil society groups that might have an interest in some of the specific issues of 
interest.  
General provisions are also given on modalities of interpretation or implementation of the MoU 
in instances of conflicts between the parties (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU). Any 
differences that result in the process being contested are to be resolved by negotiation between 
the parties involved. Through mutual consent between the parties, amendments to the initial 
MoU can always be initiated by the participating country where there is a substantial change in 
the issues that were originally thought to be of prime concern. Additionally, in all instances the 
procedures to be adopted under the APRM need to be consistent with the decisions and 
procedures of the African Union (Article 27, MOU of APRM 2003). This provision is 
formulated to make use of dialogue, through the influence and auspices of the African Union, as 
the most accepted means of solving all conflicts that might emerge in the process. The APRM 
sees dialogue and mutual persuasion as the most potent instruments to rally all member States to 
implement their programs.  
To a large extent, the substantive criteria adopted by the member States to guide the initial stage 
of the peer review process narrow the discretion of the actors in the assessment of the programs 
and policies of a country at the preliminary stage. Since the initial stage of drawing up a program 
of action, prescribing how big issues identified can be fixed, is characterized by many political 
considerations, the move to have a precise questionnaire that serves as a guideline on the 
contentious areas helps in reducing conflicts that could arise. The guidelines generally reflect a 
set of principles that should be considered in the assessment process, and then restrain, as much 
as possible, the tendency by government to politically manipulate the process and render it 
impotent in achieving its goals and objectives.  
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3.5.2. Second Phase of Country Visits and Validation of Reports: Strong Accountability 
Mechanisms Leading to the Proper Application of General Decision Criteria 
Several accountability mechanisms are intended to ensure that the independent APR Panel 
adheres to its task and does not abuse the powers and competencies at its disposal. They also 
demonstrate, to a large extent, that governance systems will be enhanced substantially where 
institutional mechanisms contribute to greater accountability in the decision-making process, and 
this could lead to the involvement of several expert actors with varied levels of interests. The 
2004 Kigali meeting of the APR Heads of State adopted recommendations that stressed the need 
for an inclusive and broad involvement of civil society. It called specifically for participating 
countries to take steps to identify or establish broad-based and all-inclusive APRM National 
Coordinating Structures (NCS), which were to be responsible for ensuring that a wide variety of 
stakeholders in the APR are involved at each stage of the process.  
The assessments of major issues in the APR process by the country review team, and the 
subsequent drafting of the review report, are perhaps the most far-reaching tasks of the review 
team. The team is usually composed of members of the APR Panel and some other stakeholders. 
At this stage of the decision process members of the review team will visit the country 
concerned, where a wide range of consultations will be held with government officials, 
parliamentarians, political parties, civil society groups, the media, academia, trade unions, 
business and professional bodies in order to validate the authenticity of the information 
generated at the national level, and the feasibility of the program of action put up by the country 
on remedies to perceived shortfalls. The composition of the country review team and its guiding 
rules helps to sort out any parochial interest which member States may seek to pursue. The 
involvement of various entities also makes the members internally accountable to each other.  
A country review team is composed of up to fifteen members. It is led by, at most, two members 
of the APR Panel. Others members on the team include experts from the UN Commission on 
Africa, The African Development Bank and representatives of some research institutes in Africa. 
The APR team determines the compliance of the participating country to the core commitments 
outlined in the base documents, and suggests improvements where implementation is lacking 
(Para. 42, NEPAD guidelines for Countries, 2003). Decisions of the team are arrived at by 
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consensus and with further discussions with the government over the best alternatives remedies 
to the current challenges that are identified. As a result, any attempt by the government to pursue 
its own interest will dramatically slow the process. It is also the responsibility of the team to 
assess whether attempts are being made, in good faith, by the country to comply with core 
commitments, and to note difficulties encountered by the country in its compliance efforts, in 
order to facilitate deliberation on the best options available (para. 45, Guidelines, 2003). Since 
the review process focuses on specific areas of governance, it is impossible for any members of 
the team, who are less than expert in any area, to divert the work of the review team on the basis 
of a strong view on a particular issue, without the fundamental expertise to back up that claim.  
Another important factor that helps to encourage all members of the team to be accountable for 
their decisions lies in the establishment of the multi decision loops that are created with the 
involvement of several actors within the process. The self-assessment questionnaire, and the 
program of action that gives an indication of the problems and challenges of a country, emanate 
from officials of the country under review. At this point, if the State has an interest in not 
highlighting a particular issue area that is paramount to the process, it could do so by simply not 
giving it prominence, even though it might be of great importance to the collective good. 
Member States may therefore display an interest in underestimating the real problems in their 
implementation, as a result of political expediency or in order to paint a favourable picture. 
However, the consultation by the team offers the country the opportunity to give convincing 
reasons for proposing a particular policy path, and, though the country sets the agenda on the 
issues to consider, they are accountable to the subsequent stages of the process and will need to 
justify why one position is more appropriate than another.  
Though the APR Panel constitutes the Centre of expertise in the review process, it does not have 
power over final decisions. The Panel is merely charged with responsibility for the oversight and 
monitoring of the process (Article 3.1a, NEPAD/HSGIC/2003/APRM). It thoroughly scrutinizes 
all reports submitted by the various bodies at the national level, in a ‘police patrol’ manner. The 
influence of the expert Panel on the decisions of the review process depends on whether or not 
their recommendations are adopted by the APR Forum. The panel provides detailed reasons and 
comments on its recommendations. The Panel as a whole is accountable to the Forum, and has 
incentives to generate appropriate expert recommendations, even if individual members might 
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occasionally have personal preferences or pursue the interest of a stakeholder in the process. 
Final decisions are then made by the APR Forum, though the agenda for Forum discussions is set 
by the recommendations and assessment that is made by the expert panel. Historically, the 
Forum has taken the work of the Panel seriously and, in practice, has hardly rejected 
recommendations made by the Panel.  
In addition, decision-making bodies at this stage are externally accountable to an interested 
public, and to other partner organizations that have high stakes in the review process. Civil 
society groups and other public forums that participate in the consultations serve as an additional 
‘fire alarm’ system in the review process, and have formal rights to contribute to or challenge 
any issues presented by either State officials or the APR decision makers. These consultations 
are very transparent. In some instances NGOs and research institutes have submitted position 
papers on policy proposals. However the nature of the areas of focus demand that only 
competent actors are able to seize the opportunity to influence the outcome of the 
recommendations, by providing appropriate reasonable argument or relevant information that is 
of essence to the review process. The meetings of the APR Forum are also open to national 
officials of member States and members of the strategic partners of the APRM, such as the UN 
Commission on Africa, UNDP and African Development Bank. Upon adoption of its 
recommendations, the reports of the review process are made public and tabled in regional and 
sub-regional institutions such as the African Union Parliament, the African Commission on 
Human Rights and the Economic Social and Cultural Council of the AU. Hence, it is highly 
improbable that badly reasoned recommendations and decisions by the APR Panel or the Forum 
will remain undetected, since these bodies are accountable to the public and interested partner 
institutions that have expertise in the project areas. 
Aspects of the design of the APRM system, whether intended or not, are modeled in a way that 
deprives all committees, bodies and individual decision makers involved of the ability to stray 
from appropriate decisions consistent with the general criteria. The APR Panel’s ability to 
influence the decisions of the Forum is a function of the expert knowledge at its disposal. Several 
accountability mechanisms that are created also deprive the Forum, the most political organ of 
the system, from bargaining or compromising on well-reasoned decisions. The general public is 
involved from the initial stages of the process until the final stages, and has the opportunity to 
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intervene with well-reasoned arguments to influence the process. The general guidelines are 
clear on how conflicts in the review process are to be settled, encouraging mutual dialogue 
among States and the decision makers at any point of a conflict.  
 
3.5.3. Third Stage: Monitoring and Following up on Implementation Reports, Another 
Layer of Accountability 
The implementation of policies agreed after the review, and the systematic integration of those 
policies into the national development planning scheme, is monitored by various actors in the 
APR system. The Secretariat, the partner institutions, the APR Forum and other interested actors 
are in a position to pay attention to the progress reports that are submitted by the national Focal 
Points on the implementation of their policies and programs. Some States have resorted to 
creating a national governing council to coordinate the activities of the APR Secretariat and their 
national government. This direct link between policy makers at the national level and the APR 
Secretariat ensures that recommendations agreed upon by all parties are implemented by the 
countries involved in the process. An annual progress report on the implementation of a National 
Program of Action is presented by the Head of State at the sidelines of the AU General 
Assembly meetings, meaning that member States, participating in the APR project, are informed 
of the progress made by the State in actualizing the set goals after the review. This gives another 
opportunity to discuss the challenges in the implementation process, and to fashion the best 
alternatives to address them. States have an incentive to present accurate reports on the level of 
progress made, as their partner institutions are the agencies instrumental in mobilizing external 
funds for the country in key priority issues of concern. 
At the 25th Assembly of the African Union Heads of State, held in June in 2015, Uganda and 
Sierra Leone, for example, presented their progress reports to the Heads of State and government 
representatives participating in the APRM (Report of APR Forum to the 25th AU Assembly, June 
16, 2015). The Forum congratulated them on their progress, so far, in achieving some of the 
issues contained in their national Program of Action.  
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Over the years, some member States have called for the integration of the APRM into the 
African Union system and structures, so that it does not operate as an autonomous organization. 
This makes sense, in the light of the fact that all its members are part of the AU. The AU 
commission is currently working at fully integrating the APRM into the African Union 
organizational framework. The implication of this is that peer review reports will be widely 
tabled in all sub-regional parliaments and thoroughly discussed. This will generate additional 
accountability mechanisms to make sure that neither the Panel nor the Forum adopts 
recommendations that are problem-inadequate, as the reports will be subject to parliamentary 
debates in the sub-regional parliaments.   
Procedures for reporting on progress in the implementation of agreed projects in the APRM 
presently limit the discretion of the States and other decision makers to put forward inaccurate 
reports. These procedures ensure that it is difficult for particular actors within the system to 
pursue their parochial interest without being subjected to verifications from other actors in the 
process. The member States of the APR risk credibility and faltering reputation if they too 
generously report on false progress with their program of action, and the Forum, in light of its 
position, cannot afford to deviate from its mandate and allow inappropriate reports to be 
delivered by member States.  
 
3.6. The Nature of Decision-Making in the APRM  
The APRM promises to make policies and practices of participating States more complaint with 
the political, economic and corporate governance standards set by the African Union NEPAD 
program. It aims at achieving political stability, high economic growth and Continental economic 
integration through capacity building and the identification of deficiencies (APRM Overview 
Doc. 2002: 3). It allows individual States to voluntarily accede to a self-monitoring mechanism 
on their governance performance in four broad key areas. Each area is assessed against a set of 
codes and standards agreed and contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic 
and Corporate Governance (NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2013/APRM/Guideline/OSCI/09.03.2013). If a 
State signs up to the protocol, and a peer review is initiated and completed, the process 
culminates in the identification of deficiencies and good practices in key areas of interest. Good 
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practice is identified in order to serve as a learning point for participating States, while identified 
deficiencies are highlighted in order to be fixed by the State involved. The whole spectrum of 
tested policies that emanate as a result of the peer review process is expected to create a robust 
platform for Continental economic surge and regional integration.  
Notwithstanding the cost implication for submitting to review, the process is expected to also 
serve as a platform to attract extra regional actors. Participating States, in a bid to appear 
attractive to other actors when putting forward a case for attracting international aid, may find 
the APRM a useful tool to enhance their viability in that respect, and furthermore demonstrate 
and signal a commitment to the principles of good governance and the rule of law.  
There is a danger that, if the APRM is poorly administered, it could undermine the commitment 
system that is envisaged in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate 
Governance of the NEPAD program. A peer review generates an obligation on member States to 
assist other States, who have been through the process, to fix identified deficiencies by soliciting 
possible financial and technical solutions. Other members States with the technical know-how  to 
support could opt to independently help mitigate the difficult circumstances that are identified 
through the peer review process. Therefore, a poorly evaluated session on a member state could 
seriously undermine the collective intention of the member States of the African Union to 
stabilize their economies and increase intra-region integration and socio-economic development.   
The administration of the APRM system therefore raises a credible commitment problem. In as 
much as member States may have a long term interest in the decent operation of the review 
mechanism, they may be tempted under other circumstances to pursue a different interest with 
regard to a particular issue area which is seen as important in pursuing a foreign policy goal or an 
issue that has domestic ramifications. Countries expecting to experience difficulty in fulfilling 
the obligations identified in the review process are encouraged to depend on the proposed 
recommendations and appropriate good practices arising from the review process, which then 
might enable a country to attract some foreign aid from extra regional actors, who see the APRM 
as a sign of commitment to democratic principles and a striving inclusive polity. In such a case, a 
country may require protection from the strict application of a negative response by the review 
team over the extent of deficiencies and non-conformity to international and regional protocols 
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that are a prerequisite for the attainment of the general goals set by the APRM instrument. In 
normal circumstances, countries have an interest in positive reviews, even if this can tacitly 
undermine the overall objectives of the review process, since they stand to gain in their standing 
and attract performance among some extra regional actors that can be important to their 
economic survival. Perhaps this need for positivity can interfere with those countries who intend 
to implement recommendations from the APRM review at home, and are therefore generally 
interested in ensuring that the review process is conducted in an atmosphere where 
recommendations, irrespective of their cost implications, are geared towards identifying reforms 
in the country.  
It has to be noted that, while the review of a country on particular issue areas may benefit some 
countries, it may not always generate similar benefits to other States. As a result of the divergent 
interest of States regarding the outcome of a review, member States would be confronted with 
continuing decision problems if they take it upon themselves to separately make decisions on the 
programs of member States in their annual meetings. The APRM is promoted by countries in 
Africa who have a strong infrastructure and good production capacity base to enable them access 
the economies of member States. To enjoy the full benefits it is therefore proper to get member 
States to enact laws that protect their companies and to also open up markets for their goods and 
services. Though some commentators have criticized the flexibility and non-binding nature of 
the decisions taken during the peer review process, the absence of an effective commitment and a 
functioning criteria-based review process could jeopardize the whole decision system, given the 
mixed interests constellations of the member States involved.  
The nature of this decision problem may explain why member States in the APRM, who may be 
exposed by their separate decisions, delegate the day-to-day business of the APR to an 
independent agent, avoiding permanent conflicts and committing themselves credibly to its long 
term collective goals.  
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3.7. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the AU’s resort to a peer review process has created a governance structure that 
splits a rule-making and norm application functions between the APR Forum and the Panel. The 
decision process also allocates specific functions among other subsidiary bodies, in particular the 
Committee of Focal Points, the National Governing Councils and the Research Institutes. Each 
of the sub-bodies within the review process performs distinct functions and operates under 
certain procedures. As a result of the different mandates entrusted to each of the subsidiary 
bodies, each body makes different kinds of decisions with different institutional constraints. As a 
consequence, the complex decision structure that emerges in the review process creates a high 
demand to make the subsidiary bodies accountable through rules.   
In this light, the act of assigning decision-making competence to agents in order to solve a 
credible commitment problem creates a constellation of interests, characterized by a need to 
make the agent accountable for decisions without short-changing its independence. As a result, 
agents in a delegation relationship that is characterized by such features are mostly protected 
from direct interventions by their principals into their day-to-day activities. Since they are 
charged not to deliberately follow the preferences of their principals, hierarchical control 
mechanisms would tacitly undermine their autonomy to take decisions that are in the long term 
interest of their principals. The establishment of decision-criteria, defined by the principals, 
largely promotes the long term interest of agents, and serves as a guide for them not to deviate or 
pursue their personal interest. Since the tendency to abuse the powers bestowed on the agent 
exist, the agent is made accountable for those decisions. Accountability mechanisms are 
therefore geared towards preserving the autonomy of the agent from any interference in their 
assigned task. Institutional mechanisms then rely on an internal accountability that does not 
diminish the agents’ ability to disregard any external influences. Measures such as the demand 
for rationality, a division of labor in the decision process, accountability to the general public and 
reporting on implementation and progress are potent tools to make decision makers accountable 
in the decision apparatus. 
The presence of the APR Panel, the Forum and the wider public as participants in the APRM 
process contributes to making the accountability mechanism stronger, and prevents, as far as 
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possible, interventions from member States to pursue their parochial interest in the process. The 
Forum, as the political body in the decision system, has thus successfully assigned the task of 
oversight and the making of expert decisions to the Panel, which is a repository of expert 
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Chapter 4 
4.1. The Organizational Development of the South African Review Process 
Following the theoretical argument of chapter 2, which promotes the idea of functional 
differentiation and its promise of merit-based decisions, I provide an empirical framework in 
analysing the actual division of competencies which occurred during the review process in the 
South African country review process. It concludes that the separation of different decision 
functions, among actors in the South African review process, deprived them of the opportunity to 
influence decision outcomes through the mechanism of bargaining. It is able to demonstrate a 
complex interlinking between country level and continental structures in the review process. It 
therefore is able to give an account of the organizational structure of the South African review in 
practice, in order to assess any implications concerning the method and content of the decisions 
that the process produced (see Fig. 1 for author’s illustration of the governance structure).  
Secondly, the analysis of the review process necessarily takes into account, and makes 
comparisons concerning the different positions of associated interest groups and of the 
government under review, on issues of socio-economic development, corporate governance, 
democracy and political governance. From this comparison, it is able to demonstrate that 
divergent interests were at play during the review process of South Africa. This then supports a 
description of how institutional arrangements played a decisive role in framing how these 
relevant actors made their deliberations on contentious issues, and how problem-adequate 
solutions to various policy issues of the review process were found.  
Thirdly, this empirical analysis generates a concrete explanation of how the constellation of 
actors, with their divergent interests, proceeded towards deliberation, showing clearly how 
different stages of the review process stabilized over time, and established accepted guidelines 
for decision making. A distinction between three stages in the organizational development of the 
South African review process is made. The initial stage of the process is characterized by 
conflicts which lead to a potential derailment of the ability of the governance system to produce 
effective decisions. In the second phase, members of the bodies involved in the decision-making 
process resort to general guidelines and rules that are provided by the APR Panel as reference 
points for decisions. Finally, the third stage of the decision-making process is characterized by an 
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in-depth engagement with stakeholders in the decision-making process, which can resolve the 
initial conflicts. This practice is seen to have huge implications for the governance of the 
decision-making process, which can then take into account the extent to which divergent actors 
can find common ground in resolving difficulties in the review process. 
The South African review process appears to have been one of a relatively few cases that posed 
significant difficulties in the APRM process. In the light of this concern, this chapter undertakes 
an interrogation of the different types of impediment to reason-based decision-making within a 
decision-making process that might be affected by power and interest based politics (Gehring 
and Kerler 2008:1002). As a selected case, the South African example is not fully representative 
of the universe of cases. It displays a strong bias towards consideration of the experience of the 
early participants of the review process. This is inevitably so, because the pioneer countries of 
the review process have had the longest period of engagement with the APRM among member 
States, and the fact of their early participation has implications, particularly in reflections upon 
their  enthusiasm for the process. Nevertheless, the earliest reviewed countries did provide ample 
evidence of the main challenges of the APRM system, with the main indicators demonstrating 
the existence of difficulties in the review process arising from the persistent occurrence of 
conflicts among decision makers, repeated consideration of items in the Issue papers, and an 
impasse among key actors over major issues of how the various specific country-level processes 
are to proceed.  
In describing this process, this analysis provides evidence to support the theoretical argument 
that differentiation in the APRM decision system accounts for problem-adequate decisions in the 
review process. This conclusion is arrived at by paying close attention to the institutional 
operations of the South African review process. It notes that, even where members of an 
international organization delegate decision competence to sub-bodies that are composed of 
members of the organization, there may exist an incentive for members to refrain from 
bargaining over unfavourable cases. This absence of self-interested behavior may be explained 
by the preference to have recourse to general norms and guidelines on the application of 
contentious case-specific decisions, since disagreements between the APR Panel and the 
government under review would have to be overcome to enable the review process to advance 
(Jordaan 2007: 341).  
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Figure 1: Governance Structure of the South African Review Process, Author’s Illustration   
  
Disagreements with decisions and recommendations at each stage of the process can put to the 
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analysis demonstrates how actors who are opposed to disadvantageous decisions are pushed to 
abandon their case-specific interest in favour of previously agreed guidelines and norms of the 
review process.  
The analysis of the process is based on country review reports, communiqués of the APR Panel 
and Forum meetings, implementation reports of the APRM, summary records of meetings of the 
Forum, and expert interviews conducted by the author in South Africa between August and 
October 2015. This wide-ranging data source is unique, in the sense that previous work on the 
APRM has tended to ignore the richness of these documents in the analysis of the APRM 
decision-making process.  
 
 4.2. The Organizational Structure of the South African Review Process 
The organizational structure of the South African review process was characterized by a 
differentiation of functions between various bodies. The functions and competencies assigned to 
the National Governing Council (NGC) of South Africa and the sub-committees within the 
governance structure of the review process are differentiated from each other and from other 
processes. Within the review process, other actors, such as the continental APR Panel and 
Research Institutes, act as independent actors acting as a complement to the decision-making 
process. 
In the scheme of the review process, it is the composition and management of country level 
institutions which provides context to explaining the decision process and the functional 
competencies assigned to each entity. Notably, a common practice among participating countries 
is the establishment of an APR Focal Point. In all cases, the Focal Point serves as a liaison 
between the Continental Secretariat and the national APR structures. To this end, the Focal Point 
is usually a minister or diplomat or a senior civil servant with direct access to the executive or to 
the Head of State (Herbert and Gruzd 2008, 14; Article 1 of APRM MOU of Technical 
Assessment).  
Within the South African review process, a Focal Point was established to oversee the 
implementation of the process at ministerial level. The Minister for Public Services and 
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Administration was designated as the Focal Point (Country Review Report of South Africa 2007: 
39; Pogue 2010: 147).  He was mandated to coordinate and organize the country level structures 
needed for the review process of South Africa. In this regard, the Focal Point organized 
workshops and sensitization activities, to create awareness among stakeholders and to define the 
modalities for participating in the review process. To assist the Focal Point, an interim 
interdepartmental committee and a secretariat were established at the Department of Public 
Services and Administration (DPSA). The mandate of the interim committee was to put in place 
the necessary mechanisms for overseeing the implementation of the review process (Country 
Review Report of South Africa 2007: 39). The committee was given the task of conceiving of 
and designing appropriate strategies for the engagement of South Africa in the review at the 
national level. In the context of the review process, the committee served the role of an agenda-
setter.  
The structural idea behind the involvement of the Focal Point was, as much as possible, to 
diffuse the interference of the State in the review process, and to prevent the country under 
review from unnecessarily intervening in the decision outcomes at each stage of the process. 
South Africa used its Focal Point as the National Governing Council (NGC), with the innovation 
of creating provincial APRM councils in each of the nine political provinces of the country 
(Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 258). The implication of this unique design of the organizational 
structure of the review process in South Africa is that it offered the opportunity to expand the 
involvement of interests groups and individuals at the grass-root level. In this way, an 
opportunity structure was created for individuals to intervene, with the associated input of 
relevant information of interest in some policy areas.  
Reflecting its relevance in the review process, the National Governing Council was initially 
composed of 15 persons drawn from State and non-State actors.1 Representatives on the council 
were therefore senior officials of various civil society groups and some government ministries. 
The governing council was led by a Chairperson, who, incidentally, was the Minister at the Focal 
Point. Most members on the council were appointed by the Focal Point. As a consequence of this 
interpretation of the role of the Focal Point, the national government appears to have exacted a 
desire to dominate the review process at the country level. This is, to some extent, problematic. 
                                                          
1 See Annex 1 for a full complement of sectors represented on the NGC 
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Civil society actors, in particular, questioned the rationale for establishing a governance structure 
that was heavily managed by State actors. Their argument essentially had to do with the ability 
of the governing council to demonstrate transparency and accountability in the decision-making 
process. For this reason, some critics, especially from civil society sectors, expressed pessimism 
concerning the intended independence of the National Governing Council in the review process 
(Pogue 2010: 148). Since accession to the APRM requires a commitment from governments to 
the process to identify policy challenges and deficiency with complete candidness (Jordaan 2006: 
350), the presence of government representatives at the level of decision implementation was 
seen to be indicative of a detrimental exercise of power politics in the decision making process of 
the review.  
As a consequence of this tendency, the process of formulating a framework and implementing 
policies in relations to the proper execution of the review process was seen by many as needing 
improvements at the country level. The responsibility of regulating the activities of the review 
process at the country level rests within the competence of the National Governing Council. The 
Council has the remit to develop policies and to specify frameworks and timelines for the 
involvement of the country under review. In doing so, the council interacts with other 
committees that operate under its control. Within the South African review structure, scientific 
committees and oversight committees work together to influence the decision making process.  
In this regard, four technical support agencies were selected by the Governing Council to work 
on the four thematic areas of the review process. The technical agencies scrutinized submissions 
made by participants at the various consultative conferences, and analysed responses to the APR 
questionnaire. An oversight committee was created to provide quality control measures on the 
work of the technical agencies by auditing the research materials that were presented for 
analysis.     
In addition, the National Governing Council worked with the other continental structures that 
have a place in the governance structure of the APRM. At the apex of the decision process, the 
APRM Forum is engaged in adopting political decisions that define the direction of the entire 
review process.  Article 2 of the APRM Organization and Process Document (2003) and Article 
27 of the Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism (2003) point 
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to the functions and powers of the APR Forum. Article 2 of the APRM process document, in 
particular, defines the type and scope of powers conferred on the Forum. The committee of 
participating Heads of State and Government, as the highest decision-making authority (Article 1 
of the document), was empowered to set directives on the implementation of the country review 
process in South Africa. 
In practice, the Forum is endowed with a wide range of discretionary powers, mainly related to 
the organization of the peer review process. As a result, the Forum has the power to create 
organs and other subsidiary bodies and assign tasks to specialized entities wherever it finds it 
appropriate (Article 10 of the Operating procedures, 2012). There are no specific rules in the 
APRM Base Documents to regulate its powers. As a consequence, the Forum confines its 
decision-making function to giving general directives and guidelines that are applied to case-
specific decisions within the implementation of the peer review process at the country level. In 
the particular case of South Africa, the Forum, at its seventh summit in 2007, reviewed the 
country report of South Africa and made recommendations in respect of the challenges and 
issues that were raised in the report. The report’s findings on issues of floor-crossing and 
xenophobia were of particular interest to the Forum. As a result, as a matter of practice, it 
requested further clarification of the challenges listed, with the aim of using the responses as a 
guide in other similar cases (Communique of the 7th Summit of the Forum, pg 4).  
Another important body that was instrumental in the review process of South Africa was the 
APR Panel. The APR Panel, which oversees the review process, makes decisions of an 
administrative nature and monitors the implementation of the review process (Article 10, APRM 
Base Document). The APRM base document proposes that the operation of the review process 
be directed and managed by the Panel. The Panel is therefore envisaged as an independent 
autonomous entity that makes decisions that represent the general interest of participating states 
in the review process. To ensure the autonomy of the Panel, and at the same time make it 
accountable, various institutional structures are put in place to guide the conduct of members of 
the Panel. The term of office of each member of the Panel is limited to a four year period, with a 
plan to have members retire in rotation (Article 8, APRM Base Document). In this way a 
mechanism is created to ensure that members of the Panel do not leave en bloc, so as to affect the 
continuity of functions that ought to be performed.  
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The APR Panel appointed the country support and review teams that undertook the review visits 
of South Africa.2 These teams were composed of a member of the Panel alongside other experts 
in the key areas of the review process (Article 11, 12&19 of APRM Base Document; Article 
1.1d, APRM Organization and Process Document).  
The Country Support Mission (CSM) was formed to serve as a technical unit that advises 
participating States on initial in-country structures. The mandate of the CSM takes effect when a 
country gives notice of its preparedness to go through the review process. Its visits, at the 
beginning of the process, are intended to inform the design of country level structures and the 
extent of inclusion of interested parties and actors in the process. Such missions are mostly 
represented by experts in the key policy areas of interest in the review process. In this regard, 
consultants were engaged when the Country Review Mission (CRM) met to scrutinize the 
proposed programme of action and the self-assessment report of South Africa (Article 1.1 (d), 
APRM Organization and Process Document).  
The country review team decides by consensus. The review team is headed by a chairperson who 
is, as a matter of principle, a member of the APR Panel. Its report is presented through the 
chairperson to the APR Panel before being finally presented to the Committee of Heads of State 
of the participating countries. As a matter of general rule, no decision can be made if a member 
of the country review team objects to an issue under consideration. This arises as the effect of the 
rule that members of the team must agree unanimously to have a decision adopted into the 
preliminary country review report. By convention, the country review team is divided into sub-
committees. This is done to facilitate the decision-making process, and may also be necessitated 
because the issues under consideration are extremely diverse.3 This makes it even more prudent 
to assign the task of deciding questions relating to the thematic areas to experts and consultants 
in each of the areas of the review, and has the advantage of overcoming decision deadlocks 
especially where a disagreement stems from technicalities.  
Besides adopting case-specific decisions in the review process, the Panel is also central to its 
rule-making function. The Panel drafts its own procedures and rules of engagement as well as 
                                                          
2 See annex I for full list 
3 Personal Interview, Consultant and member of the country review mission, Johannesburg, South Africa, 23 
October 2015.  
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giving guidelines to member States on the review process (APRM Organization and Process doc. 
para 3.1g). Over the years, the APR Panel has issued directives, in the form of guidelines, to 
individual member States on the composition of the national level structures. These guidelines 
have become the standard against which participating States model the country level structures 
that are involved in their own review process.  
The decision competences assigned to the various actors in the South African review process 
clearly demonstrate that the authority to make rules was bestowed on the APR Forum, while the 
National Governing Council was expected to apply these rules to case-specific decisions. The 
Forum’s rule making function makes it possible for it to elaborate on specific guidelines, to be 
then applied in deciding specific cases by the Panel and the governing council (Article 3 (b) of 
Operating Procedure, 2012). If, for example, all actors in the South African review process 
accept rules and guidelines as the basis for coming to particular decisions, it is possible for 
formally accepted guidelines to form the basis on which the behavior of decision makers are 
shaped.  
Against this background, decisions on the propriety of the policies of a State could take two 
different directions. If there are diverging preferences among members of the national governing 
council, decision-making by consensus might well entail several deadlocks, especially in the 
event that members of the National Governing Council try to pursue their self-interest at the 
expense of the agreed rules. However, to alleviate this situation, if the decision-making outcomes 
are dependent on the guidelines and criteria set by the APR Panel, member States may be more 
amenable to unfavourable case-specific decisions where rules and formal institutional 
mechanisms may have taken precedence in explaining decision outcomes of specific cases.   
As a result of differentiation of function, if an entity gains autonomy in an organizational setting, 
such differentiation could increase the capacity of the organization to process enormous amounts 
of information in highly selective ways (Gehring and Dorsch 2010: 18). Where an inter-
governmental decision process addresses complex issues (Buzan 1981), this is managed 
commonly as an outcome of a number of specialized sub-systems, with each fulfilling a specific 
function within the overall decision process of the organization. The presence of functionally 
specialized sub-systems within the governance structure of the South African review process 
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may fundamentally change the decision rationale of various entities in the organizational setting. 
This delegation to sub-systems leads to a situation where the APR Forum, over time, will 
automatically specialize in the remaining tasks of discussing and approving country review 
reports. Thus the Forum itself becomes a specialized sub-system within the operations of the 
review process, as has been demonstrated in principal-agent situations (Hawkins et al 2006). If 
an organization makes its decisions through its specialized sub-systems, it allows for each unit to 
focus on a narrow aspect of the decision process. As a consequence, it allows for better 
elaboration of relevant aspects of the policy issues, and addresses the need to disregard other 
irrelevant issues that have no consequences on the decision outcome.  
Furthermore, this analysis leads to the assertion that the separation of functions among different 
sub-systems in an organization may even systematically deprive participating actors of the 
opportunity to influence the decision-making process through divisive forms of bargaining 
(Gehring and Dorche 2010). As has been argued, a decision process characterized by the 
elaboration of general criteria, and their application to specific cases assigned to different 
forums, may have the net effect of changing the decision rationales of actors involved in these 
levels of decision-making (Gehring and Plocher 2009). This is because the act of concentrating 
on the task of elaborating decision criteria is likely to deprive actors of the opportunity to pursue 
their case-specific parochial interest in an issue under consideration. Actors are, by design of the 
duality of the task of elaborating and applying general criteria, necessarily forced to be consistent 
across a range of cases.  The dichotomy of these differentiated tasks is helpful, then, insofar as 
the task of key actors at this stage is limited to producing abstract standards that are to be 
implemented by other actors in unknown situations, so that they are theoretically deprived of 
their opportunity to bargain over specific cases (Brennan and Buchana 1985). 
To examine these assertions, the following sections take a look at the various decision stages of 
the review process in South Africa, which provide empirical evidence of the various activities 
and issues that culminated in the final decision outcomes of the South African review process. 
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4.3. Phase 1: The Stage of Government Dominance and the Absence of Precise Guidelines 
South Africa acceded to the APRM in March 2003 in Abuja, Nigeria. The country review of 
South Africa was carried out from the second group of countries who agreed to undergo the 
review process, and to present its Country Review Report (CRR) to the APR Forum within 21 
months (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 257). The Minister of Public Services and Administration was 
appointed by the government as the National Focal Point (NFP) to systematically map out a 
strategy for the management and successful implementation of the review process (Country 
Review Report No. 5, Republic of South Africa, 2007:1). Prior to signing the Memorandum of 
Understanding, South Africa had played a major role in the formation of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development which the APRM complements, and played a leading role in fulfilling the 
task of realizing its objectives. From a much broader perspective, these initiatives fit into the 
broader picture of the African Renaissance Project which led to the transformation of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002 (Matlosa 2014: 7).  
For specific reasons, the designation of the South African National Focal Point at a ministerial 
level has been criticized by some scholars in their discussion of the processes of the APRM. It 
appears to some that any engagement of the Focal Point in the reporting activities of the review 
process would amount to an inappropriate strategic involvement of the South African Focal Point 
in the decision-making process, with the implication of an intrusion into the process of ulterior 
motives on behalf of the government. For instance, in reflecting upon the relevance of the APRM 
to enhancing governance in South Africa, one particular analysis on the third progress report, 
concerning the implementation of national programmes of action, pointed out that the South 
African government was using the review process as a foreign policy tool in its engagement with 
the rest of the continent (Turianskyi 2014: 4). However, this contentious conclusion, as critical as 
it might be, does not fully take into account how these institutional arrangements could foster 
better deliberations for decision making in the review process. Particlarly, it does not address the 
issue of how governmental participation in the process might enhance a contintental desire to 
achieve the collective goals of members of the APRM.  
It is generally accepted that the decision to participate in the review process signals a 
commitment on the part of member States to the principles and values of the review mechanism. 
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By acceding to the APRM, a country commits itself to periodic reviews in terms of its policy 
frameworks, institutional architecture and practice regarding the four thematic areas of the 
review mechanism (Matlosa 2014). In general, the APRM aims at shaping the behavior of 
participating states on agreed policy areas, as outlined in the Declaration on Democracy, 
Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (AHG/235 XXXVIII, 2002). It immediately 
opens up a country for scrutiny by other peers, and, in the process, members of the APRM 
Forum engage the country in the formulation and implementation of public policy, as envisaged 
in the memorandum of understanding that is signed between the government and the APRM 
committee of participating Heads of State and Government.  
It may be expedient that the review mechanism, as an undertaking adopted by a particular 
member State, offers limited guidelines on how to go about the process (Katito 2008: 3). 
Virtually no concrete directions were contained in the Memorandum of Understanding which 
committed South Africa to the APRM, except to reaffirm the commitment of the State to the 
principles and objectives of the review process, and to accept the goal of ensuring that policies 
and practices of participating States conform to agreed political, economic, and corporate 
governance standards (APRM, MOU, Para. 6: 2003). The MOU, signed by then South African 
President, Thabo Mbeki, in 2003, is nevertheless clear on its claim that it is the mandate of the 
APR Panel and other stakeholders to pass judgment on the internal policies of the State (para. 15, 
MOU). It lists obligations expected of the country under review, which, among others, include 
the need to ensure that South Africa, as a participating State, conforms to the expectation of 
achieving mutually agreed objectives in socio-economic development (para.6). It also gives its 
consent for identified deficiencies to be made public by reviewers (para. 8), and also 
acknowledges the need to facilitate activities leading to the review process by allowing 
unfettered access to information to all participants in the process (para. 13&14).  
The wording of the MOU, like all others signed by participating States, appear vague, as it does 
not provide concrete substance of the nature of the process, and the kind of institutional 
infrastructure needed to fully implement the review process.  These concerns are however 
addressed in supplementary guidelines provided by the APR Panel, while the initial 
documentation that established the APRM provides for the establishment of a National 
Governing Council. This Council is mandated to coordinate and manage the review process at 
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the country level. It serves as a focal point at a ministerial level to play the role of a liaison 
between the government and the APRM Continental Secretariat (Guidelines for Countries to 
prepare for and to participate in the APRM, para 20 (II)).  
The ambiguous nature of the language, used in the MOU and other founding documents which 
established the South African review process, immediately subjects the process to contestation at 
the country level. For example, the imprecise directive requiring the establishment of a 
governing council at the country level immediately subjected the South African governance 
structure to internal conflicts (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 255). With no further details of the 
modalities and the make-up of the council, many contentious issues were generated between the 
government and civil society. The participation of civil society groups was largely envisaged, in 
the foundation of the review process, as a mechanism to serve as an extra check on activities at 
the country level. As a result of the imprecise wording of the MOU, the initial stage of the South 
African review process was characterized by an arbitrary application of the guidelines in the 
lead-up to the country self-assessment. Given that the country self-assessment is one precise area 
of the review process in which civil society organizations might exert some positive influence 
(Odoi 2008: 6; Hutchings et al 2008), the unfortunate dominance of the process by government 
machinery was a recipe for contestation among participants in the decision process.  
The Council had a noticeably strong government representation (Hutchings et al 2008: 6), which 
therefore created the perception that it would be susceptible to proposals that were close to the 
government’s position. The council’s initial 15 members contained five representatives with 
government ministerial roles, leaving only the remaining ten seats to represent stakeholders 
outside government. This initially skewed composition of the council gave prominence to 
government influence in the South African example, and therefore contributed to some of the 
early decision problems that were encountered in the effectiveness and veracity of the review 
process. 
As early as October 2004, the Minister of Public Services and Administration had been 
designated as the Focal Point. As Focal Point, he acted as chairperson of the National Governing 
Council. On 28 October 2004, the Minister briefed Parliament on the preparatory works 
underway for the review process to commence, and outlined a preliminary programme for the 
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review process (Parliamentary Media Briefing, Oct. 28). The government had taken some steps 
to create awareness by engaging senior civil servants in two separate workshops in December 
2004 and April 2005. The outcome of these workshops was a consensus on the need to outline 
strategic modalities for participating in the process (Implementation Process Report, April 2005 
to June 2005: 7). It was, however, never clear which strategic interests the government sought to 
pursue in the process of the review. However, the dominant role of the government in the process 
gives enduring clues as to the possibility of their pursuing case-specific interests, if, in the event, 
they saw the utility of promoting decisions beneficial to their own cause. A decision was taken to 
complete the self-assessment report within 3 months and to appoint a steering committee at the 
ministry. This was agreed upon by Cabinet without recourse to any consultations with other 
stakeholders.  
The intention of finalizing the self-assessment report by July 2005, in itself, draws attention to 
the exclusivity of the government’s adopted approach. According to an interview source, the 
government had already tasked different departments to respond to sections of the APRM 
questionnaire before public input was solicited.4 Reports produced by various government 
ministries on the questionnaire were then consolidated into a composite report which later 
became known as ‘the government submission’ (Herbert and Gruzd, 2008: 257).  
Bond asks, rather rhetorically, how these powers of government, which gave them control over 
the process at the initial stage, had an impact upon the recommendations and outcomes of the 
South African process (Bond 2009: 559). Overall, any criticism of the dominant role of the South 
African government in the setting up of the review process should be seen as largely a result of 
the flexibility of the guidelines that allow States to model the country level process in accordance 
with the prevailing circumstances and context of the country. Though flexibility gives States the 
space to factor in the issues that they see as being of prime importance, it also carries the danger 
of restricting the review process. This is particularly so in any instance where the system fails to 
curtail the powers of the State to stifle the broad involvement of a variety of agencies in the 
process.   
                                                          
4 Personal Interview, Gruzd Steven, Programme Director of the Governance and Democracy Project at the South 
African Institute of International Affair, Johannesburg, South Africa, 28 July 2015.  
 139 
 
Between September 2005 and February 2006 a series of meetings and activities were organized 
by the Focal Point with the involvement of major stakeholders in the process. The first national 
consultative conference was held from the 28-29 September 2005 in Midrand. The conference 
had a dual purpose, seeking firstly to initiate the APRM process, and then to inaugurate the 
National Governing Council (Hutchings et al 2008: 3). These meetings and activities appeared to 
foster a sharp divide between government, on one hand, and a coalition of NGOs and civil 
society organizations in South Africa, on the other. Prior to the conference, representatives of a 
number of NGOs jointly organized a workshop for civil society organizations. Organizations 
present at the workshop included the South African non-Governmental Organization Coalition 
(SANGOCO), Transparency South Africa (T-SA), the South African Council of Churches 
(SACC) and the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). The aim of the 
workshop was to form a common position on issues pertaining to the APRM, and to enhance the 
skills of members in participating in the review process (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 258). The 
main issues that attracted contention arose from criticisms made from civil society actors of the 
governance structure and the proposed implementation schedule that was outlined by the 
government in a press conference of 13 September 2005 (Media briefing, September 2005).  
In a subsequent meeting, SANGOCO and other civil society groups argued for an independent 
national council, and the engagement of research institutes in the compilation of the self-
assessment report, as had happened in Ghana and Kenya. Government adamantly explained that 
South Africa, unlike other countries, did not have a need for much research to be done on most 
of the areas arising from the APR questionnaire. According to the Chairman of the Focal Point, 
most of the data that was required for the analysis was available through various State 
departments (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 256). At this point, opponents of the proposed 
arrangement made reference to the fact that the guidelines and best practices of the review 
process did not suggest that the chairman of the National Governing Council could additionally 
operate as the Focal Point. Furthermore, according to this view, those in favour of the proposed 
structure were acting contrary to the advice that the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons had given 
to other countries, which sought, as much as possible, to disentangle the direct involvement of 
the government in the process at the country level.  
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To resolve the problem, the Focal Point postponed a planned follow-up meeting, in November of 
2005, intended to validate the country self-assessment report. This was to allow for some 
consultation and to also refer the issue to the country support mission. In the midst of a public 
brouhaha, both Houses of Parliament, the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces, set their own agenda, which appeared to support the opponents of a narrow 
interpretation of the independence of the council and of the timeframe put forward for 
completing the country self-assessment report (Hutchings et al 2008).  Parliament ostensibly 
formed a joint ad hoc committee on the APRM, and established a subcommittee for the four 
thematic areas of concern to the process. Their intention was to create a parallel system to the 
review, and to generate a report that would be submitted directly to the Continental APRM 
Secretariat. To achieve this, it was proposed that public hearings would be held and submissions 
accepted from interested parties. Parliament’s move generated substantial interest among critics 
of the government, and had the full backing of civil society groups who were not in support of 
the proposals and motives of the government.  
The visit of the Country Support Mission (CSM), from the 9th to 11th November 2005, was 
important in getting some issues in perspective. Some observers have criticized the relative short 
period the mission spent during the first visit, and the overambitious and unrealistic schedule it 
attempted within a brief time period. Herbert and Gruzd describe the process leading to the 
meeting as ‘chaotic’, as some members were only alerted of the meeting hours before the event 
(Herbert and Gruzd, 2008: 261). As a result, some of the invitees had limited engagement with 
the team since they had to shuttle between venues to meet various stakeholders in the process. 
However, three important issues, worthy of note, were a product of the support mission’s visit. 
Firstly, in the communiqué that was issued after the engagement, the mission was able to address 
a contentious issue within the structure of the national governing council, which worked to 
encourage a bottleneck to the decision process. In a unanimous decision, it agreed to the 
expansion of the National Governing Council with greater representation from non-state actors 
(Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 261). The governing council was expanded to 29 members, therefore 
embracing more civil society members in the decision process of the country self-assessment. 
Secondly, it directly addressed the issue of the parallel structure that was mooted by Parliament. 
The support mission finally brought this nagging issue to an end when it was agreed that 
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Parliament could submit its report to the National Governing Council, to serve as an additional 
source of authentication of the self-assessment report (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 261). The 
parliamentary committees were therefore obliged, and subsequently made direct input, to 
contribute to the work of the council, instead of presenting an independent report to the APRM 
continental secretariat, as originally conceived. Lastly the initial plan of government not to 
involve research institutes in the self-assessment report was also addressed, the support mission 
resolved that the involvement of research institutes were important to the process and their role 
could not be overlooked (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 261). Through these mechanisms, it appeared 
that critics of a looser approach had sent a strong signal that government needed to respect the 
guiding principles of the review process and to abide by the guidelines of the review. With these 
decisions of the Support mission, the terms of engagement at the country level in the South 
African process were made clearer, and formalized earlier demands that were being sought by 
critics on the government-driven process.    
It can be seen that this first phase of the review process was characterized by decision stalemates 
that largely stemmed from the imprecise nature of the guidelines, and the unclear provisions of 
the memorandum of understanding which served as the basis for South Africa’s participation in 
the review process.  As a result the National Governing Council was dormant for a large part of 
the period, and hardly made any progress on formulating the procedures needed to guide the 
decision process at this stage.  
 
4.4. Phase 2: Relative Stability in the Process, but no Specific Decision Criteria 
Following the intervention of the country support team which achieved clarification of the issues 
that had stalled the review process, the system appears to have resorted to informal means, 
involving consultation with a range of other stakeholders to reach consensus on various issues in 
the decision-making process. At this time, the council did not adopt any specific decision criteria 
to guide their conduct, but, by and large, the council resorted to informal means to reach deep 
agreements on any contentious motions that were put forward.  
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From December 2005 to June 2006, a number of proposals were made, from all sides, on issues 
pertaining to the process of research and the editing of the self-assessment report. To this end, 
the council in November 2005 appointed a research subcommittee to oversee the compilation of 
the self-assessment report. According to Herbert and Gruzd (2008), the resolve of the council to 
involve technical research agencies was founded in the desire to ensure quality assurance, 
providing a means of preventing defects and maintaining the quality of the research information 
needed to make informed decisions at each stage of the process. In this regard, a robust quality 
assurance framework within the decision process was deemed necessary to prevent unnecessary 
problems that had the potential to affect the review process. The credibility and quality of 
information provided at the country level was seen as central to the outcome of decisions in the 
final review reports, necessitating the highest control measures to provide the means to arriving 
at appropriate information for each policy issue.  
Effective administrative and procedural activities were seen to be needed to be designed into the 
quality system, to enable requirements for the most appropriate decisions in the self-assessment 
report. There arose a requirement to assign the tasks of creating systematic measurements, and of 
the monitoring of the review process, to a specific research entity. This would enable the system 
to create a feedback loop to assist in the prevention of errors at every stage of the process. In the 
presence of an effective quality assurance system, participants in a decision-making process were 
expected to be pushed to abandon their case-specific parochial interests, since the extra measures 
put in place are likely to identify inappropriate, less informative proposals. Though the 
appointment of the research institutes was accompanied with some difficulties, as detailed below, 
it played an important role at the country level process. The involvement of the Technical 
Research Institutes addressed the need to ensure the credibility of the process, and to strengthen 
its immunity to the whims and caprices of participants who may intend to pursue their parochial 
interest.  
In order to make them relevant in this respect, two important arrangements were put in place by 
the National Governing Council in appointing the Technical Support Agencies (TSAs) engaged 
in the South African review process. This process had unintended consequences in inducing 
further and extra incentives for making decisions that represent the collective goals of member 
states participating in the review process. Firstly, in a move towards creating extra accountability 
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and monitoring mechanisms in the process, the research subcommittee (of the national governing 
council) invited over 200 institutions to apply as voluntary research partners. The aim in 
partnering these organizations was to validate the work of the research institutes that were 
contracted to compile the self-assessment report for each of the four thematic areas. This 
innovation was envisaged to be able to contribute to a fair representation of the inputs of all 
actors in the review process, and give systematic access to minority groups wishing to have their 
concerns heard. Though geared towards pushing the various research institutes to be accountable 
for the decisions they made in the compilation of the reports, this aspect was not properly 
implemented. Fifteen such bodies were accredited, but never met to review the technical reports 
(Herbert and Gruzd, 2008: 262). These difficulties were attributed partly to inadequate resources 
and the limited timeframe to complete the self-assessment process.  
Instead the services of two quality assurance agencies were engaged to assess the quality of work 
that was produced by the technical support agencies. The Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) and the office of the Auditor-General were given responsibility for evaluating the work 
of the four technical agencies that compiled the reports. In each case this provided the technical 
agencies with incentives to make decisions that generally reflect the goals and objectives of the 
review process. The knowledge that the contents of their reports would be scrutinized by other 
agencies, with equal expertise in the issues of relevance, provided incentives for the technical 
agencies to produce the most problem-adequate decisions. Even if this incentive was absent, the 
research agencies had their reputation at stake. Since their competence in the issues of concern to 
the review process was thereby recognized, they generally had an incentive to produce the most 
reasoned decisions in the best interest of the objectives of the review process. To this end, it can 
be seen that the onus of producing reports that reflect the intentions of the review mechanism 
became institutionalised, and created the conditions for producing outcomes that were in the best 
interest of all actors in the process.  
A second important arrangement that preceded the appointment of the technical agencies was a 
call for tenders for their engagement in each of the four areas of the review process. The main 
task under consideration was the production of a draft report that reflected the submissions and 
criticisms of all comments received. It was the responsibility of these agencies to test the 
findings of the report by organizing seminars for experts in the particular thematic area, and then 
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produce a final technical draft, with a programme of action for each of the areas based upon 
these findings.   
The question of the relevance of the autonomy of the research agencies, spearheading the review 
process in South Africa, is theoretically significant. In this particular case, the presence of the 
research agencies seems to serve to reduce doubts about the potential of the government led 
National Governing Council to interfere with the decision making process. Research agencies, in 
the institutional framework of the review process, are expected to contribute to decisions based 
on their expertise. They are guided into making recommendations that represent the criteria spelt 
out in the guidelines. As a result, the decision rationale of the technical research agencies is akin 
to that in trustee-agent relations, where decisions are made to reflect some previously established 
criteria that are defined by the principal and largely representing their long-term interests 
(Gehring and Plocher, 2009: 688). This externally given criteria, if they exist, serve as an 
intervening force in the principal-agent constellation to preserve the autonomy of the agent in its 
day-to-day operations.  
The contestations that characterized the initial operations of the South Africa review process 
appeared to have become stabilized, to a large degree, with most contentious issues being 
mutually agreed upon by resorting to the guidelines. An issue of importance was the attempt by 
the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) to get two specific issues, of whistleblowering and 
freedom to information, addressed in the APR questionnaire (Hutchings et al 2008).  It is clear 
from the APRM questionnaire that issues related to the access to information and the protection 
of whistleblowers is missing from the standardized questionnaire sent out to each participating 
country in the review process. In its claim to get these issues incorporated as a key component of 
the South African review process, ODAC made appeals to the guidelines of the review process 
which are explicit on the need to make adaptations to the questionnaire in the light of the 
prevailing circumstance of the country under review.  According to ODAC’s argument, a true 
and proper interpretation of paragraph 17 of the APRM base document and paragraph 11 of the 
Guidelines would make provision for the flexibility of the contents of the questionnaire and 
allow countries under a review to take into consideration their own peculiarities (Hutchings et al 
2008: 5).  
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Based on these provisions in the guidelines, ODAC made proposals specifically related to access 
to information and whistleblowers, demanding that these issues be included in the questionnaire 
in the South African review process. In the first national consultative conference held on the 28th 
and 29th of September 2005, the Focal Point resisted any attempts to amend the questionnaire. 
All efforts to discuss the contents of the questionnaire at the conference were subdued. This 
position of the Focal Point was seemingly contrary to the guidelines, which are explicit on the 
need to amend the questionnaire to prevailing circumstances (APRM Base Doc. para 17; APRM 
Guidelines, para 11). At the same time the department of public services and administration did 
not appear to be transparent in its proceedings at the consultative conference, as required by 
paragraph 22 of the memorandum of understanding which obliges states to foster open and 
transparent participation by all actors in the process. 
As a result of the initial rejection of the proposals, put forward by ODAC in respect of the need 
to include issues related to freedom of information and protection for whistleblowers, those 
arguing for the expansion and modification of the questionnaire resorted to a formal engagement 
to get their issues accepted. Proponents of the inclusion of other issues in the questionnaire made 
a written submission on the issues of concern, advancing compelling arguments for the need to 
have the issues included in the questionnaire (Hutchings et al 2008). Their submission outlined 
the strengths and weakness of the current laws and procedures under the Public Disclosures Act 
2000, and made constructive recommendations for improvements, providing substantial evidence 
to support its contestations (Submissions of ODAC on the right to information and protection for 
whistleblowers). To give substance to claims being made, ODAC conducted extensive research 
on the right to information and protection of whistleblowers. They found that accessibility to 
information, requested by individuals or organizations from private entities, was largely ignored. 
Probably this is due to the absence of concrete legal instruments to back such demands. In 
pursing their goal of having these issues accepted as core components of the questionnaire in the 
South Africa review process, ODAC needed to be both strategic and persuasive to convince all 
actors of their position.  
The resort to a persuasive and convincing argument, to get the contentious issues at this stage 
accepted into the self-assessment process, points to the difficulty of actors who might wish to 
resort to bargaining. Even where specific interests of actors are at stake, bargaining as a means of 
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pursuing a parochial interest in the decision-making process of the review mechanism becomes 
difficult to resort to. In a situation where reasoning forms the basis upon which issues are 
resolved in a decision system, it may serve as a point of reference for future similar cases. To 
take a cue from most judicial decision-making processes, for instance, giving reasons for 
decisions at each stage of the decision process can serve as an extra accountability mechanism in 
a decision system. Where decision makers are required to give reasons for their decisions, this 
provides incentives to make decisions that are based on scientific evidence. In such a situation 
decisions produced are more likely to be problem-adequate and represent the general interest of 
actors in the decision system.  
Identifying gaps and proposing solutions on such a wide scale, in relation to the APRM, has 
proven to be a complex and demanding undertaking (Katito 2008: 4).  As a result, instituting 
proper accountability measures may well protect the decision system from arriving at arbitrary 
and power-based decisions. The promotion of a reason-giving requirement also means that 
decision makers are aware that their reasons will remain in the spotlight as external actors 
determine their reasonableness or otherwise. As a result, decision makers, at all stages, endeavor 
to represent the most appropriate solutions available to address the deficiencies identified in the 
policy areas under scrutiny. This not only benefits policy implementation, but also contributes to 
providing stability in the decision process.  
In response to a strong and convincing case to incorporate these issues into the questionnaire, 
and to begin a conversation on the issue of the right to information at the regional level, members 
of the ODAC team were afforded participation in subsequent workshops and conferences 
organized by the Focal Point, and in parliamentary ad hoc committee meetings. At the 
parliamentary engagements, for instance, presentations were made to the four committees set up 
by parliament to conduct an independent self-assessment (Hutchings et al 2008). ODAC’s 
concerns appear to have drawn some interest in the parliamentary sub-committees, leading to 
further elaborations of their proposals. At the ad hoc committees, on economic governance and 
management and on corporate governance, for instance, the committee accepted their 
submissions. It recommended to the review component on economic governance and 
management that it should address the failure of the Public Disclosures Act to protect 
whistleblowers. This was a clear recognition of the arguments advanced by the proponents for an 
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expansion of a main instrument of the process, targeted at sourcing information that could lead to 
reforms in major policy areas of the participating State in the review process.   
To further their course in getting issues, related to the right to information and the protection of 
whistleblowers, into the draft self-assessment report and the national programme of action, a 
follow-up submission was made by the ODAC to the technical research agencies that were 
contracted to work on the draft reports. This worked through the auspices of the SAIIA, which 
was appointed to collate views and submissions made by other entities into a composite draft 
report to make its submission. At the second consultative conference of May 2006, the issues 
raised by the proponents for the expansion of the questionnaire were listed, with a proposal to 
find the most appropriate mechanisms to implement and monitor the contents of the Public 
Disclosures Act. Overall, the draft country self-assessment report acknowledged that there were 
problems with the implementation and effectiveness of the Public Disclosures Act, and that it did 
not provide the adequate protection for whistleblowers that was expected.  
The South African review process, at this point, should be seen to have evolved from the practice 
of arbitrary decisions into a merit-based decision-making system.  It should be concluded that 
decision makers, by and large, were now pursuing the public interest, as opposed to their 
individual interests, in their deliberations over the various issues under consideration at the 
National Governing Council. The propriety of evidence adduced in support of the issues 
pertaining to the right to information, in particular, was given consideration, with a firm 
recognition of the evidence provided to the various scientific committees. The decision to finally 
have these issues included in the final report seems to have been as a result of the reasonableness 
of the argument put up by the ODAC. In considering the value of the information provided in 
support of their case, members of the review mission appear to have limited their judgment to the 
information provided.  
From this point, the National Governing Council augmented the role of the Focal Point, and 
accepted amendments to the decision process. Most participants at the second consultative 
conference made contributions to the proposals put forward by ODAC. As a result, amendments 
were made, which appeared to be accepted by delegates who participated in the group discussion 
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on issues related to the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (Hutchings et al 
2008).  
However, the preliminary programme of action that was formulated through the National 
Governing Council still did not address gaps that were identified in the draft self-assessment 
report. In effect, specific responses were not provided for the gaps identified and no practical 
measures were outlined to mitigate the challenges contained in the report in relation to access to 
information.  
 
4.5. Phase 3: The Final Report and Standard Decision Procedures Based on Accepted 
Norms 
The final stage of the review was characterized by a more uniform and systemic application of 
the guidelines and procedures. This seems to have emerged as a result of informal agreements, 
reached among members of the council, to resort to the APR guidelines as the basis for 
deliberations at the level of the National Governing Council.  
In this phase, the handling of proposals for the inclusion of items not specifically captured in the 
APR questionnaire became subject to complete standardization. This was largely the result of an 
increase in the demands of civil society groups to have submissions included in the national 
programme of action. Within the context of its visit, the country review mission engaged with 
stakeholders, and the final approval of the review report of South Africa by the APR Forum and 
Panel, in conjunction with the National Governing Council, developed a set of guidelines that 
served as the point of reference for the conduct of participants (APR Guidelines 2003). Through 
a communiqué issued at the 4th summit of the Heads of State Committee participating in the 
APRM, the Forum directed the APR Panel and the Secretariat to monitor and report on the 
implementation of the programme of action of members undergoing the review process 
(Communiqués of 4th summit of APR Forum, para 15, January 2006). This communiqué largely 
addressed issues of monitoring programmes of action which are, in many ways, the engine of the 
review process in terms of its vision to enhance governance practices in participating countries. 
Against this background, the Forum agreed that all issues related to the implementation of the 
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review process be addressed in accordance with the procedures and regulations of the APRM, as 
outlined in the APRM base documents. 
The adoption of the communiqué of the 4th summit opened up an opportunity for deliberation on 
the guidelines of the APR, and the possibility of making use of them in regulating the behavior 
of decision makers, in order to overcome challenges in the decision-making process of the 
review. However, the directives issued by the Forum at the 4th summit of HSGC of the APRM 
did little to provide a robust common ground for participants in the review process to come to an 
agreement. In a subsequent communiqué, the Forum requested all participating countries to make 
the process widely participatory for all interested actors, especially civil society groups. This 
process marked a reversal of some magnitude, so that members of the committee of Heads of 
State and Government now expressed concerns over the tendency of country advance missions 
and support missions to spend more time with civil society groups and non-governmental actors, 
to the detriment of the government under review (Communique of Sixth summit of APR Forum, 
para 12, 2007).  
It can be seen that the Forum has latterly underscored the participatory and all-inclusive 
character of the APRM process, and recommended that stakeholders be encouraged to 
participate, deepening the transparency of the decision-making process (Para. 12 of 
communiqué). This innovation effectively gives individuals and groups the opportunity to make 
proposals on issues of concern that are deemed important to the policy areas of the four thematic 
areas of the review process. However, such proposals are still subject to a consensus among the 
country review mission. Although this appears procedurally more progressive, it still presents 
inherent challenges. On the positive side, individuals and civil society groups with expertise in 
the issue areas can directly access and petition any of the bodies in the governance structure of 
the review process. By doing so, the process is open to extra opportunity structures that can hold 
decision makers accountable. On the other hand, its performance presents practical challenges in 
situations where petitions are ignored at the country level. This is particularly the case in 
situations where the issues of concern are perceived to have reputational effects on the State 
under review. In such cases, disagreements could, at the least, lead to a decision blockage which 
could paralyze the entire decision system.  
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The directives of the Heads of State Committee, as put forward in the communiqués (4th and 6th 
communiqué of the HSGC of the APRM), and the presence of the guidelines seem to have 
significant consequences in the operation of the review process at this stage. Since the adoption 
of the communiqués, the South African review process appears to have been more receptive to 
the adoption of proposals by civil society groups to the national programme of action at the level 
of the review mission. At the country level, however, attempts to get individual issues listed have 
proved frustrating, as seen in the ODAC case.  In separate national consultative conferences 
organized by the national governing council, ODAC attempted unsuccessfully, on both 
occasions, to get issues related to the right to information listed in the thematic areas of corporate 
governance, economic governance and management, and political governance and democracy 
(Hutchings et al 2008).  
In July, 2006 the country review mission visited South Africa. The purpose of the visit was to 
hold structured formal engagements with a cross-section of groups and actors relevant to the 
review process, in order to validate information that had been received. To this end, efforts were 
made by the review team to reach out to a variety of sources outside the formal programme 
schedule (Herbert and Gruzd, 2008 264). At this point of the process, the conflicts that had 
questioned the independence of the council and the definition of the structural components of the 
internal process were widely absent. The review team was able, more or less, to play the role of 
an arbiter between the more radical civil society groups and representatives of government on the 
council.  As a result of this practical outcome, some semblance of stability seems to have 
emerged within the decision process of the review mechanism. 
Issues of concern to the media, and to some representatives within the National Governing 
Council, have focused on the omission in the draft country review report of discussions on ‘floor 
crossing’, the ‘Oilgate’ scandal and threats to judicial independence. While strict advocates of a 
detailed process pressed for further condemnation of these practices in the report, it appears that 
government was uncomfortable with the strong wording of the reports on these issues. During 
the 2nd  May meeting of the National Governing Council, it is reported that some government 
officials had expressed misgivings at the tone of the draft report and requested the research 
agency tone down the language used to describe the situation (Minutes of 2 May 2006 National 
Governing Council Meeting).   
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The second National Consultative conference which took place on the 4th to 5th May appears to 
have been hurriedly encouraged to validate the draft reports, which were seen to have had some 
pages taken out at the last minute.5 Beside a last-minute revision of the contents of the report, as 
suspected by some participants, a further doubt was raised by the fact that the research agencies 
had not collected further and better particulars on the submissions that were made by individuals 
through the provincial councils that it had used. As the research agencies had relied heavily on 
the information that was provided by the provincial council, it was not possible to validate or 
cross check the responses that were provided to the APR questionnaire which served as the basis 
for formulating the self-assessment report.  
Notwithstanding these doubts, the Kliptown conference of 2 May was well attended by over 
1,700 participants (Herbert and Gruzd, 2008:264). It was generally agreed that the self-
assessment report and the national programme of action had succeeded in reflecting the concerns 
and issues raised. Though some sections of the participants still held the view that portions of the 
report were edited, an agreement was reached to present it to the APR Panel for scrutiny.  
The country review team worked on the country review report of South Africa, from August to 
December, 2006.  The report that was produced contained 182 recommendations in all four areas 
of the review. Most of the issues that were thought to have been watered down as a result of the 
editing of the self-assessment report had found their way back into the report.6 Nevertheless, a 
close look at the programme of action, and the responses that were provided by government to 
the comments of the review team, reveals that the government, to a large extent, had ignored and 
failed to respond to some of the condemnations directly. Admittedly, it was the case that 
government had partially responded to some of the recommendations, for instance, when issues 
of xenophobia and crime statistics were contested at the presentation of the Country Review 
Report at the summit of the APR Forum (Communique of 7th Summit of APR Forum, page 3).   
The review of South Africa, held at the margins of the AU conference, served as an opportunity 
to assess the acceptability of the report, considering that most civil society and government 
actors had expressed their concerns about the process that culminated in the report. With the July 
                                                          
5 Personal Interview, Gruzd Steven, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg South Africa, 28 
July 2015 
6 Personal Interview with Gruzd Steven 
 152 
 
2007 Summit of the APR Forum, South Africa’s case was reviewed by the Forum. Thereafter in 
October 2007, the Country Review Report and the National Programme of Action was publicly 
released.  
This brief phase of the South African review process was met with media criticism around the 
lack of transparency leading to the final country review report (Pogue 2010: 154). The central 
basis for this criticism was more related to a conflict between the National Governing Council of 
South African, on the one hand, and civil society groups that were desirous of engaging the 
review process as a means of advancing and advocating their interests, but had been sidelined in 
the process.  
Another conflict, in essence, had to do with the APR Panel and the National Governing Council. 
It appears the Panel had reservations over the lack of any comprehensive response to the 
programme of action as outlined by the government of South Africa to address the challenges 
identified in the country self-assessment report (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 307). As a result, the 
desire of the National Governing Council to go through the process as quickly as possible was 
seen a dereliction of its duty to meet the requirements for a comprehensive process with broad 
base engagement. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
The governance structure of the South African Review process provides an example of an 
institutionalized environment that incorporates incentives for making decisions that are informed 
by established guidelines and norms. The APR Forum transfers it power to the APR Panel over 
the making the day-to-day decisions of the review mechanism, which are then implemented at 
the country level by the National Governing Council. As a result, a division of labour is 
established in the exercise of the functions that are assigned to each of the committees in the 
decision process. This leads to specialization among the various decision bodies, resulting in 
implications for the decisions made. As a consequence each of the bodies in the decision process 
is faced with a specific opportunity structure. While the APR Forum restricts itself to making 
decisions of a political nature and adopts decisions that guide the conduct of the review process, 
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other bodies are faced with streams of decision proposals and have to utilize expert knowledge to 
arrive at a resolution of individual cases. Even in the particular case of South Africa, where the 
National Governing Council operates under a government ministry, the system has been able to 
push the powerful government representatives in the council towards the acceptance of decisions 
based on standards that were agreed upon to guide the review process. 
As theoretically forecast, the South African review process operates empirically in the light of 
rule-based decision making, even though powerful actors exhibit interests that are averse to the 
guidelines of the review process. As a specific case, the review process of South Africa shows 
adherence to the guiding principles of the review process, notwithstanding the initial attempts by 
the Focal Point to pursue the interest of government. The contention of this dissertation is that 
this tendency can systematically be traced to the separation of rule-making functions and norm 
implementation between the continental APR structures and the national level structures. Even in 
the face of ambiguous guidelines and imprecise country guidelines, the decision making system 
has consistently resorted to a practice that had previously existed in other review processes, and 
served as a yard stick. In summary, in the South African case, during the review process the APR 
Forum concentrated its operations on formulating rules at the political level, while the National 
Governing Council, in conjunction with other sub-committees at the national level, concentrated 
on the application of rules and guidelines. As a consequence, different tasks were delegated to 
other bodies that sought and succeeded in producing the most appropriate decisions.  
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Chapter 5 
5.1. The APRM Process in Ghana: Setting a Precedent or Governed by Rules?  
This chapter analyses how the simple structure of the APR process in Ghana has affected the 
functioning, as well the quality of decisions, in the country review of Ghana. It pursues the 
argument that, at the level of the APR Panel, decision-making issues are not resolved through the 
provision of generalized decision criteria. Instead, stability in the system is attributed to the 
ability of actors to converge on common interests through the use of expert committees. As a 
result, horizontal accountability, induced by recommendations from experts and peers, has had a 
significant influence on the APR process in Ghana.  At the level of the National Governing 
Council, the absence of decision criteria leaves actors with broad discretion over their decision-
making, which brings to light the imprecise nature of the rules or clauses in the organizational 
structure of the African Peer Review Mechanism.  
Using the example of the Ghana review process, the chapter gives empirical insights into the 
relevance of horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms in encouraging convergence on 
issue areas, even where there are no definitive provisions guiding the tenets of cooperation 
between and among States. The argument further confirms theoretical propositions by 
emphasising the enduring role of institutions in enabling stability among States in the presence of 
a cooperation or distributional problem. The argument compliments previous research that 
emphasises the importance of institutional design features in an existing cooperation project 
among States. Thus, States are seen to be rational in their choice of design features of 
institutions. States, then, consciously choose from among alternative design provisions as a result 
of the ensuing cooperation problem at hand, or as a result of the uncertainties about the world or 
the behavior of other actors (Koremenos 2016: 2). Making these assumptions has implications 
for the procedure this dissertation takes to test the presence of mechanisms that lead to observing 
the previously theorized phenomenon of rationally motivated actors using institutions as a 
conduit to further their interest and preferences in issues of conflicting interests.    
The chapter will proceed as follows: in the first section, the governance structure of the review 
process in Ghana is explored.  National and continental institutions are described, and their 
respective composition, specific role and extent of independence from government are subjected 
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to vigorous analysis. The simple structure of the APR process in Ghana is shown to illustrate a 
differentiation in a rule making function and the application of the contents of the rules to the 
cooperation project of member States in the APRM. At the continental level, the APR Forum is 
shown to be engaged in a rule making function. The Forum takes political and administrative 
decisions that are meant to give direction to the application of the rules at a lower level. At the 
country level, the National Governing Council is shown to implement directions as contained in 
founding documents of the APR process. The implication of this differentiated system is the 
creation of a horizontal accountability mechanism at the country level among stakeholders at 
various stages of the review process. This differentiation is described as fulfilling the intention to 
provide an incentive structure for various committees to offer review recommendations that are 
in the interest of the entire APR process.   
The second section of the chapter looks at the various phases of the decision-making process. It 
shows how the first and second phases of the review process were characterized by the absence 
of any concrete guidelines, since Ghana was the first country to be reviewed. The APRM Base 
document and other instruments adopted by the Heads of State and Government participating in 
the review process served as the main reference documents. This phase is characterized by a 
number of milestones that show how the commitment and intentions of the various actors in the 
process were important to ensuring an incident-free review process.    
The chapter concludes by affirming that the current design of the governance structure of the 
APR process in Ghana provides a robust system to hold actors, at the lower level of rule 
implementation, accountable for their decisions. It contends that the lack of sufficiently elaborate 
rules during the review process in Ghana did not apparently undermine the accountability system 
in the decision-making process. The separation of the National Governing Council from the 
direct shadows of a government ministry is argued to have played a role in ensuring that 
disagreements did not result in stalemates in the decision process, and asserts that members 
instead resolved contentious issues at each stage of the process through expert subcommittees 
that were formed to handle each of the issues. The presence of institutional arrangements at each 
stage of the review process contributes to pushing decision makers to resort to the APRM 
instruments as a point of reference for deciding on policy issues in the review process.  
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5.2. The Governance Structure of the Ghana Review Process 
An analysis of the APRM review process of Ghana allows for the study of problems that arise as 
a result of the absence of well-developed and concrete guidelines in a decision system. It also 
gives insight into how the APR process may insulate itself from the acrimony of power politics, 
and remain visibly non-partisan, given the interests at stake for civil society, opposition parties 
and the incumbent government. According to Grimm et al (2009), the institutional structures 
established in the process of the country review of Ghana served as the backbone to securing the 
independence of these actors. They further argue that the institutional structure designed in 
Ghana largely provided corroborating evidence for the ongoing autonomy and credibility of the 
process (Grimm et al 2009). Though the design features of the institutions, established by Ghana 
to manage the review process, sought to establish this sense of autonomy, actual operations and 
procedures carried out in Ghana were not fully detached from the political process. Questions 
may be raised concerning the fact that appointments to the National Governing Council were 
made under the authority of government. This, in itself, does not discredit the independence and 
autonomy required for the actors in the decision-making process. This section describes the 
institutional structure of the APR process in Ghana, and explores the incentives that push actors 
to make the most adequate rule-based decisions in the face of competing interests. It traces the 
development of the decision-making process in the Ghanaian example, and describes each of the 
sub-bodies in the organizational structure (see figure 2 for author’s illustration).  
As early as October of 2002, even before the APR process had been fully developed, Ghana 
stated its desire to accede to the review process (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 158; Grimm et al 
2009: 42). According to some analysts, the decision to participate in the process was a strategic, 
rational decision taken by the government in order to firmly position the country as a democratic 
and economic reformer. To this end, the government sought to demonstrate a high degree of  
transparency in public policy, a message which was aimed at various audiences, including 
domestic groups, other African states and, not least, international donors (Herbert and Gruzd 
2008: 157). One incentive for taking this position can be seen in a need to signal a strong 
commitment to the long term goals of the AU in respect of the review mechanism, but could also 
be seen, to some degree, as being connected to the foreign policy goals of the government of 
Ghana at the time. Continentally, the government sought to position the country as an active 
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contributor in the realization of the objectives of the AU and the NEPAD, as well being 
instrumental in the promotion of good neighbourliness throughout Africa, with the intention of 
fostering the closest possible cooperation and collaboration with all African countries to promote 
the acceleration of the Continent’s development. Adherence to the principles and parameters of 
these collective goals was nevertheless expected to be realised in a manner that is consistent with 
the national interest of Ghana (Art. 73, 1992 Constitution of Ghana). It may then be seen as 
questionable, whether the APRM undertaking manifestly achieved these goals, if a government 
visibly positions itself to strategically benefit from the process to further its own agenda.  
Figure 2: APR Structures at the National Level in Ghana, Author’s Illustration   
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the designated Focal Point for the review process. The National Governing Council was charged 
with the responsibility to administer the national review process, and mandated to facilitate the 
conduct of the APRM country self-assessment and monitor the implementation of the national 
programme of action (NAPRM-GC, Terms of reference, 2004).7 The creation of the Council, 
according to its terms of reference, was to coordinate and manage a non-partisan and informed 
assessment of the review process in Ghana, with a view to ensuring effective and efficient 
decisions with regard to the conception of good governance envisaged by the APRM. The scope 
of the Council’s mandate covered the four thematic areas of the APRM, aiming to increase 
participation in the process, and share Ghana’s APRM experiences with international institutions 
and organizations (NAPRM-GC, Terms of reference, para. 3, 2004).  
The National Governing Council was comprised of a seven-member panel of experts, drawn 
from academics, retired diplomats, distinguished lawyers, international consultants and senior 
religious leaders. The Council was accorded the same status and legal protection from 
government interference as other independent bodies, as expressed in the 1992 constitution of the 
Republic of Ghana (Gruzd 2006, 24). The independence of the Council was essential to its 
credibility and autonomy in the review process. Autonomy, in this sense, meant that the National 
APRM Governing Gouncil (NAPRM-GC) exercised discretionary powers and was not bonded 
by any external control, except when implementing the directives of the rule-making APR 
Forum.  
The Council was therefore not subject to the complete control of the executive arm of 
government in the discharge of their mandate, none of the council members had been appointed 
by a single President, and could only be dismissed on grounds of due cause. The mandate 
enjoyed by the Council was enshrined in the terms of reference and the founding documents of 
the APRM process (APRM Guideline, para 34, 35&36). In this regard the Council was insulated 
from the executive arm of government, preserving its role as the impartial administrator of the 
self-assessment process, a factor vital to the final review process.  
Since its inauguration in 2004 the governance structure of the Council has remained largely 
unchanged, although subject to occasional mandate renewals which have not resulted in 
                                                          
7 See Annex I for full list of the NAPRM members  
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substantive changes to the structure. Its membership over the years has been entirely composed 
of individuals from academia, the private sector and civil society. The Council is serviced by a 
Secretariat headed by an executive secretary. The Secretariat provides technical, coordinating 
and administrative support services to the Council. This general task of the Secretariat is divided 
into a technical operations unit and an administrative unit. These units broadly plan and execute 
programs and projects of the Secretariat, coordinate capacity building interventions and engage 
in the collection and analysis of data to inform the writing of progress reports (Terms of 
reference. para. 2).     
Prior to the inauguration of the National Council, steps were taken to create a ministry of 
regional cooperation and NEPAD (APRM CRR Ghana, 2006: xvii). To some extent, this move 
indicated the intentions of government to cooperate at the continental level to achieve common 
policy goals and objectives expressed through the AU. The ministry, however, did not have any 
operational functions that were directly linked to the governance and management of the review 
process. Since an independent Focal Point was established to coordinate the activities leading to 
the review, the ministry technically had no mandate in the decision-making of the review 
mechanism at the country level.  
In addition to the seven-member Council of experts, mandated to administer and monitor the 
self-assessment and the program of action, country support and review teams were also 
established by the APR Panel, fulfilling the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding signed 
by the government on 9th March 2003 to accede to the review process (APRM CRR Ghana, 
2006:xvii). The MOU gives legal and operational backing to continental APR structures to 
initiate a process of gathering the most relevant information for the policy recommendations and 
decisions that are contained in the final country review reports. With the MOU in place, any 
member participating in the process has obligations, among which is the undertaking to create 
the most conducive political environment of an incident-free review, and to commit credibly to 
the long terms objectives of the review process. 
Within the scope of the instruments which established the Governing Council, it can be seen to 
have been provided with powers of an administrative nature. It engages in making decisions that 
are guided by generally agreed rules and standards, formulated by the highest decision making 
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authority of the APRM, the APR Forum. Appointments to the Council are made by the executive 
arm of the government under review. To hedge against any potential to unduly use discretionary 
powers of appointment to victimize members who may be perceived to oppose the short term 
goals of government, the power to revoke the appoint of a member, on grounds of not diligently 
applying the rules of engagement, is virtually non-existent.  
A further important source of authority, bequeathed to the Governing Council of the review 
process in Ghana, is the power to appoint credible and reputable independent research 
institutions to undertake the national self-assessment in each of the four main areas of the 
APRM. The involvement of the research institutes is geared towards guiding the Council to draft 
a national program of action that is based on appropriate and scientific recommendations 
received from internationally reputable think-tanks in areas of concern.  
These arrangements lead to the creation of layers of accountability between the bodies involved 
in the decision process. The various bodies are not hierarchically ordered, as each of them has its 
competences and make recommendations based on its expertise. The introduction of vertical 
accountability in the organizational system of the review contributes to ensuring that appropriate 
decisions are made in the interest of the objectives of the review mechanism. Research institutes 
engaged in the process are then given incentives to make correct decisions. Since their activities 
are subject to public input, any attempt to diverge from appropriate decision-making may well be 
noticed by other external actors, and the omission rectified. Furthermore, the research institutes 
have their reputation at stake. If they engage in acts deliberately geared towards presenting 
unscientific recommendations, there exists a tendency to suffer a credibility backlash among 
their peers.   
Another important component of the governance structure of the APR process in Ghana, as 
pointed out earlier, was the establishment of the Country Review Mission (CRM).8 It was 
comprised of sixteen experts, affiliated to one of the APR partner institutions, the APRM 
Secretariat or as independent consultants contracted by the APR Panel. The CRM held extensive 
consultations with diverse stakeholders including parliament, political parties, government 
officials, trade unions, civil society groups, academia, business and professional bodies (Country 
                                                          
8 See Annex I for detailed list of membership  
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Review Report of the Republic of Ghana, 2005). In the context of the review process in Ghana, 
the CRM served as a further instrument to cross-examine the information that provided the basis 
for the various issues raised in the country self-assessment report. Receiving information first-
hand, from stakeholders who are expected to be instrumental in the process, was a vital 
component in the realization of the aims for which the mission was set-up within the system.  
At the apex of the APR process are continental structures. These include the APR Forum, the 
APR Panel and the Secretariat. The Secretariat serves as a support to the APR Panel and the 
country review teams in the performance of their tasks, as per Articles 49 & 50 of the Operating 
Procedures of the APRM. It undertakes duties in relation to the technical and administrative 
coordination of the review process in participating countries (Grimm et al 2009: 28), thereby 
providing information that is vital to a balanced judgement of the state of affairs in each case. 
Information gathering takes place before the review team considers passing judgment on the 
programmes of member states in the four areas of the review process. While the APR Panel is 
the main body tasked with having oversight over the review process, the APR Forum is the 
supreme body that makes the rules that guide the decision-making process of the APR process.  
On the basis of the functions that are assigned to each of the bodies of the review process in 
Ghana, there is a clear distinction between an upper level of the governance structure performing 
a rule-making function, and a lower level limiting itself to the implementation of the generally 
agreed rules established by the APR Forum. In this observation, it is conjectured that delegation 
to several bodies at the lower level of the review process can lead to a horizontal accountability 
mechanism that may help detect problem-inadequate recommendations made at each stage of the 
decision process. If there are less precise rules, then it is expected that, at implementation, actors 
may face a stalemate in the decision making process, making the system more likely to come to a 
standstill. With more precise rules, members of various bodies who disagree with various 
decisions are able to turn to the guidelines as a way of institutionalizing the decision rules and 
standards set by the rule-making body. Agreements on tenuous issues, avoiding any vicious 
acrimony on the agreed rules, may also be the result of the ability of members at the lower level 
of rule implementation to converge at common decisions without bargaining over the issues 
under consideration.   
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5.3. The First Phase of the Establishment of a National Governing Council through to the 
Country Support Visit 
In the initial stage of the review process as it occurred in Ghana, the APR Forum, as the rule-
setter in the APR process, provided few guidelines on how the review process was to be 
administered and governed. Ghana’s declared intention to participate in the process, in October 
2002, happened at a time when the APR Panel had not even been appointed (Grimm et al 2009: 
58). There was no proper timetable, and no continental-level structures set up to have oversight 
of the process. The country review of Ghana thus had a unique opportunity to showcase how 
standards of procedure, later generally established, gained utility in the interactions of the actors 
on the various issue areas of the review process, and how, in the absence of substantive ex ante 
criteria, various stakeholders converged at median decision points. 
Characterized by imprecise decision criteria and a lack of parameters for decision-making at this 
stage of the review process, members of the various bodies in the review process were afforded 
wide discretion in their decision-making. The Base APRM document, which served as one of the 
important guidelines at this time for the review, was, at best, incoherent over the designation of 
rules of engagement for the bodies in the organizational structure. The Base APR document 
encouraged imprecise delegation contracts to the bodies envisaged to superintend the review 
process. As a result, it created a demand for rules in each of the bodies that were only established 
at the country level. The basic expectation was that, as a result of diverging interest among 
stakeholders, the inability to substantially establish any formal or informal rules could negatively 
impact the decision-making process. However, the demand for rules at this stage, instead of 
impeding the business of the various committees and possibly blocking their work rather, proved 
beneficial. The differentiation of functions appears to have had a positive consequence for the 
decision-making process, as stakeholders seemed to be held accountable and in check by 
institutional mechanisms in the governance process of the review process.    
After signing the MOU to accept the  review process in March 2003, Ghana immediately 
inaugurated a Focal Point, as demanded by the APR base document (APR Guidelines Para. 34 ). 
No clear roadmap was put in place at this time to define a time-bound programme of action to 
implement the declaration on democracy, political, economic and corporate governance, as 
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required by Article 13 of the ARPM base document (Art. 13, APR base doc.). As a result, there 
were no concrete plans over the periodic reviews that were required in the case of Ghana. 
Notwithstanding, the review process in Ghana had the potential to set a precedent and develop 
standards that could shape the continental review process for other States (Herbert and Gruzd 
2008: 158). As Ghana was the first country to receive a review mission and present its self-
assessment report to the APR Panel, the management of the process was important in creating a 
niche for the review process as an undertaking.   
As a first step towards getting the base review carried out, after it had deposited the 
Memorandum of Understanding at the APRM secretariat, Ghana’s national APRM structures 
were developed in June 2003 and presented to Cabinet for approval (Appiah, 2004:7). Prior to 
this, a National Governing Council had been established and a Secretariat created to coordinate 
the activities of the review process. To make the Secretariat functional at this point, an executive 
secretary was appointed to manage the process by which the Secretariat delivered a self-
assessment report on the four areas to be reviewed. Ghana decided, as far as possible, to insulate 
the National Governing Council from overt partisan politics, and to ensure the independence and 
autonomy of the Governing Council. The Focal Point was therefore given an independent status 
and not located under the control of any ministry or government department. Though in practice 
the executive secretary and members of the Governing Council were appointed by the President, 
in theory they were able to act independently of the government, leading a process that could be 
seen as credible and in the best interest of the objectives of the APR process. The decision to 
establish an independent national council with broad representation had implications. It set the 
tone of engagement between stakeholders on the one hand, in support of an open and transparent 
review process, and government on the other, with its own interest in the outcome of the review 
process.  
The decision to establish an independent governing council to serve as the focal point for the 
review process created some incentives to foster cooperation between the different interests that 
were at play in the review. For instance, as early as November 2003, during a workshop for civil 
society organizations, government made claims that consultations with the general public were 
far advanced and that the country was ready for a review (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 161; Report 
on national stakeholders consultations 2005). Civil society groups present at the workshop 
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challenged these claims being made by government, and sparked an animated debate on how 
they perceived the situation to have been at the time. The main issue of contention for most 
groups was that the selection of members to the governing council did not appear transparent. 
They also expressed the opinion that  decisions made at the early stages of the process were 
skewed, and did not reflect a true and proper understanding of any desire to create an inclusive 
review process (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 161).  
These initial agitations by stakeholders signaled the seriousness of the participation of civil 
society in the process, and the strength of the interests they sought to pursue. The consultative 
report of the workshop of November 2003 indicates that the reaction of civil society had the 
effect of actually delaying the selection of the full complement of the National Governing 
Council, allowing for deeper consultation and the development of criteria for selection 
acceptable to all stakeholders in the process (Report on National Stakeholder consultations Oct. 
2005). The decision to delay the creation of the Governing Council could thus be said to have 
been made on purpose, in the light of a perceived need to ensure that the Council appeared 
independent and legitimate in its operations regarding managing the internal process. An 
independent Council, to all intents and purposes, had the potential to present a self-assessment 
report that fairly represented the goals of the review process in general. Securing its 
independence was crucial, especially when gauged against the background of the pioneering role 
and precedent that could be set by the members of the council. On the other hand, since several 
stakeholders in the review came with various expectations and needed to pursue their interests in 
the four thematic areas of the review, a Council that was independent and legitimate was seen as 
the best solution to persuade all actors to accept decisions and overcome any stalemates in the 
decision-making process.  
It is also important to note that the MOU that established the review process was not specific on 
the nature of the Governing Council. It left open to the participating State decisions on 
constructing a governing structure that was best for its practices. While it called for the 
participating State to facilitate the process by making available the necessary resources for the 
implementation of the review at the national level (NEPAD/HSGIC/APRM/MoU Article 18), it 
concomitantly fell short of clearly indicating the reporting lines of authority in the Governing 
Council, whose content and nature were also omitted. This probably explains why the 
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stakeholders’ forum was thrown into the debate between government on one side and civil 
society on the other over the extent of consultations that had taken place, and on the modalities 
of appointing members into the Governing council. Neither did the MOU include any details 
about the implementation of the review at the country level. In such circumstances the 
Governing Council was afforded the latitude to exert its influence in the decision-making process 
by setting rules of engagement that would serve as the basis on which it would operate. Overall, 
these loose arrangements show how lack of oversight of the country review process of Ghana 
initially posed threats on the management and implementation of the review.  
In the event it took almost three months for criteria to be developed to guide the selection of the 
Governing Council and define its internal procedures. According to Appiah, the initiative to 
develop standard criteria to guide the operations and conduct of the council was aimed at gaining 
acceptance from all stakeholders (Report on National Stakeholders Consultations 2005). Within 
this period, the work of the national APR Focal Point had come to a standstill, so that only 
administrative issues pertaining to the review were being dealt with. The Governing Council was 
inaugurated into office in March of 2004 (Country Review Report of Ghana, 2005). Though the 
executive arm of government supervised its appointment and inauguration, the Council did not 
take any oath of allegiance to the office of the President. This, in essence, signified an 
independent role that was being bestowed on the Council in the conduct of its duties. The 
Council, in its composition, mirrored the diversity and complex demographic structure of the 
country. Expertise and competence in the key areas of the review were prevailing factors in the 
consideration of each of the appointments. Impartiality and the ability to demonstrate a sense of 
independence from the government were regarded as matters crucial to the decision process of 
the review mechanism.   
At the same time, concrete steps were being taken to engage Technical Research Institutes in the 
thematic areas of the review process. With the full complement of the National Governing 
Council in place, four research institutes were identified and given the specific task of producing 
a self-assessment report (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 163). It was also within their terms of 
reference to produce a draft national programmme of action for each of the thematic areas. The 
four research institutes comprised the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), 
responsible for the issue area of democracy and political governance, the Centre for Policy 
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Analysis (CEPA), which handled the area of economic governance and management, the Private 
Enterprises Foundation (PEF) which became the lead research team in the issue area of corporate 
governance, and the Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) which 
managed the thematic area of socio-economic development  
These four Technical Research Institutes (TRIs), in their various domains, were to serve as a 
guide to the Council to produce a robust national programme of action (POA), which, as a matter 
of procedure, was to accompany the country self-assessment report (Country Review Report of 
Ghana, 2005: 24). The National Governing Council appears to have taken the work of the 
technical institutes very seriously, since their expert recommendations were recognized as 
necessary to inform the Council on the best decisions to take on each of the thematic issues in the 
review.  
The adoption and signing of the APRM MOU on the technical assessment missions, as was 
carried out between the APR Forum and Ghana on 27 May 2004, created a clear signal in the 
appropriate adherence to the founding documents which had been established to guide the 
conduct of the review process.  
A support mission of the APRM led by Dr. Chris Stals, a member of the APR Panel in charge of 
the Ghana review process, had been in Ghana prior to the signing of the MOU on the technical 
assessment mission. The team was composed of 8 members, including the lead consultant for the 
APRM. The purpose of the support mission was to assess the processes put in place to undertake 
the country self-assessment and to prepare the preliminary programme of action (APRM Support 
Mission Communique, May 2004). The mission assessed the preparedness of the country to 
commence the review exercise. During the visit, the mission analyzed the structures, 
methodologies and participatory processes that had been established at the country level for the 
implementation of the APRM (Country Review Report of Ghana 2005: 24). This visit brought to 
an end the initial disagreements on the composition of the governing country, and over the 
intentions of the government to set up an independent council to take overall responsibility of the 
country self-assessment process.  
The support mission, which lasted from the 24-29 May 2004, also coincided with a national 
stakeholders’ forum which was organized by the NAPRM-GC. This was followed by a workshop 
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purposfully aimed at creating national ownership of the process. The workshop also 
demonstrated an open and transparent process targeted to foster dialogue and build consensus 
among the participating stakeholders in the review. An outcome of these sensitization 
programmes was a tacit agreement, between members of the Governing Council and interested 
parties in the review process, to follow the guidelines of the national support mission in setting 
up an independent council that would serve as an arbiter in the administration of the process in 
Ghana. As a result, the Council, relying on guidelines given at the end of the support mission, 
organized a series of seminars, in all regional capitals of Ghana, to keep participants and the 
general public abreast of the fundamental aims and guidelines of the review process (Country 
Review Report, 2005:6).  
The appointment of the Technical Research Institutes created a demand for mutually agreed 
decision rules for the technical teams that were engaged. The decision was made to delegate the 
competence to make its recommendations, which would inform the drafting of the country self-
assessment report, to technical teams instead of to the members within civil society who were 
opposed to the initial plans over appointments to the Council. This made it clear that the 
implementation of decisions would need the support of all stakeholders in the process. Since the 
TRIs were each mandated to produce recommendations on a specific thematic area, it became 
important to have a uniform system for decision rules and their operations.  
In this regard, the APR standard questionnaire guidelines, adopted by the Forum, served as a 
guide. The standards set out in the questionnaire were mostly vague and in some instances highly 
generic (Gruzd 2006: 25). The questionnaire, to a large extent, was meant to elicit responses to 
the issues that were the focus of the thematic areas of concern. The general problem with the 
questionnaire for the country self-assessment process had to do with a lack of consistency in the 
formulation of questions, and the overlapping nature of most of the issues areas. Translating the 
questionnaire into the various Ghanaian languages was also an issue, especially in instances 
where it was difficult to find the equivalence of some technical terms in the local dialect. 
Notwithstanding these problems, the methodology employed by the research teams contributed 
to amending the redundancies of the bulky questionnaire.  
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However the demand to have guidelines for the operations of both the Governing Council and 
expert technical institutes became more glaring as stakeholders pushed for an inclusive and more 
participatory review process. As a result the country support mission issued a statement, after its 
visit, where proposals were made on the way to establish criteria for the operation of the 
Technical Research Institutes and the Governing Council (APRM Support mission communique, 
May 2004). The team emphasized the need for the self-assessment questionnaire to serve as a 
guide to the conduct of the self-assessment process.  
Efforts adopted by the support mission to Ghana to stabilize contentious issues at the beginning 
of the review process demonstrated the inadequacy of criteria for decision-making available to 
the National APRM Council. The mission nevertheless commended the government for the 
strides taken in appointing and establishing the foundational structures needed for the 
commencement of the review process. This positive response was particularly motivated by the 
ability of the State to commission four independent non-governmental technical advisory bodies 
to assist with the assessment process in the respective thematic areas (Para. 2(iii) of the APRM 
support mission communiques, 2004). In this regard, the technical institutes briefed the mission 
on their planned activities and methodologies to facilitate the conduct of the self-assessment 
process. The Technical Research Institutes went to great length to adopt the most appropriate 
tools and methodologies, seen as best practice in their research, in order to converge around a 
reasonable self-assessment in the areas of their mandate.   
In a follow up press statement, which was released by the APRM secretariat on the 18th of June 
2004, the APR Panel was emphatic over the need for member States to adhere to the guidelines 
of the self-assessment process, devoid of any political manipulation (Press Release on the APRM 
Country Support Mission to Ghana, Rwanda, and Mauritius on 18.06.2004). It expressed the 
hope that the Ghanaian government would be committed to the process, and not play a role that 
would, in any way, bring the process into disrepute. The press release of June 2004 also spelt out 
the programme of the Panel in relation to other review processes that were to be started. The 
guidelines, given to serve as the point of reference in the review process in Ghana, were made 
equally applicable in other situations. To further strengthen the capacity and sense of credibility 
to the mission’s work, the press release noted that the consultants and experts mobilized for the 
coming support visits were persons of high professional repute in the areas of the review process. 
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It called on all States participating in the process to put in place requisite national structures, and 
called for the proper organization of the APRM with regard to the timeframes stipulated. 
Member states therefore were enjoined to enforce and respect the rules of engagement without 
any hindrance to the work of the support mission (Press Release of Country Support Mission to 
Ghana, Rwanda and Mauritius, 18.06.2004).  
In essence the support mission’s main task was to provide the opportunity to arrive at a 
consensus with all stakeholders on existing issues of disagreements (United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa Report, ESPD/NRP/01/05, 2005). By conclusively dealing with  
pertinent issues at the preparatory stage of the review process, members opposed to the 
Governing Council’s initial steps had effectively promoted  a ruled based mechanism that would 
inform the decision making process at the self-assessment stage. Efforts put in place by the 
Technical Research Institutes to follow a methodology that would produce the most problem-
adequate recommendations to the National Governing Council, did not lead immediately to 
creating a focal point for decision-making among all the expert technical institutes that were 
being engaged. Though the support mission, in its press release, sought to give the impression 
that it had definitely dealt with any disagreements and provided solid guidelines for the conduct 
of the self-assessment, its questionnaire was vague and did not appear to have provided a 
solution to settle the discrepancies in the interpretations of the standards of the APR process at 
that time.   
Failing to come up with proper criteria for decision-making for the self-assessment report gave 
an incentive for the emergence of new issues in the decision process. Some civil society groups 
had raised the issue of inability of the guidelines to clearly specify detailed and comprehensive 
rules to regulate the conduct of decision makers. The absence of concrete standard decision rules 
at this point meant that the decision process was still subject to disagreements. With a lack of 
identification of what problems might arise in the individual projects and programmes of other 
member states, subsequent review visits and the final review at the Forum could similarly be 
characterized by a lack of standard rules to guide the conduct of the actors in the decision 
making process.  
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This first phase of the review process in Ghana came to an end with the clarifications of the Press 
Release of June 2004 by the APR Secretariat in respect of the support mission’s visit. (Press 
Release of 18 June 2004). While this statement purports to give clarity on the issues of 
disagreements between stakeholders, the statement in fact give more weight to providing 
information on the approval of the programme of work by the Panel in the subsequent reviews 
which were planned to follow the Ghanaian experience. The statement explains the purpose of 
the visit, stating:  
‘the purpose of the Support Mission is to ascertain the extent of preparedness and the capacity of 
the country to participate in the peer review process, and particularly to undertake its self-
assessment and draft its National Programme of Action. The Support Mission is also intended to 
create common understanding of the overall APRM processes and instruments, (own emphasis) 
and to ensure that the institutional and organisational arrangements provide for active 
involvement and participation of major stakeholders on an ongoing basis’ (Press Release of June 
18, 2004, Para. 2). 
The statement, however, fails to declare the processes and mechanisms put in place to 
definitively conclude on the criteria on which decisions on the propriety of member States were 
to be based. Therefore, instead of addressing disagreements on issues and the content of what 
had actually been done in respect to the preparatory work of the review process, the support 
mission merely sought to ‘ascertain’ the extent of ‘issues of capacity and preparedness’. This 
approach limits the capacity of the Panel, and avoids addressing questions over the introduction 
of specific regulatory guidelines for the conduct of various actors in the review process. 
To sum up, the first phase of the review process, which concerned the preparatory and country 
self-assessment stage (ECA pamphlet   2011:5), was characterized by a complete absence of 
concrete decision procedures and criteria. The fortunate existence of mutual preferences, 
especially between members of civil society that were opposed to any move by the government 
to dominate the governance structure of the process, enabled them to push for and sometimes 
agree on criteria for specific tasks. However, lack of clarity resulted in a weak decision structure 
aimed at guiding decision-making among members of the council and the technical research 
teams. The non-existence of any reliable criteria-based decision procedures can also be seen to 
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create incentives for members of the Governing Council to exercise an arbitrary authority, 
conferred on it by participating states in the review process.  
 
5.4. The Second Phase: From the Country Review Mission to the Review by the APR 
Forum  
A close examination of the second phase of the review process reveals that a decision system that 
is not sufficiently well-designed may lead to accountability problems, especially in instances 
where there are no adequate guidelines in decision-making situations. However, it also shows 
that this deficiency can be mitigated by the presence of multi-layered stakeholders’ engagement, 
which can prevent decision-making blockages.  
At the commencement of this second stage of the review process, neither the APR Panel nor the 
Forum appeared to take its regulatory functions seriously, and, as a result, committees at the 
country level continued to enjoy unrestrained discretion over the exercise of their duties. 
Beneficially, however, the absence of any meaningful decision criteria appears to have meant 
that any incentives for member States to introduce their parochial interests into the decision 
process were avoided.   
Internal mechanisms which could hold peers accountable were however induced by the presence 
of sustained stakeholder engagement in the process. As a consequence the review process was 
not entirely blocked from producing decisions on the four thematic areas of the review. There 
was, however, a problem with the implementation of the recommendations of the review. 
Systematic delays occurred in the implementation of the decisions that formed the core of the 
national programme of action. These delays had their roots in the non-existence of precise 
decision rules at this stage of the review process. In addition to the absence of decision criteria, 
implementation problems could also be attributed to the high cost of projects, as agreeing to 
implement the national programmes of actions inherently comes with both financial and political 
costs for the State under review.  
At the political level, member States suffer from the possibility of an audience cost in instances 
where certain proposed programs have an internal political dimension. For instance, in the 
 173 
 
economic governance area of the review, member States are assessed on the extent of their 
financial prudence in the management of both fiscal and monetary policy at the country level 
(NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI, para 3.1a, page 15). Issues of economic 
management are often ones which are hotly contested between incumbents and opposition 
political parties within the national political system. As such, any admission of mismanagement 
of the economy in the process of implementing proposals for reforms may bring with it the 
difficulty that it buttresses the claims of opponents concerning the inability of an incumbent 
government to manage the economy. If these claims are driven by findings from the review 
process, the government under review faces the real possibility of backlash of public 
disaffection. While costs of this nature are invariably inescapable, they do create unhelpful 
incentives for governments to act in ways that might not comply with the tenets of transparency 
and accountability, which are prerequisites for a proper implementation of the peer review.     
At the level of the APR Forum, member States who view the review process as a threat to their 
governance performance may have uniform preferences across cases, but become uncertain 
about the outcome of future reviews of their own performance.  This could propel them to 
bargain over different sets of rules, as the Forum is the rule setting organ of the review process. 
The consequence is that the Forum, in order to dispel this tendency, may approach its regulatory 
role with a lack of seriousness, preferring to continue to produce protocols and resolutions to 
direct the affairs of the review process where most will contain few changes to the overall 
mandate of the APR Panel. Notwithstanding the periodically required renewal and appointment 
of Panel members, which does provide an opportunity for the Forum to exercise its regulatory 
functions, these circumstances rarely lead to explicit bargaining. In some cases the pace of 
renewal of membership of the Panel by the Forum has been described as painfully slow (Adotey 
2010: 1), and, as a result, member States are excluded from bargaining over issues of restraining 
the powers of the independent bodies that make decisions, although that may have an impact on 
the behavior of States in the implementation of the review process.  
None of the communiqués issued by the Forum and the country support mission had to do with 
any change in the mandate of the country review process in Ghana (see Communiques on 13th 
February 2004: APR Forum, 29th May 2004: country support mission, 18th June 2004: country 
support mission). Instead, they confined themselves to extensions and restatements of the 
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institutional underpinnings of the governance structure of the peer review process. Neither did 
they contain any changes to the mandate designated to the any of the sub-committees. In essence, 
they confirm the responsibilities that are assigned the various bodies in the successful 
implementation of the review process.  
The resolutions of the first summit of the committee of participating Heads of State and 
Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism go a long way to clarify some structural 
issues regarding the operations of the APRM. In the communiqué of the 13th of February 2004, 
the Forum mandated the APR Panel to work out modalities to establish and facilitate the work of 
the review process by identifying specific institutions and procedures for the proper 
implementation of the review (Para. 23, APR Forum Communique 13.02.04). These further 
extensions of the mandate of the Panel also covered issues that had to do with the 
implementation of the review process at the country level. Paragraphs 24 & 25 specifically 
endorsed the creation of Focal Points at the country level to manage the administrative and 
technical aspects of the review (Communiqué of Forum, 13.2.04). The criteria for the 
establishment of these Focal Points and the characteristics of their functions were generally 
merely hinted at, without specific details. The Communiqué is unclear over the exact nature of 
the Focal Point, and appears to have left it open to member States to decide their appropriate 
structure with regard to its unique context. In an attempt to improve the imprecise details of an 
earlier wording, the Communiqué  states that ‘a focal point should be a ministerial level or a high 
level official reporting directly to the Head of State or government and with access to all national 
stakeholders’ (Para. 24, own emphasis). The language of the communiqué, in this respect, 
remains vague, and does not provide details on the exact nature of the Focal Point, beyond 
identifying persons to manage it. As a result it gave most participating States the leeway to 
appoint or locate the Focal Point with persons supporting the cause of the government in the 
review process. Examples of this practice have included the South African, Kenyan, and 
Rwandan structures. 
The activities of the review mission to Ghana, and subsequent debates on the country review 
report and the national programmes of action, demonstrate how the absence of specific decision 
criteria has an impact upon the outcome of decisions in an institutional system characterized by a 
chain of delegation.  The country review mission to Ghana was fielded from the 4-16th April 
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2005. The 16 member country review team was led by Dr. Chris Stals, then a member of the 
APR Panel responsible for the country review of Ghana (Country Review Report of Ghana, 
2005: 8).9 The terms of engagement of the team were not any different from the previously 
assigned tasks to the country review mission, as per the APRM Base documents. The review 
mission, according to paragraph 17 of the APRM Guidelines document, was to preside over the 
drafting of the country review report and the national programme of action of the country under 
review. This task was achieved in collaboration with consultants and experts from partner 
institutions of the APRM (APRM Guidelines, para 22&23). The APRM Guidelines fall short of 
mentioning or listing the criteria which the review mission was to follow to guide the conduct of 
members of the team in the drafting of the country review report. As a result members of the 
review team were left with a wide margin of discretion in their activities.   
This lack of regulation left the technical research teams with a wide range of discretion in their 
decisions. The Panel, represented by the review mission, had no concrete standards to refer to in 
dealing with each of the issue areas, for example in instances where there were disagreements 
between government and the expert committees. The mission does not appear to have come to a 
vote on issues of disagreements in the composition of the country review report.10 In practice the 
team agreed on issues through consensus building, achieved through a process of convincing 
other members of the team through arguments on the most reasonable policy options in each of 
the issues under consideration. The chairman of the review mission, who doubled as the lead 
Panel member on the team, ensured that a composite report was presented to the Panel for 
onward transition to the APR Forum, where it was discussed and approved.  
In the production of the country review report the team focused on the areas that were important 
to ensure that decisions met basic appropriate standards. The review mission first interrogated 
how accurately the country self-assessment report identified the problems faced by the country 
under review. In addition, it looked at the extent to which the national programme of action 
addressed the issues listed, and finally investigated the nature of civil society participation in the 
production of the CSAR and the NPoA (Adotey 2010: 9).  
                                                          
9 See annex I for a full list of the APRM Country Review Mission to Ghana.  
10 Personal Interview, Ms Gertrude Takawira (former Country Director, South and Eastern African Trade 
Information and Negotiating Institute (SEATINI) and Independent Consultant for the Ghana country review  
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As a result, the country review mission to Ghana held extensive discussions with opposition 
parties, parliament, government officials, civil society organizations, academics, the media, and 
professional bodies, among others, to test the veracity of the country self-assessment report and 
the national programme of action (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 174). The mission equally evaluated 
the draft programmme of action submitted by Ghana, and made recommendations where 
appropriate. To ascertain the extent of a credible and technically competent assessment process, 
the mission made provisions to discuss the Issue Paper compiled by the APR continental 
Secretariat with relevant partner institutions (Country Review Report of Ghana 2005: 9). 
Engagements of this nature were geared at building consensus with stakeholders on the 
remaining issues and challenges.  
The verdict of the mission, after the consultations had been completed, was that the self-
assessment was technically credible and free from manipulation from government (Press Release 
of Review Mission, 2004).This conclusion was not wholly accepted by critics of government’s 
role in the review process. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), for 
instance, criticized the short time span of the team’s mission to the country and suggested that 
time spent was not optimally utilized (UNECA, ESPD/NRP/01/05, 2005). Despite this criticism, 
the decision process remained unaffected, and members of the review mission generally agreed 
on the status of the two reports, as a prerequisite to the production of the country review report.  
In this way the independence of the country review mission, which draws its powers from the 
duties conferred on the APR Panel by the base documents of the APRM, was fully underlined. It 
is well established that the independence of the APR Panel is subject to the general supervision 
of the APR Forum, which, through its communiqués, gives directives to be implemented at a 
lower level of the decision-making process. The APR Panel and the country review mission are 
therefore subject to the administrative supervision of the Forum, though in limited terms which 
accord with the relevant provisions of the APR base documents. By appearing to offer the 
assigns of the Panel, in the case of Ghana, exercising discretion in the overall status of the review 
process, the Forum formally offered the APR Panel the opportunity to act independently. The 
implicit inference that may be drawn from this singular instance is that there exists the possibility 
of the APR Forum intervening in the mandate of the Panel if it fails to expeditiously deliver its 
mandate. This may be necessary where the supervisory principal sees its authority undermined. 
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Such a supervisory role of the APR Forum is not uncommon in the design of decision-making 
systems in international organizations. The work of well-established international institutions 
such the United Nations Security Council, the WTO, World Bank and IMF all afford some of the 
best examples of how superior institutionalized actors supervise the activities of lower bodies 
within a decision-making process. In appropriate cases, close administrative supervision of 
institutions of governance is warranted where it is seen as the most appropriate means to ensure 
that decisions meet agreed standard criteria. Nevertheless, supervision in this context must 
always be closely watched and hugely circumscribed, as it is well-known that principals of 
international institutions hardly have the time, resources or capability to closely monitor and 
supervise all the institutions which they have deliberately created for their benefit.  
As a consequence, the deliberations of the review mission on the country self-assessment report 
offered an avenue to hold accountable the stakeholders and participants involved in the country 
self-assessment. The self-assessment report itself, then, offers the most elaborate and extensive 
opportunity available for external actors to hold decision makers accountable. For Adotey 
(2010), the process of generating the country self-assessment report points to a trend where the 
review process is given maximum prominence. This may be so because the time allotted to the 
discussion of the draft country review report by the Heads of State Forum is mostly inadequate, 
and, in such a situation, having a well-designed accountability mechanism becomes imperative. 
This accountability is premised on institutional incentives created for actors to hold decision-
makers accountable, however institutional measures need to be designed in such a way they do 
not retard the ability of the decision system to achieve its aim of being productive and arriving at 
optimal norm-based decisions. A balance between having to impose hierarchical control 
measures on independent agents and allowing decision makers autonomy could be achieved by 
designing a decision system that allows for horizontal monitoring of decisions at each stage of 
the process of decision-making. This appears to be the case in the review process in Ghana, 
where institutional mechanisms are put in place to allow several interested participants to form 
part of the consultations which generate the final country review report.  
In this regard, in the Ghana example, the country review mission appears to have brought finality 
to the issues surrounding the propriety of the methods employed in the generation of the self-
assessment report. The approach used to arrive at the report was judged by the mission to be of 
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high quality (Herbert and Grudz 2008: 176, Country Review Report of Ghana 2005: 11). In 
essence, the mission met previous concerns on whether or not the self-assessment report met the 
requirements of credibility as set out in the APRM Guidelines (APRM Guidelines para 45).  
Nevertheless, the second phase of the review was still unable to introduce any meaningful 
regulatory framework to guide the decision-making procedures of the various committees within 
the decision-making process in the country review of Ghana.  
 
5.4.1. Features of the Country Self-Assessment Process in Ghana 
An issue worthy of investigation is how the unique methods employed in Ghana served as a 
useful incentive to induce accountability in the decision making process of the review. The 
detailed methodology adopted by Ghana for the preparation of the Country Self-Assessment 
Report (CSAR) is perhaps one of the most distinguishing features of Ghana’s APRM 
implementation process. The methodology underpinning Ghana’s APRM country self-
assessment process was designed as a people-centered, bottom-up approach, which involved 
interaction with interested actors at different levels. This is evidenced by the broad-based 
participation of respondents and stakeholders in the APRM process. The process was informed 
by four methodological approaches: those of a pre-field methodology, field methodology, in-
house methodology, and post-field methodology (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 162). 
The main objective of the pre-field methodology was to ensure popular participation and to attain 
an inclusive process of national consultation in the Self-Assessment Report and the preparation 
of the Ghana National Programme of Action (GNPOA). Steps were taken to educate, sensitize, 
and create ownership among a large section of Ghanaians. This was done through public debate 
and advocacy, using television, radio discussion, newspapers, newsletters, workshops and 
pamphlets, among other methods (Herber and Gruzd 2008: 165). These initiatives were followed 
by a harmonization and coordination of the methodological approaches adopted by the four 
Technical Review Teams and the identification and involvement of stakeholders. The pre-field 
methodology also saw to it that information and data needed for the review process in Ghana was 
gathered based on rigorous scientific principles for the purpose of the review.  
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At the same time, a field methodology was also employed for the Country Self-Assessment 
Report. It served three main purposes. First, to engage relevant stakeholders as respondents to 
the APRM questionnaire, secondly to collect, collate and analyze information to prepare for the 
National Self-Assessment Report, and finally to provide scientific and empirical grounds to act 
as a basis for drawing up the GNPOA. For example, the Institute for Statistical, Social and 
Economic Research (ISSER), which was assigned the responsibility of working on the socio-
economic component of the self-assessment report, utilized a variety of research tools. The 
reason behind their approach was to capture, as far as possible, both the perceptions of experts 
and grass-root opinion on policies of government (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 168). In this way, 
opportunities were created for the public to contribute to the shaping the contents of the reports 
through their input.   
Subsequently, elite surveys were conducted across the country, involving interviews with 
persons from specialized background in civil society organizations, the public and private 
institutions. A mass household survey intended to capture broad and representative views was 
also administered. Another tool that was used at this stage consisted of focus group discussions 
with identifiable organized groups. Among others, minority groups, the physically challenged, 
child advocacy groups, and youth organizations were specifically targeted to make the process as 
inclusive as possible.  
Similarly, a rigorous in-house methodology was also adopted by the Technical Research 
Institutes. It covered the internal operations of the research teams involved in the review process 
(Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 171). Its desk research entailed making a study of documents on the 
four thematic areas of the APRM, in order to establish the current state of knowledge in the area 
in focus. Extensive desk research, coupled with literature reviews and regular meetings to 
deliberate and exchange ideas, was pursued. For instance, the Centre for Democratic 
Development (CDD), which was responsible for the democracy and political governance area of 
the country self-assessment report, established a 15-member internal advisory group. It 
comprised experts in democratic governance who met regularly to offer comments on the 
research activities leading to the self-assessment report (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 171). The 
presence of this internal advisory group offered a way in which the institutional structure might 
contribute to the development of problem-adequate solutions acceptable to all actors in the 
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review process. It also facilitated the decision making process, as the technical reports necessary 
for completing the country self-assessment report in Ghana were efficiently completed within a 
period of four weeks (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 171).  
The fourth and final method adopted derived from a post-field methodology. According to the 
Country Review Report, the post-field methodology sought, through national consultations, to 
provide a reality check on the preliminary reports of national self-assessment and the GNPOA 
(Country Review Report of Ghana 2005).  
Initially, the Governing Council engaged experts in the four thematic areas to cross-examine the 
draft reports and POA prepared by the technical review teams.11 Measures were also taken to 
ensure that the national self-assessment report and the GNPOA were not reduced to mere 
research outcomes. To avert this possibility, the post-field methodology employed a process of 
stakeholder validation of the draft reports and POA presented by the technical review teams. In 
this regard, a national validation exercise, comprising representatives from Government, civil 
society, private sector, security agencies, and academia, was held from 10-13 February 2005 to 
deliberate on the national self-assessment report and the GNPOA (Country Review Report of 
Ghana 2005).  A team of experts, set up by Government and the Parliamentary Select Committee 
representing Parliament on APRM matters, also reviewed the national self-assessment report and 
the GNPOA. The Trades Union Congress additionally had an opportunity to validate the national 
self-assessment report and the GNPOA. This post-field methodology became crucial to the 
credibility of the final report, insofar as its different measures fulfilled the need to ensure 
accountability on the part of decision makers through subjecting the draft report to validation 
among experts. 
In summary there was an approach that centered on utilizing a bottom-up strategy in the 
compilation of the self-assessment process of Ghana. This bottom-up approach, by and large, 
contributed to improving dialogue between the government and other stakeholders in the review 
process. On the one hand, it provided government with an understanding of how citizens 
                                                          
11 Independent reviewers of the draft self-assessment: 1. Democracy and political governance- Kwasi Jonah, director 
of governance at the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), 2. Economic governance and management- Professor 
Cletus Dudonu, ClayDord consult an economist, 3. Corporate governance- Dr Robert Adjaye, a partner of Ernst and 
Young, 4. Socio-economic development- Dr Samuel Aikins, Centre for Development Studies, University of Cape 
Coast Ghana 
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perceive government actions. On the other, it provided the general public with the opportunity to 
participate in the process, and where possible, shape the contents of the recommendations made 
by the Technical Research Institutes. The opportunity to participate and influence the content of 
decisions hinged upon the incorporation of expertise and knowledge of the issue areas being 
covered by the peer review process. The ability of the general public to participate in the 
assessment process reinforced the accountability of decision makers as their actions were 
demonstrably and closely monitored.  
In conclusion, the strategies utilized in the process leading to the self-assessment report in Ghana 
set a precedent for the process of the review. It served the purpose of making a strong case for 
the effectiveness of multiple methodological insights into how best to produce the most effective 
policy options over the issues of the review process.  
 
5.5. The Final Stage of Review at the APR Forum 
The final phase of the review process revolved around the presentation of the country review 
report of Ghana to the APR Forum, and the post-review implementation of solutions to identified 
issues. This final stage was characterized by a stable and enthusiastic interest in the decision 
process by stakeholders, when Ghana, as the first country to complete the process, responded to 
the review report. In this light, the propriety of the recommendations and the challenges 
identified in the report were brought for discussion to the Forum, in order to further the process 
and ensure the adoption of the country review report and its implementation.  
Accordingly, the country review report of Ghana was presented to the APR Forum at the third 
summit of the committee of participating Heads of State and Government in the APRM in June 
2005 (Communiqué of the third summit of the APR Forum, 2005). The report gave a 
comprehensive account of the various stakeholder engagements undertaken by the review 
mission, and other processes leading to the final report. Emphasis was placed, at this stage, upon 
the challenges and overarching issues that were of prime concern to the mission.  
Some of these issues pointed to the inability of the country to adhere to some of the principles 
and standards of the review process. For instance, under the democracy and political governance 
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section of the country review report, the inability of the government to ratify a number of key 
human rights instruments was deemed to require immediate intervention by the State (Country 
Review Report 2005:16). In reference to a number of significant global instruments on 
governance and human rights, which Ghana had acceded to, the report indicted the inability of 
the government to domesticate some of these instruments through a process of formal 
ratification. Examples of this omission include a) the Convention Against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); 1992 Amendments to Article17 
(7) and 18 (5); b) the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1995, Amendment to Article 
43 (2); c) the Supplementary Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, 
2000; d) the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000; e) the UN 
convention Against Corruption, 2003, and others. In regard to this, the Panel recommended that 
Ghana adopt a binding time-frame within which the country should accede to and ratify all the 
conventions and protocols in question (country Review Report of Ghana 2005: 17). As a result, 
ministries, within whom responsibility for these actions was placed, were required to develop a 
plan that instituted automatic compliance with reporting obligations under those human rights 
instruments and conventions.  
In the context of indictments of this nature, some scholars have argued that problems identified 
in peer reviews have a strong effect upon political reputations (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 178). 
Even in instances where recommendations appear sound, they can be politically controversial 
and even costly to governments, and clearly have repercussions on the political fortunes of 
governments undertaking the review assessments.  
Another issue in the case of Ghana, for instance, was the fight against corruption in the public 
sphere, which had received a great deal of attention by stakeholders in the review consultations. 
The Panel specifically attributed the existence and consequences of corruption to bad governance 
(Country Review Report of Ghana 2005: 35). In this respect, the government had to take 
responsibility for the general perception, and accept the need to deal with the prevalence of 
corrupt practices in the public sphere. However, the government’s attempt to highlight some 
institutional and policy measures, as a way of dealing with the issue of corruption, did not 
succeed in convincing critics they were a solution to the problem. As a consequence, the Ghana 
Governance and Corruption Survey of the Centre for Democracy and Development found out 
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that 75% of the households surveyed regarded corruption as a serious national problem (CRR 
Ghana 2005: 36). One effect of this issue was seen when the government of the time suffered 
electorally, particularly among electorates that attributed the prevalence of corruption to the 
inaction of government.   
Given the high profile interest that was generated about the review process in Ghana, it is quite 
surprising that it was unable to immediately respond to the country review report at the summit 
of the APR Forum in June 2005, when it was presented. The actual ‘peer review’ of Ghana by 
the Forum was held in Khartoum, Sudan in January 2006. At the review session of the Forum, it 
emerged that 159 recommendations, made in the programme of action of Ghana, needed to be 
implemented by the government. A significant concern to some members of the Forum was the 
seemingly western-inspired neoliberal policies being pursued by the government at the time. 
While comments from some Heads of State sought to castigate the economic model being 
advanced by the State, the APR Panel finally endorsed the liberal market orientation taken by the 
government (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 180). As a consequence, the disagreements expressed by a 
section of the Forum were not powerful enough to over-rule the recommendations proffered by 
the Panel. In this respect, the inference drawn from this case is that, even in a situation where the 
Forum disagrees with the decisions of the Panel, it offers limited incentives to impose a counter 
policy recommendation to a State under review. The Forum, at best, is offered an opportunity to 
have a say on the country review report, but with limited incentives to change the decisions of 
the Panel. 
Despite this, the move to publish the country review report of Ghana, after the APR Forum 
meeting in Khartoum, Sudan in January 2006, was important in ensuring accountability in the 
decision making process. Although the process of publishing the report was delayed as a result of 
some administrative lapses, it was finally made available to the public and interested parties in 
the review process. In the final analysis, the last stages of the review process were defined by the 
ability of the decision-system to adhere to the guidelines of not interfering in the decisions of the 
APR Panel. As pointed out, even in the particular instance where some members of the Forum 
disagreed with the Panel on issues of economic management, there was no opportunity for them 
to have their views stated in the final report. 
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5.6. Conclusion  
The review process in Ghana illustrates a clear case where the absence of substantive decision 
criteria at both levels of the decision-making process does not lead entirely to a blockage of the 
review process. Instead, internal accountability mechanisms were induced, through the 
engagement of stakeholders and the public (individuals of varied interests), into the information 
gathering stages of the review process. Unconstrained discretion of the expert bodies, in itself, 
did not point to a situation where they develop any autonomous influence outside of their 
mandate. As a result, the structure of the governance of the review mechanism in Ghana 
appeared not to provide incentives for powerful actors to bargain over cases where decisions are 
against their preferences. In a rather interesting scenario, the structure of the review process in 
Ghana promoted cooperation among the various stakeholders through consensus building on 
issues of contention in the decision making process.  
Contentious issues that emerged in the decision process were not necessary solved through the 
adoption of mutually agreed decision rules to guide the conduct of actors. Rather, decisions were 
transferred to the upper level Forum, which in most cases preferred that States manage the 
process according to the APR questionnaire and the base documents.  
Overall, the institutional structure of the review process did not provide robust incentives against 
any power based bargaining if a member States wished to exploit that opportunity. The 
institutional arrangements together with informal mechanisms are therefore seen as the 
institutional mechanisms that constrain powerful actors in decision-making process. They served 
as a means to bind them to the collective interest of all member States.  
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Chapter 6 
6.1. Decision-making in the African Peer Review Mechanism: How the Absence of Decision 
Criteria Paralyses the Review Process   
In this chapter, an analysis is presented which addresses the institutional structure of the APRM 
process in Kenya. It focuses on the conflicts and challenges that plagued the review process in 
Kenya. To support these contentions, an investigation is made of whether or not the governance 
structure of the review process in Kenya created any incentives for arriving at decisions that 
were devoid of the interests of members involved in the review process.  
The chapter advances a functionalist argument on the potential power of institutions to shape the 
behaviour of actors in the interaction of states in international organizations. From this 
perspective, decision-making processes that reflect competing interest constellations for 
members of an organisation may need to manage strong disagreements on issue areas that have 
different benefits to each actor. This may potentially turn such decision-making processes into 
bargaining arenas. Cooperation, under such circumstances, requires a careful institutional design 
to enhance the quality of decisions to the common advantage of all actors in the cooperation 
project. As a result, State leaders are compelled to coordinate State policies and the actions of 
their relevant State bureaucracies if they are to gain from the benefits of cooperating (Fearon 
1998:271). To harness the benefits envisaged in cooperating on an issue area, decision-making 
processes need to strive to produce decisions that are seen by all actors as a product of the rules 
and norms guiding standards of behaviour.   
Drawing on insights from the theoretical approach advanced in chapter two, this chapter asks 
whether, and to what extent, the creation and composition of the APRM national structures in 
Kenya impacted on the contents of the APRM country review report of Kenya. The chapter 
argues that functional differentiation within the governance structure of the APRM review 
process in Kenya contributed to the outcome of the decisions of the country self-assessment and 
the country review reports of Kenya. It contends that the institutional design of the Kenya 
country review process created incentives for members in the National Governing Council and 
the Technical Research Institutes to produce decisions that represent the general interest of 
member States participating in the peer review mechanism. For this reason, when faced with the 
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problem of coordinating policy goals at the continental level, member States of the review 
process delegate decision-making authority to a Panel of eminent persons and technical 
committees. In this manner, they demonstrate a credible commitment to long term policy goals 
and also take advantage of various experts to improve the depth of public policy. Doing so 
allows member States to make informed decisions on policy issues that are synchronised with the 
AU’s agenda on NEPAD. This intention increases the likelihood that decisions and information 
that emanates from the various expert committees would enhance the quality of policy goals and 
their implementation at the country level. 
Arising from this argument, the general assumptions of this approach are that actors in the 
review process are rationally motivated, and therefore would protect their preferences within the 
constellations of interests that arise concerning particular issue areas. The initial premise it takes 
is that Kenya’s decision to sign up to the APRM indicated a commitment to the principles of 
good governance and respect for the principles of democracy and human rights (Manby 2008). 
As a consequence of that commitment, the expectation is that issue areas that are defined by a 
perceived fundamental importance to the survival of a State may attract interest in the review 
process, and ultimately generate frequent and persistent conflicts if actors pursue their own 
preferences. The establishment of norms of procedure and guiding rules for the conduct of the 
review process can serve as a mitigating factor in restoring order in the decision making process, 
if all actors play by the rules of engagement. Following this argument, subsequent sections of 
this chapter investigate the causal chain of events that led to the final country review report of 
Kenya.  
The first section of this chapter explicates the governance structure of the APRM process in 
Kenya. It examines in detail the composition of the National Governing Council and the 
Technical Research Institutes. The section explores the incentive structure that may exist for 
actors to make decisions in the interest of the objectives of the review mechanism. This has 
significance, especially as the Focal Point in the review process in Kenya came under the 
supervision of a minister of state, contrary to the structure that was deployed in Ghana. The 
second section pays attention to the initial stage of the review process. It focuses on the 
appointments and selection of members to the National Governing Council and the ensuing 
contestation between civil society groups and government on the preferred methods to be 
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employed in the review process. The next section discusses the process of the country self-
assessment process in Kenya. It traces the events and issues leading to the compilation of the 
draft self-assessment report, and the role of civil society groups. This is followed by a section 
describing the presentation of the country review report of Kenya at the summit of the Forum in 
2006, and leads to an overall conclusion.  
 
6.2. The Governance Structure of the Review Mechanism in Kenya: Strong Accountability 
Mechanisms Limiting Unreasonable Power Politics  
Analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism process in Kenya helps provide insight into the 
role of functional differentiation and organization path dependence in the decision-making 
process of the Kenya country review process. It demonstrates how individual entities can emerge 
in an organizational setting and gain autonomy in their institutionalized environment. The 
emergence and influence of such entities is seen as rooted in the institutionalized and 
organizational norms that were established in the decision-making process, following from the 
previous experience of other States.  
After signing up to the APRM, Kenya designated the Ministry for Planning and National 
Development as the Focal Point of APRM process (Herber and Gruzd 2008: 189; Masterson 
2005: 10). At the time of the review process in Kenya, only 25 countries were participating in the 
process.12  Unlike the Ghana review governance structure, the Kenya review was modelled on a 
system that did not establish a separate and independent Secretariat for the National Governing 
Council, reporting directly to a minister under their supervision. That notwithstanding, the 
governance structure of the APRM in Kenya was characterised by an extensive differentiation of 
functions. At the zenith of the governance structure was a Minister of State, who served as the 
main Focal Point for the process and gave political direction to the implementation of the review 
process. As per established precedent in the reviews of Ghana, Rwanda and South Africa, the 
Focal Point served as the main hub for the coordination of the activities of the review (APRM 
Guidelines, paragraph 34). This practice was envisaged to help in making identified policy 
                                                          
12 As of May 2006, there were 25 APRM participating countries: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.  
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failures known to the government, in order to prioritise them in national planning and 
development. As the Focal Point, the Minister, in charge of the coordination of the review of 
Kenya, arrogated to himself the powers needed to control the activities of the members of the 
National Governing Council, which was designed to be independent of the activities of the 
participating State in the review process. Under the chairmanship of the Minister of Planning and 
National Development, the government reconstituted a NEPAD steering committee in early 2003 
under the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) (Herbert and Grudz, 2008: 190).  
The steering committee had a membership of 15 persons. They included permanent secretaries 
from some ministries, academics, and representatives from industry and nongovernmental 
organizations. The task of the steering committee was to establish the Kenya NEPAD Secretariat 
in order to pave the way for the successful implementation of the APRM country review process 
in Kenya. It was also its responsibility to organize a high-level interim task force, made up of 
both government and non-state actors, to provide interim coordination and the necessary 
modalities for the creation of a National Governing Council (Masterson 2005: 10). Through this 
process, a mechanism was provided to guard against the temptation of wholly selecting members 
who promoted the interest of government in the review process.   
With the establishment of an APRM task force at the national level, a clear signal was given of 
the intention to institutionalize the country’s structures for the review process. The key functions 
of the task force, among others, were to propose a detailed programme for the process in Kenya. 
In addition, the task force adopted and developed robust terms of reference and guidelines for the 
various institutional structures for the APRM in Kenya (Akoth 2007: 11). In this regard, the task 
force ensured that a timeline for the APRM process in Kenya was in place to precisely gauge 
progress and achievement through the various milestones of the review process.  
The task force was responsible for the appointment of a permanent National Governing Council 
to manage the country self-assessment of the Kenya review process (Masterson 2005). It is 
apparent that deploying such an interim task force in the selection of a National Governing 
Council created an incentive for the selection of a team that was representative of perceived 
median interest constellations that might come to be involved in the process of the review.  
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Another advantage of adopting this two-step model in the appointments of members to the 
National Governing Council was that it ensured that civil society and non-State actors were 
actively involved in the process, and able to curtail any instances of similar conflicts to those that 
unsettled the initial stages of the South African process (Masterson 2005). As has been argued by 
Herbert and Gruzd (2008), the launch of the APRM in almost every country raises questions of 
how the process will be managed, as well as the nature of consultations that will be held. In some 
instances, the obscure ways in which these genuine concerns are handled have tended to hinder 
the initial organizational process. Consultation among actors, on the modalities and methods of 
participation in various levels of the decision-making in the review process, was seen to be 
important in defining the kind of institutions that were ultimately settled upon at the country 
level. It was therefore seen as a pragmatic move of the Kenya APR process to deepen 
consultations with potential actors in the process, which could, as much as possible, curtail any 
initial disagreements that could stall the decision process. In this regard, the process adopted 
ensured that civil society was given a voice at all stages of the process (Masterson 2005:10). 
Giving civil society groups the highest visibility during the process contributed to deepening 
transparency and accountability among decision makers in the process. At the same time, it also 
created another incentive to hold decision makers accountable at each stage of the process. This 
was because civil society representatives brought on board their expertise in the issue areas 
covered by the review mechanism. Overall, then, the decision of the task force to engage broadly 
on the formation of the National Governing Council made a significant contribution to defining 
the nature of the review process. 
The formation of the National Governing Council to manage the peer review process was an 
important feature of the APRM institutional design in Kenya. Kenya’s APRM Governing 
Council was composed of 33 members, drawn from six different groups. Membership of the 
council comprised academics, religious leaders, civil society groups, policy practitioners and 
government representatives. The Council arrived at decisions based on a simple majority. Of the 
33 members, eight were non-voting members representing the lead technical agencies and the 
four conveners of the thematic areas (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 194). Seven ex officio members, 
being representatives of various line ministries and key public institutions, were also part of the 
council. An important aspect of the composition of the Governing Council was the dominance of 
non-state actors. Twenty-four out of the 33 members were representatives of professional and 
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civil society groups with huge expertise in the main issue areas of concern to the review 
mechanism.  
The Governing Council was intended to be an independent body, with the powers to make final 
decisions on the management of the review process in Kenya. Within the governance structure of 
the review, it was under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning and National Development. 
This arrangement, to some degree, had the potential to jeopardize the operational capacity of the 
Council to fully remain independent. In discharging the duties conferred on it, the Council was 
not subjected to executive control in the discharge of its mandate. Protecting the independence 
and autonomy of the National Governing Council was necessary to ensure credibility and 
accountability among decision makers.   
The discretion of the Minister of Development and National Planning, with the opportunity to 
appoint two members, was subject to some terms and conditions. The Minister, in exercising the 
discretion to appoint 2 members on to the National Governing Council, was mandated to take 
into cognizance the need to create balance in the representation of various interests groups, and 
to follow ‘any other criteria’ (Herbert and Gruzd 2008:194). An attempt was made to guide the 
selection of the Minister, to some extent, with the intention of limiting the discretionary powers 
of appointment bestowed on him. By providing a guide to the considerations to be taken into 
account before making such appointments on the Council, it thought it would be possible to 
curtail the discretion entailed in his powers. In practice, however, such an attempt proved 
illusory. In the first place, any note of caution implicit in the criteria, concerning the basis on 
which an appointment could be made, was not backed by any further checks and balances. Since 
there was no stated need for any consultations with relevant stakeholders, the flood gates were 
opened for the minister to capriciously exercise the powers enshrined in the guidelines for the 
review process.  It is not clear what ‘any other criteria’ might have meant in the context. The 
very vagueness of the terms of reference in this sense leaves a great deal of leeway for the 
appointing authority to appropriate powers vested in them in any manner that might seem 
appropriate.  
The Governing Council provided political direction for the processes leading to up to the 
compilation of the country self-assessment report (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 191). It was also 
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entrusted with a planning role, being mandated, amongst other tasks, to plan and develop a 
programme of action that formulated measures required to address challenges identified in the 
review process. As has been the practice in most countries, the National Governing Council also 
played a facilitating role in relation to the visit of the country support mission and the country 
review mission. In facilitating the movement of these teams it respected the need not to interfere 
in the fact-finding missions of the teams, ensuring that a credible country review report would be 
delivered. The assistance provided by the Governing Council to the review mission gave it 
access to almost every part of the country to verify information provided by government.  
The Governing Council was given the responsibility to manage the in-country review process, 
and was therefore responsible for the appointment of the lead technical agencies to provide 
technical and expert reviews on the specific areas of the APRM (Masterson 2005: 11; Herbert 
and Gruzd 2008: 15). By taking away the authority to appoint lead technical institutes from the 
government, the structure intended to insulate itself from naked political interference from the 
executive arm.  
In furthering this aim, the Governing Council was institutionally modelled to be independent in 
its operations, so as to signal a credible and open review process. In this way, the structure 
ensured that decisions of the Council were not based on a narrow view of the constituencies they 
represented, but were expected to be representative of the entire body. In this light, decisions 
made by the council were held to be binding on all members. As a consequence, decisions made 
on issues pertaining to the management of the review process at the council level were not to 
open to appeal by any dissatisfied member. Furthermore, the decisions of the Council were 
intended to be fully informed by the expert bodies providing information and opinion on aspects 
of the review.   
To further its appointing role, the National Governing Council was serviced by the Kenya 
NEPAD Secretariat, under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning and National 
Development, whose staff was seconded from partner institutions. The Secretariat was headed by 
a chief executive officer who implemented the strategic plans of government on NEPAD-related 
projects and the APRM. The APRM desk in the Secretariat had two programme managers and a 
programme officer to coordinate and advise the chief executive office on the implementation of 
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projects related to the APRM.13 The Secretariat assisted in facilitating the work of the Governing 
Council by providing logistical and administrative services, coordinating training workshops and 
conferences related to APRM activities. It therefore served as a point for disseminating 
information about the APRM to relevant stakeholders, and also collected data for the purposes of 
the country self-assessment process and the drafting of periodic reports on the implementation of 
the APRM national programme of action. Over the years, it has also been the mandate of the 
Secretariat to update the continental APRM Secretariat on the progress of the review process.  
Another important institutional component of the Kenya review process was seen in the role of 
technical agencies. Leading technical agencies, in the context of the Kenya APRM review, 
served an important role in providing expertise on the issue areas of the review process. Four 
technical agencies were mandated to compile a draft country self-assessment report and 
programme of action (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 190).  The Governing Council appointed four 
independent and reputable research organizations, known for their expertise in the thematic areas 
of the APRM. Experts within the APRM decision process advised the National Governing 
Council during the formulation of policy proposals for the national programme of action. The 
information and analysis generated by the expert technical agencies then informed the work of 
the review mission. The proposals put forward by the expert technical agencies provided a guide 
to members of the review team in the formulation of their final recommendations on policy 
options and alternatives to the problems identified in the draft country review report. If member 
States, in the review process, attempt to pursue their interests in response to the ‘big issues’ that 
accompany the review report, the information provided by the various lead technical agencies 
serves as the main means for judging the reasonableness of the policy options available at each 
stage of the process. The presence of thematic conveners within the institutional structure 
demonstrates an attempt to design a decision making process which is accountable at each stage 
of the process. The thematic group conveners served as the interface between civil society and 
the research institutes (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 191). Conveners organized forums that 
facilitated further non-governmental organizations and other experts to make relevant input in 
the self-assessment report and the draft national programme of action.    
                                                          
13 Found on the Kenyan NEPAD website http://www.nepadkenya.org/staff.html  
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It is evident from the brief description of the functions and duties endowed to these various 
bodies that accountability mechanisms were intended to ensure adherence and non-abuse of the 
competencies of the National Governing Council and the APR Panel. The approval of the 
guidelines to the APR questionnaire used to inform the country self-assessment is perhaps the 
most far reaching power of the APR Panel in the review process. This is so because such 
approval almost amounts to rule-making, as the APR questionnaire is expected to guide the State 
under the review in the methodologies to be employed in arriving at the draft self-assessment 
report. In effect, the APR questionnaire for the country self-assessment report constitutes a set of 
highly detailed criteria to assess each of the thematic areas under review. This is supplemented 
by guidelines for the country review and any other information that originates for the APR Panel 
for that purpose.  
The National Governing Council is structured with the mandate to implement set guidelines by 
producing a country self-assessment report which serves as the basis for subsequent decisions on 
the country review process. Guidelines for countries to undertake the self-assessment are 
published, and may be adopted by other countries for their country review processes if the best 
practices identified fit their particular situation. If decisions of an approval system are to be 
nonpartisan and problem-adequate, as suggested by Gehring and Plocher, accountability 
mechanisms must be designed in such a way that they create incentives for stakeholders to 
restrain from the power to bargain over issues that might not be in their best interest (Gehring 
and Plocher 2009:11). In this regard, problem-adequate decisions on recommendations of the 
APR can emerge if sufficient incentives are created by accountability mechanisms to deprive 
actors of the ability to resort to their bargaining power in influencing the final decisions of the 
review process.  
Accountability can be achieved through a variety of mechanisms. The multi-sectored and 
inclusive composition of the National Governing Council helps to sort out parochial interests that 
individual members may pursue. This is achieved by ensuring that decisions of the governing 
council represent the entire committee and not individual members in the council. By assigning 
the power to arrive at a decision to a committee, members to a large extent are pushed to find 
solutions that are representative of the general interests of all actors in the decision-making 
process of the African Peer Review Mechanism. Decision makers, at each stage of the review 
 194 
 
process are therefore formally pushed to be accountable for their decisions. For instance, the 33 
members of the National Governing Council represent a wide range of professional, technical 
and advocacy groups with high stakes in the issue areas of the review mechanism. These 
appointments were sub-divided into six categories (Herbert and Gruzd 2008: 94), where each 
category was allocated a number of representatives, based on predetermined criteria of the APR 
task force, put in place to define the institutional set up of the review process in Kenya.  
Any attempt by any of the blocs in the Council to pursue partisan interest could slow down the 
decision-making process or possibly truncate it all together. The Governing Council is thus 
subject to the power of committee governance (Sartori 1987), with a demand for an accepted 
resolution of every decision on the numerous issues of the review. As the country self-
assessment at the country level focused exclusively on specific thematic areas, agreed upon by 
the Heads of State participating in the APRM, it was thought difficult to accommodate the 
interests and preferences of all Council members through any act of bargaining. To overcome 
this, members with different positions on an issue were expected to accommodate their 
preferences and turn to the commonly accepted guidelines to provide a focus on which all 
expectations could converge. The guidelines for the review mechanism, in this instance, served 
as mandatory criteria which guided the behaviour of all actors in the decision-making process. In 
practice, committee governance is reinforced by the fact that each member of the Council acts in 
their personal capacity.  
In addition, the review process in Kenya provides a multi-layered decision-making process and 
encourages the active involvement of several actors and stakeholders (See figure 3). This is 
evident in the involvement of civil society groups and professional associations in the formation 
of the national governing council and the technical and research agencies. At the national level, 
several consultative fora were organised by the national governing council to involve the 
interested public in the issues related to the thematic areas of the review process. This resulted in 
a situation where multi-sectored stakeholders were engaged in the organizational structure of the 
review process in Kenya. 
The governance structure within which the Kenyan Review Process took place is shown 
diagrammatically on the next page: 
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Figure 3: Governance Structure of the Kenyan Review Process, Author’s Illustration   
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secretariat (APRM Guidelines, paragraph 30). The process is set in motion when country review 
structures are put in place by the participating state, and a country self-assessment process is 
started. The self-assessment is mostly led by research and technical institutions that are known 
for conducting independent research on the main issues of the APRM, balancing the fact that 
governments may have an interest in overstating their achievements in relation to goals of the 
APRM, hoping to generate positive reports on their governance credentials. They must, however, 
convince the decision process that the information on the key areas of the review process 
satisfies the general guidelines as outlined in the APRM self-assessment questionnaire.  
As a result, a State under review sets the agenda for the process, but is accountable at each stage 
of the process as explanations and responses will be demanded by the review mission on issues 
that remain unclear and vague in the draft review reports. The country self-assessment is carried 
out by a group of independent research institutes with expertise in the areas of issue. Beyond 
this, the process is subjected to public scrutiny and interested individuals can make submissions 
on the various issues at each stage of the process. The technical institutes serve as the centres of 
expertise in the review process, and report to the National Governing Council and the APR 
country review teams. Though the research institutes are acting in their personal capacity on 
various issue areas, they do not have the final decision power on areas of their expertise. The 
final decision on the State of each of the thematic areas is left with the APR Panel, which then 
seeks final approval from the Forum (APRM Organization and Processes, paragraph 3.2).  
Therefore, in essence, the technical institutes enjoy an advisory role. The influence of the 
research institutes depends on whether or not their recommendations are accepted by the country 
review mission and the APR Panel. For each issue that is raised by the research institutes and the 
country review team, detailed recommendations and background information pertaining to the 
issue are provided. Since the research institutes are accountable to the country review mission 
and the National Governing Council, strong incentives are generated to provide sound expert 
advice that is devoid of any parochial interest.  
Additionally, the decision-making bodies in the review process are externally accountable to the 
general public. As a result, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups are involved 
in the country self-assessment process. The country review team and support teams therefore 
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invite and consult broadly with interested groups and individuals over their draft reports. In this 
respect, public observers serve to supply necessary warnings concerning the decision-making 
process of the peer review. Civil society groups may intervene with adequate and better 
information on a particular issue that they feel is not properly assessed. The internal procedures 
of producing the country self-assessment report are so transparent that individual members, 
present at the national consultative and validation meetings, may make public statements on any 
issue area of interest to them. Proceedings of the various processes are published and the final 
country review report is posted on the website of the continental Secretariat of the APRM. It 
should, however, be noted that access to public consultations are quite restrictive and selective, 
as , in most cases, only technically competent experts in the thematic areas of the APRM can 
effectively participate in deliberations.  Meetings of the APR Forum, at the Heads of State level, 
are even open to APRM partner institutions and civil society groups. The Forum undertakes the 
final approval of decisions and recommendations contained in the country review report that is 
submitted by the APR Panel. With these measures in place, the Forum, the Panel and the 
National Governing Council can reasonably expect that any poor decision or recommendation 
will be detected.  
A further check is provided by the fact that APRM reports are tabled in the Pan-African 
Parliament for debate. The Pan-African Parliament debates final country review reports before 
they are adopted as working documents of the continental legislative body. This serves as an 
extra tool to lead decision-making processes into producing the most problem-adequate 
recommendations on the policy options available for each problem identified. The plenary 
sessions of the Pan-African Parliament consider for debate the final review reports of the 
process. While it can comment on policy recommendations and the programmes of actions 
proposed, the Parliament’s debates do not in any way change the findings in the final review 
reports. However, the parliamentary debates are geared at making the review a more transparent 
process to create incentives for decision-makers not to deviate from the decision criteria for each 
of the issue areas. The Pan-African Parliament can make proposals for further elaboration of 
rules and criteria for decision-makers. In the last session of the Pan-African parliament in 2016, 
four review reports were laid before the house and debated upon. With the intervention of some 
advocacy groups, translations of the reports were provided in the official languages of the Pan-
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African parliament. In this way, contents of the final reports are widely disseminated throughout 
the Continent through their representatives. 
A careful examination of the procedures for the review process in Kenya, and the design of its 
governance structure, therefore clearly points to an intention to deny all bodies and decision-
makers any opportunity to deviate from the well-reasoned decision criteria agreed upon, ex ante. 
From the formation of the task force to the composition of the National Governing Council, steps 
are taken to protect the decision system from arbitrary decisions that could contribute to slowing 
or distorting the review process. While the influence of the Technical Research Institutes relies 
almost exclusively on the expert knowledge of the members, the National Governing Council 
and the review teams, through several accountability mechanisms, are deprived of the ability to 
compromise on the agreed upon guidelines or to indulge in bargaining. The presence of civil 
society and APRM partner institutions make it impossible for States at the level of the Heads of 
State Forum to intervene in single cases which might not be in their interest. These mechanisms, 
together with others, complement each other to force States to accept the guidelines established 
for the review process. As a result, States are deterred from acting in a way that would lead to an 
inappropriate intervention in the decision making process.  
 
6.3. The First Phase of the Review Process: from the Creation of the National Governing 
Council to the Follow-Up Country Support Mission  
The early stages of the review process in Kenya provided a vague and imprecise structure to 
accommodate procedures, and were also characterized by imprecise decision criteria. As a result 
they created a demand for rules to guide the decision making process of the review in Kenya. As 
a result, the presence of diverging interests between actors had the potential to affect the contents 
of the decisions taken at each stage of the review process.  The base APR documents, together 
with the MOU, which served as the basis on which the governance structure of the Kenya review 
mechanism was designed, lacked any precise rules and guidelines for the decision-making 
process in the review of Kenya. This led to disagreements between civil society and the 
government on the way to process the country self-assessment.  
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In March 2003, Kenya, along with Ghana, Rwanda and Mauritius, signed the memorandum of 
understanding, committing itself to be reviewed under the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(Akoth 2007: 1; Reitmaier 2011:5). Kenya was subsequently the third of the first four countries 
to be reviewed at the Heads of State and Government Forum in Banjul, the Gambia, in July 
2006. A decision to participate in the review process was taken to indicate a commitment to good 
governance and respect for the principles of democracy and human rights (Manby 2005), as, for 
many critics, events had created a background where its new government needed to demonstrate 
an orientation towards the rule of law and fundamental human rights (Manby 2005; Herbert and 
Gruzd 2008). In demonstrating a commitment and shift in policy towards a more African focused 
agenda in the attainment of the NEPAD objectives, the acceptance of the APRM process seemed 
a promising project for the new Kenyan government to indicate a new direction for the 
governance of the country. 
The memorandum of understanding, which underlines the duties and responsibilities of member 
States participating in the APRM, gives an unspecific mandate for member States in the 
implementation and the establishment of country level structures for the governance of the 
APRM. As a result the Kenyan decision process, from the outset, was subject to the possibility of 
disagreements between interested actors in the review process.  The MOU is cast, at best, in 
general and vague terms. There are no specific detailed provisions over the procedures and 
governance structures that are to be established for the review process. Article 12 &13 timidly 
welcomes the initiative taken by the accepting member States, whose intention was to implement 
the declaration of the 3rd November 2002 in Abuja, Nigeria on the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (Art. 12 of APRM MOU). The context of the accompanying provisions, concerning 
a declaration of intent to implement the principles enshrined in the declaration of democracy and 
political governance, appears not to give any specific guideline on the expected obligations and 
behaviour of member States in the attainment of the objectives of the review. This lack of precise 
guidelines therefore gives member States unlimited discretion in the implementation of the 
country self-assessment at the country level.  
Article 13, which calls for commitments from member States participating in the APRM, is also 
vaguely framed. It calls for member states to ‘fully commit in the implementation of the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development and in particular the African Peer Review Mechanism’ 
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(Art. 13 of MOU of the APRM). It is not clear what it means to be fully committed. Member 
states can thus make available the resources needed for the country level process, but remain 
reluctant over implementing the recommendations that may be contained in the final programme 
of action. As a result of the imprecise and vague nature of the MOU, the start of the Kenyan 
process was mired with disagreements on the formation of the National Governing Council, and 
the level at which it was to be placed. Civil society groups wanted to lead the process, with 
control at the country level, to ensure that government did not take full control of the decision-
making process. As stated in the founding documents of the APRM, the purpose of a review is to 
create a credible and independent self-assessment of the programmes of the State under review, 
in order to enable a candid and true discussion of the challenges and progress required in the 
issues of concern to the review process (APRM Base Doc, paragraph 3). In this respect,in the 
light of these vague parameters and potential issues of control,  the formation of the National 
Governing Council was highly instrumental in the process of getting the Kenya process started at 
the country level.  
In February 2004, in response to the first summit of the African Peer Review Mechanism’s 
agreed Kenya review, a Focal Point was appointed and a NEPAD Secretariat established 
(Communiqué of first APRM summit, 2004). Following the establishment of the Secretariat, a 
task force was founded, with the remit to serve as the coordinating authority for the review 
process in Kenya. The fact that the initial composition of the task force was dominated by 
government functionaries led to some disagreement  between civil society and government over 
the need for civil society representation. An issue and source of contention, at this stage, 
concerned the method of nomination of representatives of civil society into the Governing 
Council (Reitmaier 2011:5). While input from civil society agitated for the nomination of its own 
representatives into the Governing Council, formed under an umbrella coalition of NGOs in 
Kenya, the Kenyan Focal Point held the view that the authority to make appointments was its 
own preserve. In April 2004, the South African Institute of International Affairs organised a 
workshop in Nairobi with the purpose of sharing information and building the capacity of 
possible instruments that could be used in the review process in Kenya. The Focal Point had, 
seemingly, taken the decision to go ahead with appointments of members into the National 
Governing Council without any consultation with relevant stakeholders (Herbert and Gruzd 
2008: 192). Civil society groups, at this point, protested, and formally demanded the Focal Point 
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ensure the independence of the Governing Council by allowing civil society organisations 
(CSOs) to appoint their representatives. Disputes over the composition and appointments of 
representatives to the Governing Council delayed the decision-making process for a considerable 
time. As a result, the National Governing Council did not undertake any substantive work for 
almost three months, and there was no meeting during this period to discuss any substantive 
issue relating to the country self-assessment.  
Despite these background deliberations, a country support mission was deployed to Kenya. It 
was headed by Graca Machel, a Panel member who became responsible for the Kenya review 
process in July of 2004. Other members included senior personnel from the African 
Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and representatives from the APRM continental 
Secretariat (Akoth 2007: 8). The composition of the country support team provided substantial 
incentives for members of the National Governing Council and the Technical Research Institutes 
to make decisions that are problem-adequate, because members of the country support team were 
accepted experts on all of the diverse areas of focus in the review process. Through this expertise 
they contributed directly to the country self-assessment process in meetings at the country level 
with members of various bodies. Even in a scenario where the country support mission might 
prove unable to detect a badly formulated decision on certain aspects of the review process, an 
opportunity still existed for other stakeholders to then intervene in the review process through 
these public consultations with bodies who held expert knowledge.  
The purpose of the country support mission was to assess the process and mechanisms put in 
place by Kenya to undertake its self-assessment and to approve a draft a programme of action 
(Communiqué of APRM Support Mission to Kenya, 27 July 2004; Kenya Country Review 
Report 2006: 8). It was within its mandate to asses Kenya’s readiness for the review process, and 
to offer technical assistance, if required (Akoth 2007: 8). According to its mandate the country 
support mission plays the role of an advisory body servicing country level structures with 
expertise, in order to prevent any challenges and failures in the process of the review. This 
preventative function provides impartial arbitration during the build up to the county self-
assessment report, aiming to settle contending issues in the National Governing Council.  
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During the visit, the memorandum on the technical assessment mission and the country review 
mission was signed between the APR Forum and the government of Kenya (Communiqué of the 
APRM Support Mission to Kenya 26 to 27 July 2004). This essentially committed the 
government to a transparent and open review process, and also called on the government under 
review to provide the necessary resources available for the review to gain access to all sections 
of the population in order to validate its self-assessment (Communiqué of Support Mission to 
Kenya, 2004).   
According to the Communiqué of the Support Mission to Kenya of 27th July, 2004, adequate 
progress was being made in the implementation of the review process. The team appeared to be 
pleased with some structural advancements made in setting up the country level institutions 
which define the review process at all levels of the process. In particular, the team commended 
the appointment of a Focal Point for the APRM as the Ministry of Planning and National 
Development (Communiqué of Support Mission to Kenya, 2004). With the focus of the APRM 
on socio-economic development, the support team was of the opinion that the Focal Point could 
play an active role in steering the national APRM process. Given that the role of the Ministry of 
Planning and Development was to be focused on the key thematic areas of the APRM, it made 
sense to have it co-ordinate the implementation of the review process.  
Other efforts that appeared to have received commendation from the support mission included 
the establishment of a task force, comprising members from both government and non-
governmental organizations, to conduct the national process pending the appointment of the 
National Governing Council (Communiqués of Support Mission to Kenya 2004). The 
government also held consultative APRM sessions on the 14th and 21st July, 2004, prior to the 
visit of the support mission to Kenya. Consultations in these forums, with contributions from all 
stakeholders that had an interest in the implementation of the review process at the country level, 
resulted in the appointment of nominees for the National Governing Council.   
In the consultations and meetings between the country support mission and the Focal Point a 
consensus was reached on resolving the contentious issues that had affected the operations of the 
review process. The request by civil society to be fully represented throughout the review 
process was dealt with positively, after the support mission suggested an increase in the number 
 203 
 
of representatives for civil society members. The membership of the National Governing Council 
was eventually expanded to include more stakeholders, with civil society bodies selecting its 
representatives. The conveners for the four pillars of the review were also representatives of civil 
society (Reitmaier 2011).  
At this point stakeholders, in support of a National Governing Council with broad representation 
from all sectors, were pushing for the decision-making process to proceed, as far as possible, 
towards accepting guidelines and procedures on the activities of the various committees that 
were envisaged in the governance structure of the review process in Kenya. This was seen as a 
necessity as the main guidelines to the review, and the supplementary guidelines which were 
issued by the APR Panel, did not define the exact procedures for the implementation of the 
review. While it was clear that the National Governing Council could actively participate in the 
country self-assessment, with adequate representation from civil society, the decision of the 
country support mission left open the question of the exact nature of concrete decision criteria to 
guide its conduct. In practice, the country self-assessment was guided by a questionnaire 
prepared by the continental APRM secretariat, which was adopted to meet the prevailing 
circumstances in Kenya. Therefore, to overcome any further stalling of the decision-making 
process, as a result of this absence, the Technical Research Institutes and the conveners for the 
thematic areas were tasked to develop a set of guidelines and checklists for envisaged focus 
group discussions (Reitmaier 2011).  
The call for a criteria based decision-making system at the country level was deemed necessary 
for two related reasons. In the first place, since participating States and stakeholders have, to 
some extent, different preferences and interests in the outcome of the review process, it becomes 
important to prevent actors from using the various bodies as bargaining arenas. In a situation 
where a stakeholder might pursue a parochial self-interest in any of the committees working at 
the country level, decision guidelines may serve as a means to prevent any power-based 
bargaining which might arise in situations where a decision does not favour that party. Secondly, 
it is received knowledge, from research on committee governance, that criteria based decision 
making can do much to facilitate decisions. By establishing the criteria on which decisions are to 
be based, especially over issues that may have asymmetrical outcomes for actors, the provision 
of guidelines may overcome the conundrum which might arise where actors have to intervene in 
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decision outcomes that are not in their interest. As a practical example of this problem, even 
where members of the Governing Council might generally agree on a need for guidelines for the 
operations of the conveners and the Technical Research Institutes, the issue of monitoring and 
oversight of their operations still remains contested and unresolved. 
As a consequence of these unresolved issues, the first meeting of the National Governing 
Council was delayed until January, 2005 (Reitmaier 2011), although the 33-member National 
Governing Council had been officially inaugurated in October of 2004. As noted earlier, there 
were serious disagreements over the process, and these administrative challenges reflected a 
persistent rift between defenders of a proposed government-led process and the agitators of 
demands for broader civil society representation. As a result, the activities of the National 
Governing Council were slowed down substantially (Reitmaier 2011; Akoth 2007:9). A closer 
look at the trajectory of events to this point shows a clear strategy by government to 
systematically neglect civil society in the activities of the review process. According to Akoth 
(2007), in spite  of the insistence of the continental APRM Secretariat and the APRM Panel for 
the process to be participatory, it took intense lobbying from CSOs and the intervention of the 
country support mission led by Graca Machel to get civil society fully involved (Akoth 2007: 9). 
Civil society, as a matter of fact, further challenged the procedures being employed in the lead up 
to the self-assessment process. They argued for an entitlement to fully participate and make input 
into the self-assessment report. While government sought to maintain its dominant position in the 
process, there were threats from civil society groups to boycott the proceedings of the country 
review process and set up a parallel system to make input through the review mission, which 
raised tensions between both sides.  
A second country support mission to Kenya, in July of 2005, did little to overcome the disputes 
in the National Governing Council, which at that time, had a majority of its members 
representing civil society. Though there are some obvious advantages to the Kenya governance 
model, with its element of a dominant civil society, it equally has some drawbacks. According to 
Masterson, an advantage of the approach adopted by Kenya was an increased ownership of the 
process (Masterson 2005). With the highest number of representatives on the National 
Governing Council, civil society obviously had clear channels of communication into the all-
important decision-making body of the review process at the country level. It almost appeared as 
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if civil society had the power to set the agenda for the issues that were tabled for discussion at 
the meetings of the National Governing Council, as the four thematic convenors that were 
responsible for organising the conferences and workshops for inputs into the country self-
assessment report were members from civil society. In this way, the National Governing Council 
had the advantage of being equipped with experts from civil society on the thematic areas of the 
review process.  
Notwithstanding the advantages of this arrangement, the structure was prone to the danger of the 
National Governing Council falling prey to the parochial interests of members of civil society, 
particularly where members in the Governing Council found an opportunity to advance their own 
cause through the APRM (Masterson 2005). If this had become an accepted practice, there would 
be am inevitable potential to undermine the central role of the National Governing Council in 
making problem-adequate decisions. To preserve the focus of the National Governing Council, 
the establishment of multi-level stakeholder participation in the review process could serve as a 
mechanism to prevent members in the Governing Council from pursing any interest which was 
detrimental to its smooth operations.  
As a corollary of the country support mission of 13th to 15th July 2005, a new plan to complete 
the country self-assessment was put in place. Revised deadlines for the submission of the self-
assessment report became necessary because of unnecessary delays in the process of 
administering the surveys and gathering information from other regions of the country. These 
delays meant that the draft country self-assessment report could not be submitted to the APR 
Panel for consideration, as initially envisaged. The Kenya review process appeared to have 
stalled at this point as tensions over the management of the country self-assessment had virtually 
rendered the entire governance system non-operational (Akoth 2007: 12). The National 
Governing Council, mandated to direct the implementation of the country self-assessment, had 
few guidelines or clarity in its administrative procedures. Among other things, there was no clear 
guidance on how, and under what conditions, members of the National Governing Council could 
be sanctioned for a breach of the terms of their appointment.   
In summary, the first phase of the review process was characterised by a complete absence of 
decision criteria and procedures for the conduct of the National Governing Council activities. As 
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a result, decision-making procedures were weakly structured. This led to a situation where the 
Governing Council referred almost every difficult outstanding issue back to the Focal Point.  
 
6.4. The Second Phase: Decision Standstill as the Demands of Civil Society Impede 
Progress 
The second phase of the Kenyan review clearly demonstrated the effects of a poorly designed 
accountability system on the governance of a decision-making process. The absence of rules of 
procedure to regulate the conduct of Council members gave them considerable leeway on all 
decision proposals. This, to a large extent, did not allow for the development of an internal 
accountability system as a reference point to hold peers accountable, even at the level of the APR 
Forum. There seemed to be little or no incentive in place to hold members of the Governing 
Council and the Focal Point accountable, or to prevent the pursuit of individual parochial 
interests in the decision process. As a consequence, the review process was completely 
paralysed, and there appeared to be virtually no regulatory framework to ensure the successful 
implementation of programs of action that it generated.  
At the level of National Governing Council, members were generally perceived to hold divergent 
preferences on issues shaped around the four thematic areas of the review process. While 
members with a civil society background might be expected to promote policy issues that are 
market oriented and based on principles of accountability and the rule of law, most government-
aligned members might be seen as being interested in decisions and review recommendations 
that portray the government in a good light. As a consequence, the absence of guiding criteria for 
decision-making raises the stakes in preventing the arrival at any consensus in the Council, and 
gives the Focal Point an opportunity to unnecessarily interfere in the work of the Governing 
Council.  
The minister in charge of the Focal Point exploited loop holes in the APR Base document and 
took the action of dismissing three members of the Governing Council, on 20th July, 2005. The 
Base documents, which stipulate the nature and process of organising the country structures for 
the governance of the review process, fail to explicitly outline the conditions under which a 
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member of the National Governing Council could be sanctioned at the country level. The chair of 
the National Governing Council, and two other members, were sacked without due process by 
the Minister in charge of the Focal Point (Akoth: 2007: 13), whose reason for the arbitrary 
dismissals was reported to be linked to allegations by the Minister that these three individuals 
had made the work of the National Governing Council almost impossible (East African 
Standard, July 2005).  
At this stage of the review process, these actions raised concerns over overt interference by the 
Minister, in that he acted within what was conceived as an independent body in the governance 
structure of the review process in Kenya. The independence of the National Governing Council 
was conceived of as an important requirement and component of its ability to make decisions 
that are in the best interest of the various interest constellations of actors in the decision-making 
process of the review. Any indication of that the National Governing Council was controlled by 
an agent of the government under review brings into question the credibility of the final self-
assessment report produced. In this particular instance, the Minister in charge of the Focal Point 
clearly meddled in the operations of the Governing Council, as the dismissals were an imposition 
of his sanctioning powers on a hitherto independent body. In response to these actions, the 
Kenya NEPAD Secretariat, which serviced the review process in Kenya, issued a press statement 
intended to correct information that was in the public domain on the circumstances leading to the 
dismissal of the three council members. In a press statement dated 22nd July, 2005, the NEPAD 
Secretariat described as ‘incorrect and misleading’ accounts by a section of the media that the 
Minister of Planning or any government official had attempted to micromanage, control or have 
any undue influence in the APRM decision-making process (Akoth 2007: 14, Press Statement, 
Kenya NEPAD secretariat, 22nd July 2005).  
The consequence of this incident became clear, and meant that the decision-making process was 
further delayed and the National Governing Council was unduly paralysed. But the NEPAD 
Secretariat continued to deny any possibility of the decision system running to a halt as a result 
of the dismissal of some members of the council. According to the Secretariat the 
‘degazettement’ of just three members out of a total of thirty-three could not have affected the 
operations of the National Governing Council (Press Statement of the Kenya NEPAD 
Secretariat, 22nd July, 2005). The subsequent meeting of the National Governing Council on the 
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27th July, 2005 appears to have endorsed the dismissals of the chairperson of the Council and the 
two others. Reports from the minutes indicated that the National Governing Council at the 
meeting was briefed of the dismissals. This briefing indicated that, on the basis of information 
received by the Minister on the workings of the National Governing Council and the challenges 
the review process was encountering, he took a decision to ‘degazette’ the three from the 
Council. The dismissals were deemed appropriate as the Minister claimed to have acted within 
the powers delegated to him by the Head of State as the appointing authority of the Council (seen 
in Akoth 2007: 13). An interesting aspect of the propriety of the dismissals, vis-a-vis the powers 
of the Minister as the Focal Point, was the absence of standard operating procedures for the 
Council. In the absence of any standard procedures for the conduct of the Governing Council, it 
was thus unsurprising that the Focal Point appeared to misuse its mandate as the appointing 
authority in order to justify the dismissals.  
Akoth’s (2007) perspective on the dismissals and the controversy surrounding these issues is 
illuminating. According to his observations, the meeting that purported to have endorsed the 
dismissal of the three council members did not appear to have discussed in detail reasons for 
their abrupt sacking. In his view, it seems unusual that the meeting proceeded to confirm the 
appointment of a new chairperson, but failed to agree on the issue of replacing them. Akoth sees 
it as strange that the Council was unable to alter the agenda of the meeting to address the topic of 
replacement of the sacked council members, giving as their reason their opinion that the 
appointment of new council members was beyond their scope of competence (Akoth 2007). On 
the other hand, the Council indicated its preparedness to offer advice to the Focal Point should 
they be consulted on the issue.  
The aftermath of the issue brought the legitimacy of the National Governing Council into 
question. Though a new chairperson for the Council was elected from among the remaining 
members of the council, and not selected by the Minister at the Focal Point, engagement with 
civil society appeared to have been dented. While opinion on supposed meddling in the affairs of 
the National Governing Council was divided among members of the council, an expert on the 
APRM suggests that the Minister’s intrusive action into the activities of the National Governing 
 209 
 
Council, at this stage of the review process, was at best irresponsible and lacked proper recourse 
to best practice.14   
The three dismissed members of the National Governing Council proceeded to the High Court to 
sue the Minister for wrongful dismissal,  also seeking a declaration to the effect that the 
Governing Council had been starved of funds from the Ministry of Planning and Development 
(Herbert and Gruzd 2008:196; Akoth 2007: 12). The case, however, was dismissed by the High 
Court in October of 2005. This wrangling between members of the National Governing Council 
and the Focal Point almost halted the entire review process as its decision-making was held 
hostage for close to nine months. The inability of the Governing Council to agree on criteria to 
guide procedures at the country level self-assessment, as well as outstanding issues on the legal 
standing of the Council in relation to other independent bodies established by law, contributed to 
contestations that delayed the implementation of the road map for the review process.  
In a nutshell, the second phase of the review process was characterised by the arbitrary 
interference of the Focal Point into the activities of the National Governing Council. This 
subsequently led to a decision standstill in the Governing Council, where nothing much was 
achieved in relation to the completion of the self-assessment report. The absence of any decision 
criteria contributed to the haphazard situation that plagued the decision process of the review. 
 
6.5. The Final Phase: the Country Review Mission and Demand for Accepted Standards of 
an Independent Assessment by Experts   
In the third phase, although there was still no established decision criteria, experts played an 
important role in the production of the country self-assessment and the national programme of 
action. The committees that composed the self-assessment report and the national programme of 
action were left with large discretional powers in the formulation of the final recommendations 
to the country review mission.  In the light of vague or unavailable rules to regulate the review 
process, there was a need to fill the void with established practice or the use of experts in the key 
                                                          
14 Personal Interview, Ms Gertrude Takawira, Managing Consultant, Governance and Development Services 
Zimbabwe on the 15th November 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa 
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thematic areas, in order to arrive at consensus on issues without bargaining. Problems in this 
situation were exacerbated by the fact that the decision process was delayed, with several 
decisions needing to be made on issues to be delineated in the assessment report as priority areas 
needing attention through the programme of action. As a result, recourse to using experts to 
define which issues to prioritise as the overarching ones in the national programme of action, 
benefited the decision system by introducing a consistent decision practice, acceptable to all 
actors in the review process. 
From the 3rd to 17th October, 2005, a 19-member APRM country review mission visited Kenya. 
The aim of the mission was to assess the integrity of the country assessment and its processes, 
leading to the production of the national programme of action (Herbert and Gruzd, 2008:16).  
The review mission evaluated the adequacy of the items included in the draft country programme 
of action, and identified gaps in the various issue areas of the review process. As a part of efforts 
to get a clear understanding of the issues, the team visited eight provinces, enabling the team to 
engage stakeholders and acquaint themselves with issues in the report. A series of meetings and 
interviews with relevant interested groups were held to verify the information contained in the 
draft self-assessment reports.  
Prior to the composition of the country review report by the country review mission, the lead 
technical agencies had already produced an initial draft of the self-assessment report, in the third 
week of August, 2005 (Akoth, 2007:13). The process to arriving at decisions and 
recommendations in the draft self-assessment report was not entirely clear. However, a team of 
independent experts were organised to critique the initial draft. The team was tasked to submit 
the final version of the self-assessment report to the NEPAD Kenya Secretariat and the Ministry 
of Planning and Development (Akoth, 2007). An expert team, composed of academics and 
policy experts in the cognate fields of the review mechanism, worked from the end of August 
until the middle of September 2005 to ensure that the document was adopted as the self-
assessment report of the review process in Kenya. It was initially reported in a newspaper on 2nd 
September that the group of experts had categorically rejected a draft self-assessment report 
which was to serve as the basis for producing the final self-assessment report (East African 
Standard, 2 September 2005), although, according to Akoth (2007), this claim was denied by the 
team. The procedures through which the expert group formulated the key issues in the final self-
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assessment report appear to have been based entirely on issues raised by the lead technical 
research agencies.  
A National Consultative Forum was organized in early September 2005 to validate the self-
assessment report that was produced by the expert group, and was open to members of the 
public. Most of the participants in the Consultative Forum had previously attended events related 
to the review process. As a result, participants were familiar with the APRM process, having 
participated in previous provincial forums to validate initial draft reports of the self-assessment 
process. As a result, the tabled report was familiar to most of the participants, and the final self-
assessment report received endorsement, without any challenges. This showed that the decisions 
taken by the expert groups were popular with the participants at the consultative forum.  
The Consultative Forum served as an extra accountability mechanism in the governance structure 
of the review mechanism. It enabled interested parties, and think tanks working on allied issues 
related to the APRM, to have another opportunity to shape the contents of the review report. 
Since most of the participants were a part of the process at the provincial level, it was easy to 
detect issues that appeared to have been brought in to the draft report in addition to agreed items 
listed at earlier forums (Akoth 2007). The fundamental issue with this means of making decision 
makers accountable is the limitation presented to participants with regard to technical issues 
being discussed, suggesting that the Forum prioritised a need to be accessible to experts on the 
issue areas of the review mechanism. This, to some extent, made participation less attractive to 
individuals with no expertise in the key areas of the review. 
By providing this extra means to hold decision makers accountable for their actions, the 
governance system of the review process in Kenya provided incentives for the expert group to 
make decisions that adequately addressed the problems identified in the self-assessment process. 
Research on regulatory governance has shown that extra monitoring structures, and the 
involvement of the public, contribute to providing incentives to hold decision makers 
accountable for their decisions (Krapohl 2003). Members of the expert group, selected for the 
sole purpose of producing the self-assessment reports, had an incentive to produce a report that 
was not representative of their parochial interests. In order to demonstrate their expertise and 
credibility in the issue areas they were credited with, the group had the responsibility to produce 
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a self-assessment report that was problem-adequate in passing judgement on the various 
governance problems identified in the course of the review process. In addition, since the expert 
group was aware the report would be subject to a broad consultative process and handed to 
another body for fact checking and scrutiny, there was an incentive to produce a report that 
adequately addressed the issues from an expert perspective.  
Notwithstanding accountability measures, put in place to ensure that the process leading to the 
production of the self-assessment report by the experts did not suffer from any intense parochial 
and power politics, there were no guidelines to direct the activities of members of these groups. 
The absence of concrete guidelines for the expert group did not in any way impair the ability of 
the group to successfully meet the requirement of submitting the self-assessment report, within 
deadlines, for public scrutiny. It is curious to interrogate incentives that might have played a role 
in enhancing the ability of the group to work without any major problems. With hindsight, it may 
be argued that the expertise and independence of the team played a major role in ensuring a 
problem-adequate process to the writing of the final report. In its composition the team of experts 
was appointed based on their knowledge and track record on issues related to the review process. 
As a consequence, their expertise appears to have been a guiding principle in the process leading 
up to the composition of the final self-assessment report. It appears that the deliberate decision, 
to  dedicate a period exclusively for the process of composing the report, was useful in not 
distracting the main focus of the team. Even in the mist of media speculation on the purported 
rejection of the draft report that was presented by the lead technical research agencies, the expert 
independent team remain focused (Herbert and Gruzd 2008). 
Even with the self-assessment report  completed and submitted at the end of August 2005, the 
National Governing Council still had the task to deliver a national programme of action 
formulate to address any governance problems needing critical intervention. According to 
Herbert and Gruzd (2008), Kenya had outlined clearly the process leading to the development of 
this national programme of action in a SAIIA workshop on learning lessons from the APRM in 
September 2006. Considerable time and resources seem to have been invested in the process 
leading to the final draft programme of actions. Again, the lead technical agencies played a 
decisive role in working on the composite programme of actions for all the thematic areas of the 
review, before it was subjected to analysis by a group of permanent secretaries.  
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A multi-stage process was thus created in the production of the programme of actions. As a 
consequence, incentives were created for both the lead technical agencies and the permanent 
secretaries to be accountable for their decisions. To further enhance the need for a problem-
adequate process, participants attended a residential retreat to discuss and ultimately endorse the 
programme of actions (Herbert and Gruzd 2008:2004).  
Ensuring that the lead technical agencies were accountable to another body also provided an 
incentive structure to develop a concrete and problem-adequate programme of action to address 
each of the issues listed in the self-assessment report. An extra procedure was initiated which 
involved subjecting the programme of action to comments from each ministry, providing another 
avenue to detect unreasonable policy proposals that might have emanated from any of the 
participating bodies. Not only were the items listed in the national programme of actions 
subjected to wide scrutiny, they were also prioritised and adapted to meet the needs of the 
various ministries. In this way, for example, a clear framework was put in place to ensure that the 
national programmes of actions were costed in the short to medium term.  
Following this process, the country review mission gathered its own independent information 
based on desk research, a task which was conducted by the APRM continental Secretariat. Based 
on the information gathered, the review mission subjected the final country self-assessment 
report and the draft national programme of action to scrutiny. In the process leading to the 
drafting of the final country review report, independent technical consultants and the APRM 
partner institutions were at the centre of the final review report. The independent consultants 
were assigned to the thematic area of their speciality in the review process (Herber and Gruzd 
2008: 206). This resulted in a situation where experts, in each of the various issue areas, were 
given a task based around their expertise. To facilitate the composition of the country review 
report, the entire country review mission was subdivided into four groups to correspond to the 
main themes of the review process.15 
The process leading to the composition of the country review report was guided by the work of 
previous missions, and the procedures for the conduct of a country review mission (APRM 
process and organization, 2003). Article 5 of the process and organization document of the 
                                                          
15 Personal Interview with Evelynne Change, Programme Office at the APRM continental Secretariat, on 17th 
September 2015 in Johannesburg South Africa 
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APRM partially addresses the measures needed to guide the conduct of country review teams 
(Art. 5 APRM process and organization, 2003), recommending that a country review team  is 
formed for the purpose of a particular review process. It envisaged that the composition of any 
APR team be designed to reflect a balance of technical competence and professionalism (Art. 5.1 
of APRM process and organization, 2003). As a result, members appointed to each of the APR 
missions were, uniformly, established consultants and experts in the main areas of the review 
process. The decision structure utilized experts who were expected to decide on issues listed in 
the country self-assessment report and the national programme of action based on their expert 
knowledge, and not on their political or parochial interest in the review process.  
Further incentives were created for APR teams to form decisions based upon scientific 
information and the objectives of the review mechanism. A code of conduct and guidelines for 
the country review mission was provided for by the APRM Secretariat. It served as the main 
instrument to guide members in the teams to produce decisions that were in line with the 
principles and objectives of the review mechanism (APRM Guidelines, 2003). The presence of 
guidelines appeared to have helped in stabilising the decision process at this stage of the review.  
Against this background, decisions for each of the thematic areas were arrived at by consensus. 
Each thematic area had a group of experts and consultants contracted by the APRM Secretariat 
for the exclusive purpose of investigating and interrogating the country self-assessment report 
and the national programme of actions.  
The two-stage process adopted in the conduct of the country review mission in Kenya had some 
implications for the governance structure of the review process in general (CRR Kenya, May 
2006: 6). The strategy of interacting with a diverse range of stakeholders including the National 
Governing Council, trade unions, academics and policy makers created an extra avenue for 
information validation (CRR Kenya, 2006). This brought to the fore the importance of 
information gathering in reporting and monitoring instruments in international governance. The 
availability and accuracy of information on the policy field under consideration was seen to 
facilitate the work of decision makers. Adequate information sharing was confirmed to lead to a 
situation where actors involved in a decision-making process were well informed of available 
alternative choices, based on the credibility of information received. Besides its ability to help 
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shape the direction of informed decision-making, the sharing of information may also have the 
potential to enhance trust among actors cooperating in a particular policy field. In a situation 
where the pay-off structure in a policy area is asymmetrical, information sharing plays a major 
role in stabilising coordination problems among actors. In so doing, it mitigates the potential of 
actors to free-ride, especially in a situation where the issue area is disproportionate in the 
distribution of outcomes. The presence of a third party to coordinate information in the provision 
of the public good is also seen as important in ensuring that coordination results in the best 
outcome for all parties in the cooperation project.  
 In addition, resorting to provincial forums tended to offer other means through which the 
country self-assessment report and the national programme of actions were fact-checked to 
ascertain their credibility and accuracy. By providing a multi-level scrutiny of the items listed in 
the self-assessment report, an opportunity structure was provided for actors to make decisions 
that are in the best interest of the review process. It has to be acknowledged, however, that this 
did not completely insulate the review process even at this stage from internal Kenya domestic 
politics.  
In May 2006, the APRM Secretariat requested further information from the country review 
mission regarding issues related to the rejection of its draft national constitution, and the Anglo 
leasing scandals in which billions of Kenya shillings were purported to be paid in a fictitious 
security deal (Akoth 2007: 14).  The exposition of this scandal at a time the country review 
report was almost finalised had major ramifications for political events and governance 
generally. While it had the potential to damage the reputation of government (Herbert and Gruzd 
2008: 2005), the high profile corruption cases also had the tendency to stall the review process 
and divert the attention of the media to issues unrelated to the review process. The APRM 
Secretariat therefore sent a team to specifically analyse the new developments and integrate its 
findings into the country review report. These developments were effectively dealt with by the 
team, and the issues related to the scandals were inserted as a separate appendage of the review 
report.  
Following the completion of the review report by the APR review mission, it was subsequently 
presented to the APR Forum for debate at the AU summit of June 2006 in Banjul, the Gambia. 
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Following the debate on the report by the Forum, Kenya was peer reviewed. The President of 
Kenya was questioned by his ‘peers’ on issues raised in the report. According to Herbert and 
Gruzd (2008), Kenya was open to comments and not overly defensive concerning the difficulties 
and challenges identified in the report. However, there appeared to be no strong incentives 
created at the APR Forum to affect the behaviour of the State under review to implement the 
national programme of actions. Neither was there any opportunity structure at the level of the 
Forum, at this point, to restructure the governance procedures of the Kenya review process.  
The conception of the final debate on the country review report, at the level of the Forum, 
appears to make it strongest appeal to the social force of ‘peers’ in the review process. In the 
particular case of the Kenya review process, the peer component appears not to have had any 
identifiable influence on the decision-making process as whole. According to reports by a 
participant at the APR Forum in June 2006 at the Gambia, the Heads of State and Government of 
participating countries in the review process did not disagree with any of the recommendations 
contained in the final country review report of Kenya.16 The ‘peer’ component in this sense did 
not appear to have any significant influence over the content of the final reports. Other than 
commending Kenya for taking the bold step to go through the process and offering suggestions 
on how to tackle some problems identified in the Kenya review, the Forum seems to have had no 
influence on either the content of the report or the organizational structure of the review process. 
While the drafted national programme of action presented to the APR Secretariat contained 29 
objectives, 153 sub-objectives and 368 monitoring indicators (Reitmair 2009), and the Kenya 
country review mission made several recommendations on the improvement of the governance 
process in Kenya, the review report did little to adopt any meaningful external procedures to 
govern aspects of the decision-making process in the review of Kenya. The recommendations 
contained in the country review report focused mainly on implementation of various policies, the 
monitoring of the programme of actions and suggestions on the way forward to address the 
deficiencies identified (Country Review Report of Kenya 2006). It appeared that the review 
teams, in general, refrained from making any substantive input to guide the conduct of the 
procedures of the various bodies within the review process. This could be as a result of their 
                                                          
16 Personal Interview with Ambassador Ashraf Rashed, Member of the APR Panel of Eminent Persons, on 17th 
August 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa 
 217 
 
loosely defined mandate, which is constrained to mainly focus on the composition of the country 
review report, based on the country self-assessment report and the national programme of action 
which is proposed by the country under review (APRM Organization and Processes doc. 
Paragraph 1.1d, 2003). It therefore does not appear that the review process had the ability to 
influence the behaviour of actors in the decision-making process through its statements and 
reports. Its weak authority was exemplified in the ability of the National Governing Council of 
Kenya to consecutively miss deadlines for the completion of the self-assessment process 
(Herbert and Gruzd 2008). Since the mandate of the review mission to some extent curtails its 
authority to structuring the decision-making process, it left it to concentrate on dealing with 
substantive issues related to the key areas of political governance, economic governance, 
corporate governance and socio-economic development.  
Lack of regulations for the various APR teams, at the country level, left members with wide 
discretion when dealing with the expert reports from the technical research agencies. It also 
made it difficult to consider proposals on the listing or inclusion of items into the country review 
report. The technical research agencies continuously made proposals for the listing of items that 
needed proper policy interventions at the country level (Country Review Report of Kenya 2006). 
Notwithstanding their capacity to provide information on possible issues to be listed in the 
country review report as challenges, the research agencies were not able to submit their requests 
directly to the country review team. The draft report from the research agencies succeeded in 
sparking a huge discussion on the need to make criteria available to guide the process of listing 
issues into the country review report, as well to limit the apparent desire of the government to 
overshadow the decision making process (Herbert and Gruzd 2008). The draft report by the 
research teams did, however, form the basis on which other expert teams were assembled by the 
Focal Point to produce the final national programme of actions and the country review report.  
Additionally, the governance structure under which recommendations from the technical 
research agencies and the expert teams were considered by the review team, was not seen to 
generate strong enough incentives to frame a discourse on the admissibility, or otherwise, of all 
recommendations contained in their report.  
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Although the final recommendations of the Kenya review process were the outcome of extensive 
consultations with diverse interests groups, discussed in informal consultations with consultants 
for the various pillars of the review process, strikingly no procedures exist for members of the 
review team to give reasons for their recommendations and decisions. As elaborated by 
Evelynne, each of the thematic areas of the review process was apportioned to a group of experts 
in the review team.17 Each pillar had a chairman and a consultant for the issue area of interest, 
the chairman giving leadership in the proceedings to issues related to their pillar. However, 
decisions on the contents of the recommendations presented by each group were guided by the 
consensus principle. The entire team attempted to find a consensus in order to adopt 
recommendations for their pillar, based on the information received from consultations and the 
self-assessment report. There was therefore a large margin of discretion by members of the 
review team in how they deal with recommendations in the final country review report. This 
leaves members with unconstrained discretion in the inputs they make into the final review 
report. In the Kenya review report, for instance, of the 159 issues that were identified and needed 
urgent policy intervention, the national programme of action directly addressed only 69 
overarching issues (Herbert and Gruzd 2008).  
Even though there is a practice on publishing the country review report following the Forum 
debates and reports at the margins of the Heads of State and Government meetings, the Kenya 
country review report was not immediately published. The self-assessment report itself was only 
circulated to a limited audience (Akoth 2007: 14). Delays in publishing both the country self-
assessment and the country review reports were initially attributed to the need for coherence in 
presenting both reports at the same time, so as not to create confusion about the process. The 
Kenya APR Secretariat blocked the publication of the interim draft report, using a similar 
argument of avoiding inaccuracies Proponents for the publication of the reports vehemently 
argued for the need for transparency and openness (Akoth 2007). Civil society and the media, in 
particular, pushed for a greater participatory process. They argued that publishing the reports at 
each stage of the process would provide a strong incentive of promote accountability and 
transparency in the decision-making process of the review. A further lack of responsiveness was 
exemplified by the fact that, in the particular case of the country self-assessment report, the 
                                                          
17 Personal Interview 
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National Governing Council had, on several occasions, missed the deadline to submit the final 
report to the review mission. Consequently, two separate amendments had to be made to the 
initial programme to enable completion of the self-assessment process.  
In summary, in the third phase of the country review process in Kenya, neither the APR review 
team nor the APR Panel were able to resolve the challenges of the review through any 
meaningful guidelines. As a result, the decision system increasingly relied on the presence of 
expert committees to regulate the behaviour of actors through the production of decisions that 
were scientifically informed. As a consequence of these circumstances, the review process 
suffered from the consequences of affording too much discretion to members of the various 
expert teams, making the accountability system weak and ineffective at most stages of the 
decision process.  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
The analysis of the Kenyan review, offered above, is suggestive in several ways. First and 
foremost, it shows how a poorly designed decision-making structure in the APR process can 
influence and shape the magnitude and nature of challenges to the governance of the review 
process. The absence of guidelines to regulate the conduct of members of the various expert 
teams in the review process afforded actors with wide discretionary powers. As a consequence, 
the National Governing Council was left without adequate procedures to serve as a guide for 
decision-making at the level of the Council, while the governance system of the review process 
in Kenya was exposed to several challenges. This led to a situation where the decision process 
was paralysed for a long period of time, suggesting that in the absence of any meaningful 
decision criteria, the decision system of the APRM became ineffective in regulating the 
behaviour of actors.  
In this regard, the Kenyan case illustrates a process which affords unconstrained discretion on 
the part of the APR expert teams. The lack of any requirement to give reasons for their 
recommendation in the country review report gives the expert teams unfettered discretion in their 
decisions. The implication of this situation is that the governance structure does not provide 
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strong incentives for members of the National Governing Council to forego power politics in the 
decision making process. Consequently, members pursue diverse preferences in the decision 
making process, which then has the potential to lead to conflicting outcomes for actors in the 
review process.  
In addition, the case of the decision process in the Kenya review demonstrates the inability of the 
APR review team to take appropriate measures to enforce its own recommendations and 
decisions. While the APR review team to Kenya consistently showed its displeasure in the 
inability of the National Governing Council to meet deadlines for the submission of the country 
self-assessment report, it was not able to exert any sanctions, even where evidence of seeming 
government interference was manifest in the dismissal of some members of the National 
Governing Council by the Focal Point.  
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Chapter 7 
7.1. Conclusion and Implication for Further Research 
This study has analysed how, and with what consequences, functional differentiation in the 
decision-making system of the African Peer Review Mechanism affects the logic of decision-
making. The dissertation has focused specifically on how institutional arrangements in the 
organizational structure of the decision-making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism 
can operate to facilitate a productive recourse to rule-based decisions among decision makers. 
The study has presented substantial evidence that institutional arrangements within the decision-
making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism largely trigger the need for actors to 
resort to rule-based decision-making.  
Evidence of this functional differentiation of the APRM decision system leads to a firm 
conclusion. While the APR Forum, the superior political body, is assigned a rule-making 
function, the APR Panel, and other subsidiary committees within the organizational structure of 
the decision-making process of the review, concentrate on the application of the general 
guidelines to case specific decisions. This leads to a situation where, at the political level, major 
actors provide a general set of guidelines to serve as a point of reference for subsidiary organs 
within the organizational structure of the review process. This confirms the findings of the 
dissertation that there is a tendency of decision makers to resort to guidelines as an external point 
of reference in deciding on issues that might lend themselves to disagreements on specific 
details. In the three cases investigated, particularly those of South Africa and Kenya, existing 
organizational structures at the country level were characterised by major conflicts, so that the 
peer review was faced with severe stalemates within the decision system. Despite these setbacks, 
encountered at the country level, the presence of a multi-functional governance apparatus was 
seen to serve as a meaningful weapon to push actors to act with disregard for their parochial 
interests when intervening in the decision-making process.   
This concluding chapter proceeds in the following steps. In the first section, a summary of the 
main research findings is presented, derived from the empirical analysis of the decision-making 
systems of three review processes of the APRM. A discussion is then generated of the theoretical 
implications of these findings, and of their implications for the understanding of the African Peer 
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Review Mechanism, and of peer review processes in international organizations more broadly. 
Finally, policy recommendations for the governance and operations of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism are presented, with an assessment of their implications for the improvement of the 
quality of democratic and socio-economic development among the participating States of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism.   
 
7.2. Summary of Main Findings 
This dissertation provides a systematic account of the organizational structure of the decision-
making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism, with the following clear findings.  The 
study particularly provides an understanding of the consequences of delegating decision-making 
competencies to several subsidiary bodies in the organization structure of the APRM process. Its 
major assertion is that empirical analysis of the decision-making system of the African Peer 
Review Mechanism demonstrates a propensity by decision-makers to favour rule-based decision-
making, as opposed to bargaining.  
The organizational structures of the cases under consideration show a separation of rule-making 
and rule-application functions among decision-makers. As a consequence, the clear separation of 
functions between the APR Forum and other implementation bodies generate incentives for 
decision makers to formulate decisions based on generally accepted guidelines, in order to avoid 
stalemates in the decision system.  In all, the cases investigated establish that sufficient 
safeguards are in place so that even the most powerful actors in the process find it difficult to 
bargain over decisions at the rule implementation stage. This is a result of the institutional 
arrangements put in place to make all decision makers accountable for their decisions at each 
stage of the decision-making process. In this respect, the findings of this research illustrate that 
institutional arrangements, at both the rule-making and rule-application phases of the decision-
making process of the review mechanism, have positive effects upon the content of final country 
review reports of the APRM.  
These empirical findings record similar patterns of decision-making, occurring across a range of 
issue areas, in a variety of organizational formats, over a range of decisions and within a broad 
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range of interest constellations of participants. This may well be the case because the 
examination of each example of the APRM peer review process presents similar decision 
situations for participating member States of the review mechanism. For instance, the tendency 
to make decisions in accord with the guidelines of the review process was clearly prevalent in the 
South African review process, and noted in the APRM scholarly literature for its problematic 
trajectory. However, equally, there was found to be a rule-based character to the decisions of the 
country review mission in Kenya, which followed a similar logic in deciding on issues related to 
the inclusion of the Anglo Leasing Report, the Goldberg Scandal and the November 2005 
referendum.  
The South African review process, in particular, illustrated that the tendency to accede to rule-
based decisions occurred almost immediately, at the first phase of the implementation of the 
country review process. In the context of initial disagreements between the government and civil 
society groups with respect to the composition of the National Governing Council, proposals for 
an independent national council relied upon arguments that directly reflected the APRM 
guidelines on the establishment of a governing council, and of the good practice established by 
previously reviewed countries. This approach served to institutionalize a routine of resorting to 
the APRM guidelines as a source of making appeals to the decision makers in the validation 
workshops.  
The reference to guidelines applied clearly to the review situation in Kenya also, when, for a 
variety of reasons, its decision system was held hostage at the initial stage. In the Kenyan review 
process, civil society groups disagreed with the appointing powers of the Focal Point on their 
representation on the council and demanded the ability to appoint their own representatives, 
under an umbrella of a coalition of non-governmental organizations. In a repetition of the South 
African resolution, the evidence shows that the justification for the argument, advanced to 
address this dilemma in the Kenyan example, was based on APRM guidelines and of existing 
practice in member countries that had undertaken the review process already.  
Even in the case of Ghana, which, as the first country to be peer reviewed, could be said to be 
disadvantaged by a lack of established procedure, the composition of the National Governing 
Council was based on the need to establish an independent entity with clear, credible authority 
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that was widely recognized. The Ghana review process, conducted without any precedent, 
nevertheless similarly established procedures that made it possible for decisions to be made 
based on the APRM instruments as a guide. 
The findings of the empirical analysis undertaken in this dissertation show that the majority of 
the problems encountered by the decision-making system in the review process are located at the 
country level. The process of establishing country level structures lends itself easily to conflicts 
between any interest constellations at play. In comparison, the Ghana review process appears to 
have been less afflicted with organizational difficulty than the Kenya and South Africa review 
processes.  
In the Kenyan review process, for instance, the decision stalemate on appointments into the 
National Governing Council delayed the decision-making system for close to three months, with 
no substantial work being done by the National Governing Council. In the same way, the South 
African review process was subjected to a protracted decision stalemate at the initial stage of the 
process, as a result of organizational issues. Notably, the organizational difficulties encountered 
at the country level were related to decisions by participating countries to establish National 
Governing Councils that were not fully independent of the State. While the National Governing 
Council of Ghana in particular was composed of actors outside of the State apparatus (members 
of the National Governing Council of Ghana are wholly independent non-governmental actors), 
the National Governing Councils of Kenya and South Africa were initially dominated by State 
officials.  
A further organisational variation is exemplified by the fact that the Focal Point of Ghana was 
established as an independent entity, with its own secretariat. The secretariat was headed by a 
chief executive officer, giving it autonomy outside of central government apparatuses.  In the 
cases of Kenya and South Africa, on the other hand, the Focal Point and chairman of the 
National Governing Council were appointed at ministerial level, which meant the review process 
was led by a government official, unlike in Ghana. There is an implication here that these 
examples demonstrate that weak and ineffective organizational structures at the country level 
may well have impact upon the decision-making process of the review. Where the institutional 
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structures are dominated by government officials, decision systems were seen to suffer from 
intractable stalemates on the issues related to the set-up of the National Governing Councils. 
In addition, these cases of the decision-making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism 
provide strong empirical evidence to support the claim that committee governance within a 
decision-making system encourages rational actors to deliberate in decision situations, rather 
than bargain at the rule-application stage of the decision process. It is clearly shown that, if the 
APRM Forum delegates the implementation of decisions to subsidiary bodies in the decision-
making process of the review, then the Forum will adopt general substantive criteria for 
implementation to case specific situations by subsidiary committees. At the rule-application 
level, it is expected that guidelines will be adopted to guide decision-making, with application 
even to subsequent case-specific situations. The empirical relevance of this proposition was 
confirmed by evidence which scrutinized whether decision-makers at the rule-application stage 
systematically elaborated general rules in case specific situations, and were subsequently used in 
other decision situations.  
This analysis also reveals that assigning decision-making competencies, to subsidiary bodies 
within the organizational structure of the decision-making process of the APRM, can generate 
incentives which systematically push actors to be consistent in rule application across a broad 
stream of decision situations, even in the presence of the exhibition of self-interest by some 
actors in case-specific situations. At the rule formulation stage, for instance, it demonstrates, 
beyond reasonable doubt, that political actors at the level of the APR Forum adopt general rules 
for the operations of the review process with no conception or knowledge of what their case 
specific interest would be in the application of the rules.  
As a result of adopting rules, most of the operating procedures and standards formulated in the 
APR Base Document and Standards and Procedures of the APRM are necessarily incomplete, 
creating a need for further elaboration of the operating procedures by decision makers in specific 
decision situations. In all the cases under study, the generally adopted rules at the rule-making 
level did not consistently favour any particular party at all times. Both civil society members and 
government representatives were, on different occasions, dissatisfied with some rules on specific 
decision situations. The evidence suggests, interestingly, that the application of norms 
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formulated at a higher political level creates incentives for consistency in the application of rules 
to case specific incidents. For example, the third phase of the South African review process 
showed that members of the National Governing Council resorted to guidelines of the country 
review mission as a reference point for the implementation of the country self-assessment 
process. An incidence, where the Open Democracy Advice Centre (ODAC) showed intent to 
locate the specific issues on whistle-blowers and freedom to information into the APR 
questionnaire, in the face of diverging situation specific interests among other actors, 
demonstrated a determination to be consistent in the application of the guidelines of the APRM. 
In the case of the rejection of the draft national constitution in Kenya in 2005, as another 
example, a decision was taken to re-field a review mission to assess the impact of the immediate 
ramifications to the political situation. Despite government’s specific interest in objecting to 
initial requests to look into this issue and other scandals, a second review mission was 
subsequently fielded to assess the situation. In the case of Ghana, the country review mission 
adopted the practice of utilizing independent research institutes in gathering data for the self-
assessment report. This was consistently applied to subsequent review processes, 
notwithstanding the different preference constellations of each country over the decision to 
deploy independent research agencies for their country self-assessment report.  
The implications of this dissertation’s empirical findings suggest that, by separating the functions 
of rule-making from rule-application, actors are institutionally pushed to forgo their situation 
specific interest at the norm application stage. As a result, the application of rules to case-
specific decision situations is not subjected to bargaining by powerful actors with situation-
specific interests. Guidelines formulated on specific case situations can therefore gain 
consistency in their application in subsequent situations. The APR Forum thus can concentrate 
on formulating general rules to serve as a guide in the implementation of the review process, 
while the APR Panel and other subsidiary bodies in the decision-making process of the APRM 
are charged with applying the guidelines on case-specific situations for their consistent 
application.  
In this respect, the analysis of the functional differentiation of the governance structure of three 
review processes of the APRM confirms this dissertation’s first general empirical expectation, 
which is that the more a differentiated decision system closes down the opportunities for power-
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based decisions, the more it promotes rule-based decisions. The case analysis shows that, with 
the separation of a rule-making function from a norm application function, the opportunity for 
power-based decisions at the rule implementation stage is completely diminished. Within the 
South African review process, for instance, activities at the country level, susceptible to conflicts 
among actors, led to a consistent resort to the APR guidelines as a means to stabilize the decision 
system. In the specific case of the initial decision by the Focal Point not to include the technical 
research agencies in the formulation of the country self-assessment report, any opportunity for 
power-based bargaining on the part of the government to pursue its case specific interest was 
absent. Since the implementation of the review process was governed by the National Governing 
Council, the implementation and process of the South African review was guided by previous 
practices and the standard guidelines. As a result, the National Governing Council implemented 
the review process of South Africa by insisting that technical research agencies should be 
employed to provide for a technically competent review process that met the highest standards. 
Similarly, in the Ghana review process, any opportunity for power-based decision-making was 
non-existent, as decision implementation was delegated to multiple research institutes who 
generated the country self-assessment reports. In this light, the government had no opportunity, 
at the implementation stage of the review process, to bargain over specific decisions in each of 
the thematic areas of the review process.  
In each of the empirical case studies there is substantial evidence to demonstrate that, at the rule-
application stage in the decision-making process, each issue was considered as a separate case, 
while decisions by the country review mission were based on separate considerations. For 
instance, issues related to democracy, political, economic and corporate governance, and socio-
economic development were separated and assigned to consultants to assess individually each of 
the issues raised in the country self-assessment report. Each group of consultants within the 
country review mission made their decisions on separate issues, based on their assessments in the 
specific context of the issue under consideration. By separating issues and making decisions on 
individual cases, the incentives for package deals in the decision-making process become a 
rarity. In the Kenya review process, for instance, the team of consultants considered each of the 
thematic areas on the merits of the information that was available to them. As a result, even if 
actors sought to pursue their parochial interests at the level of the country review mission, the 
procedures of the committees in the mission did not allow for decision makers to add single 
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cases to packages. Accordingly, decisions of the different consultants in the review mission were 
based on the individual considerations of single issues, and precluded any opportunity for 
powerful actors to resort to power-based bargaining. 
Empirical findings on these cases also provide evidence to support the claim that the institutional 
arrangements in the decision-making system of the African Peer Review Mechanism provide 
incentives for reasoned-based decision-making in the subsidiary bodies of the decision process. 
The complex and multi-functional APRM organizational structure assigns the task of rule 
application to different sub-bodies, rather than to a sole agency. As a result, the decision process 
is structured horizontally among the subsidiary bodies at the rule application stage. Horizontal 
structuring leads to a situation of mutual interdependence and control among the sub-systems 
involved in the application of rules in the broader decision system. As a consequence, stalemates 
in the decision process are avoided as every unit of the decision process discharges its duty, and 
is unable to indulge in controversy.  
In the review process of Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, several subsidiary units are involved in 
the application of norms to situation specific situations. The country level structures included the 
national APR Focal Point, the Research and Technical agencies, the National Commission and 
the National Secretariat. Each unit was assigned specific functions in the overall decision process 
of the review mechanism in all the empirical case analysis. The consequence was that the 
directives issued as a solution to the organizational challenge of the Kenya review process 
became a reference point for subsequent review processes. Furthermore, countries that undertook 
their reviews after Ghana’s review were expected to replicate the example of Ghana in the 
formation of their National Governing Councils by making non-governmental actors take the 
lead in the country self-assessment process. 
Empirical analysis elicits and confirms the second general empirical expectation of this 
dissertation, which is that the more a differentiated decision system provides strong incentives 
for discursive decision-making, the better its ability to prevent arbitrary application of general 
norms in case-specific situations. In the Ghana review process, for example, the opportunity 
structure created for deliberation, during the validation process at the self-assessment stage, 
provided strong incentives for participants and decision makers to deliberate on the policy 
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options in each of the identified challenges. As a result, it contributed to a uniform application of 
the guidelines in the consultations undertaken by the review mission with government officials, 
civil society groups, academics and the media. In addition, the research methodology, utilized by 
the research institutes tasked to compose the draft country assessment report, was uniform across 
issue areas and provided a platform to apply these criteria when utilising research agencies at the 
country level.  
Comparison between the three case studies shows that functional differentiation has an impact on 
the content of final country review reports. The differentiation of functions in the decision 
system of the APRM is shown to act as a trigger to applying rule-based decision logic in the 
decision process. This effect may be attributed to the perceived shared interest of actors in 
supporting a functional decision system that produces decisions that are problem-adequate to 
remedy deficiencies in their own policies. In the review process of South Africa, the constant 
engagement with civil society groups was able to sort out institutional bottlenecks in the process 
of incorporating salient issues into the APR questionnaire, and created incentives to decide on 
issues based on the standard procedures of the review process. In the third phase of the review 
process in Kenya, for instance, the decision to involve experts, with a keen focus on the various 
policy issues of concern to the review mechanism, was very instrumental in the production of the 
country self-assessment report. The presence of experts at that level meant that decisions on what 
issues to include into the report were not subjected to bargaining by actors with situation-specific 
interests. Decisions were largely reached through consensus building among the experts that 
were tasked with working on the country self-assessment report. As in the other cases, the 
National Consultative Forum, organized in September 2005 to validate the draft country self-
assessment process, provided an extra-accountability mechanism to hold the experts in check. As 
a result, the experts who worked on the self-assessment report applied the guidelines in a 
uniform manner across the issue areas.  
In the case of the review process in Ghana, the decision to establish a differentiated decision 
system, where membership at the rule-application level was independent and different from that 
of the rule-making body, contributed to the quality of decisions arrived in the final country 
review report. For instance, civil society showed an interest in the activities of the review process 
when they categorically rejected a claim made by the government related to the readiness of the 
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country to be reviewed. The interventions of civil society groups at this stage largely contributed 
to shaping the structures that were later widely modelled for the execution of later review 
processes.  
Alternative theoretical explanations of decision-making in an international organization, 
reflecting on the power resources of actors participating in the decision process, would be unable 
to provide any convincing evidence to explain the observed effects of functional differentiation 
in the decision-making system of the APRM. Power-based decision-making appears to hold 
where decisions are made in a uniform manner with the possibility of powerful actors seeking 
package deals. However, in the decision-making process of the APRM, one decision on each 
issue area is separated from any other. As a result, decisions are made on single specific cases 
with no opportunity for powerful actors to seek package deals in the review process. Since 
decision-making at the rule-application level is based on a case-by-case application of the 
guidelines, the opportunity for power based bargaining on situation-specific issues become 
absent in the decision-making system of the review process. 
Therefore, in the three cases under study in this dissertation, any alternative theoretical 
explanation would fail to account for the observed effects of functional differentiation in the 
organizational structure of the decision-making process of the African Peer Review Mechanism. 
The South African review process, in particular, points to the fact that the most powerful 
members of the review process are constrained by institutional arrangements in the decision-
making process to bargain over unfavourable decisions. This is palpably the case, as shown by 
the attempt by the South African government to reject findings on xenophobia and corruption in 
the draft reports of the South African review process. Although the response from the 
government ignored the findings of the report, the APR Panel insisted on highlighting the issues 
in the final review report of South Africa. This dissertation concludes, therefore, that it is clear 
that none of the cases studied presents evidence of an alternative explanation of power-based 
decision-making taking place at the level of the review mission. In all the cases, the APR review 
mission considered issues separately and package deals were not entertained in any of the 
country review processes. Powerful actors were therefore restrained from bargaining over any 
decision outcomes in the review process.  
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In conclusion, the empirical findings of the case analysis does not present any evidence to 
support the alternative explanation that power-based bargaining at the level of the rule 
application stage had an impact on the final decisions of the various committees involved in 
making decisions on specific issue areas. The observed patterns of functional differentiation, 
pushing actors at the rule-application stage to deliberate on options in application to situation-
specific decisions, are evidently robust across the three empirical cases.   
 
7.3. Theoretical Implications for Understanding the Operations of the Decision-Making 
Process of the African Peer Review Mechanism 
The analysis of the organizational structure of the decision system of the African Peer Review 
Mechanism presents enduring theoretical implications for a conceptual understanding of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism, and of the role of functional differentiation in decision-making 
systems in international organization broadly. This section draws theoretical implications of the 
analysis for a better understanding of the APRM process.  
In the first place, it is argued that prevailing accounts of the APRM, revolving around the design, 
processes and the effective implementation of the recommendations of the review process, do not 
suffice to explain the organizational structure of the decision-making process of the African Peer 
Review process. The concept of functional differentiation and delegation in international 
institutions offers a more plausible explanation of the separation of decisions functions among 
several subsidiary bodies in the organizational structure of the decision-making process. Analysis 
of the three case studies demonstrates that modern institutional theory, with elements of 
organizational theory, provides a plausible explanatory mechanism for understanding the 
decision-making system of the African Peer Review Mechanism. The core of these concepts 
highlights the effects of particular institutional arrangements on the decision-making system of 
the review process and the outcome of decisions made at each stage of the review process.  
The concept of functional differentiation, in particular, proves its relevance and universal 
applicability to decision-making systems that surround policy issues that are not guided by 
compulsory enforcement mechanisms. This has huge implications for the dominant International 
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Relations theory of Neorealism, which hardly recognises the role of institutions and their power 
to facilitate cooperation among States. In the conception of Neorealist scholars, States are 
conceived as the main actors in global politics, while international institutions are barely 
relevant. In the perspective of this dissertation, the concept of functional differentiation goes 
beyond Neorealist explanations of power politics in global governance by presenting a more 
systematic mechanism through which institutional arrangements can influence the behaviour of 
rational actors in a decision-making process. A concrete step to achieving this effect, in any 
functionally differentiated decision process, is the separation between a rule-making function and 
the application of rules at a lower level by multiple subsidiary bodies in the organizational 
structure of the decision-making apparatus. 
Secondly, the study has implications for the organizational aspects of international institutions 
broadly. Research on delegation of decision-making authority to independent agents emphasises 
the need to delegate to a trustee-agent, as a signal of a credible commitment of member States to 
their long term interest. The concept of functional differentiation shows that rational actors can 
commit credibly to merit-based decisions through institutional arrangements in a decision-
making system. While the literature on modern regulatory theory is preoccupied with 
hierarchical control, functional differentiation is concerned with the operations of a decision 
system in the making of decisions that are problem-adequate to issues in a given policy area, 
exhibiting competing interests to participating actors. As a result, differentiation of institutional 
arrangements in a decision system provides extra mechanisms to hold actors in a decision-system 
accountable for their decisions, without instituting hierarchical measures that could derail the 
benefits attained by assigning decision competencies to different bodies in the decision system.  
In practice, situations are common in contemporary international relations among States, where 
international organizations assign several tasks to subsidiary bodies in the operation of their 
institutions. In most of these institutions, the political task of formulating general rules for the 
governance of the organization is handled by political actors, while the stage of applying rules to 
situation specific cases are delegated to subsidiary bodies. The benefits of these arrangements, in 
part, are in preventing decision stalemates at the rule application level. At the same time they 
assist efficient decision-making, as delegated tasks are carried out by a committee that 
specialises in particular areas of the decision system.  
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Beyond this advantage, a functionally differentiated decision system, though fully protected from 
political interference in the decision-making process, may nevertheless be subject to decision 
stalemates where actors are faced with a tendency by powerful members to resort to power-based 
politics, instead of respecting the decision rules instituted to guide the behaviour of all actors. As 
a consequence, research on international organizations, attempting to explain the autonomy of 
bureaucracies in the operations of international institutions, needs to accommodate alternative 
sources of influence residing in institutional mechanisms in order to produce decisions that are 
problem adequate, regardless of their distributive effect. This means going beyond a focus on the 
secretariats of international organizations, which in themselves do not capture the entire 
workings of the institution.  
Finally, this dissertation concludes that any application of the concept of functional 
differentiation to an institution based on voluntary participation would suggest the kind of 
institutionalized forms of cooperation present in the African Peer Review Mechanism. By 
extension, it makes the assumption that the effects of functional differentiation, found in the 
decision-making process of the APRM, would be likely to have similar effects on other peer 
review processes in international organizations. Although generalizing these effects to decision-
making process of all international organizations may not be possible, a plausible, though limited 
extension of the concept of functional differentiation can be made to similar peer review 
mechanisms under the ambit of international organizations, particularly in the governance of 
issue areas of particular interest to States. Furthermore it can be argued that if the African Peer 
Review Mechanism, which operates as a ‘soft’ arrangement between the participating States, can 
generate incentives for actors to deliberate at both the rule-making and rule application stages of 
the decision process, then other international organizations with peer reviews on issues of high 
politics could generate equally important institutional effects.  
The concept of functional differentiation specifies the mechanisms through which institutional 
arrangements can influence organizational decisions in any decision system. A first practical step 
is to separate the roles of rule-making and rule application in the decision-making system. At the 
rule-making stage, actors concentrate on formulating general rules without requiring any 
knowledge of what their preference might be in anticipated case-specific situations. In such a 
situation, rational actors are pushed to search for the most appropriate options since they are not 
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anticipating their case-specific interests. The search for appropriate guidelines leads actors to 
deliberate on anticipated applications of the rules to specific situations, and, even if they 
calculate properly what their anticipated situation specific interests are, may well settle for a 
median position.  
At the rule application level, actors can be prevented from indulging in power based politics in 
the application of decision guidelines by limiting their opportunity to bargain over decision 
situations. This can be done by limiting decision-makers at the application stage to the confines 
of guidelines that necessarily limit the degree of arbitrary application of the rules by the 
implementation body. In addition, decision makers at the rule application stage are obliged to 
separate the handling of cases. This mechanism works to prevent a situation where powerful 
members in the decision process resort to package deals. By preventing the most powerful actors 
from seeking package deals in the decision process, the requirement to provide reasons can serve 
as a powerful check to oblige decision makers to adhere to the decision guidelines at each stage 
of the decision process. In effect, the ability of institutional arrangements to push actors in the 
decision system to rule-based decisions is based on this causal chain of factors arising from the 
reality of functional differentiation. 
 
7.4. Policy Implications 
Following the theoretical implications of the research analysis, four policy implications and 
recommendations for the operations and governance of the decision-making system of the 
African Peer Review Mechanism are presented.  
Firstly, it is recommended that the African Peer Review Mechanism should systematically 
delegate the implementation of the review process at the country level to independent consultants 
and research institutes, since that arrangement would better lead to rule-based decision making at 
the country level. As a consequence of accepting this recommendation, the act of delegating 
decision competencies to several independent consultants and research agencies at the country 
level would increase the rate of producing problem-adequate decisions in the implementation of 
the APRM process in individual member States. Against this background, functional 
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differentiation of the decision making system of the review process serves as a factor in pushing 
powerful States in the review process to accept decisions in the APR country review reports, 
which then has huge benefits for the implementation of the review process in all member States. 
The recommendation enables participating members to strengthen the autonomy of subsidiary 
bodies in the organizational structure of the review process, in order to enhance the quality of 
decision recommendations contained in the country review reports.  
A second recommendation is that the implementation of the review process at the country level 
should adhere to the application of the guidelines governing the review process. In most 
instances, the production of the country self-assessment report is subject to several controversies 
over organizational issues. To prevent decision stalemates in the processes leading to the self-
assessment report, participating member States should adhere to the good practice of making the 
National Governing Council independent of government. By instituting an independent and 
autonomous National Governing Council, member States are prevented from interfering and 
intervening in the decision process. This allows mandated subsidiary bodies to produce the most 
problem-adequate solutions to the problems encountered by individual member States in various 
policy areas of concern to the APRM process.   
Thirdly, to ensure accountability at the level of the APR Forum, consideration of country review 
reports must go beyond the confines of the Forum. All country review reports should be tabled at 
the pan-Africa Parliament for discussion within the continental legislative body. By so doing, 
this process creates visibility for the APRM, and deepens accountability among decision makers 
on the final recommendations presented in the country review reports. The analysis of the 
empirical cases show that the more the decision process is subjected to several accountability 
measures, the more actors arrive at decisions that are acceptable to all participants in the review 
process.  
Lastly, a recommendation is made that the separation of a rule making function from the 
application of rules to situation specific cases should be properly structured in the statues of the 
APRM. The APR Forum, as the rule setter in the organizational structure of the review process, 
would thus take its rule making functions seriously to avoid instances of vague guidelines 
concerning the application of the standards. The presence of precise guidelines can greatly orient 
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the behaviour of actors to refrain from any attempts to bargain over the application of rules in 
specific decision situations. In the empirical analysis presented, the presence of guidelines has 
generally generated incentives for decision makers, at the rule application stage, to be consistent 
over all the issue areas of the APRM.  
In conclusion, for the APRM decision-making process to follow a decision practice that is 
always ruled-based, the separation of rule-making and rule application in the decision system is 
required to ensure that the decisions of the APR Forum are rule-based, notwithstanding their 
political nature. The APR Forum, as the political and supreme decision-making body, is then 
encouraged to be consistent in the formulation of general rules, since it would be unaware of the 
future specific decision situation under which general rules are applied. The positive effect of 
this arrangement will then be that the APR Panel and other subsidiary committees will be pushed 
to make merit-based decisions based on the criteria provided by the political decision organ.  
  
7.5. Extension and Further Research  
This study is the first systematic attempt at explaining the impact of functional differentiation on 
the decision-making system of the African Peer Review Mechanism. Through this analysis, it 
shows the generalizability of this dissertation’s conceptual framework across different peer 
review process in other international organizations. In this final section, I suggest other possible 
avenues for further research based on the conceptual framework offered in this study.  
The findings of this study can be added to ongoing scholarly debates on institutional mechanisms 
to produce decisions that are problem adequate irrespective of their distributive effectives on the 
policy issues under consideration. Paying due attention to organizational aspects of international 
institutions contributes to our understanding of how specific international organizations function. 
In particular, the study addresses a curiously neglected aspect of the APRM process which has 
the potential to contribute theoretically to the literature on peer review processes in international 
organizations.  
In this regard, an extensive analysis of the impact of the review process as an undertaking in 
individual member States can be useful in explaining the extent of implementation of policy 
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recommendations that emanate from the review process. Since the reinvigorated interest in the 
study of international institutions in recent year, some analyses have sought to explain the 
effectiveness of international institutions in their issue areas of focus. Curiously though, research 
in this area has paid little attention to institutions of the nature in this study. A systematic study 
in this regard can contribute to research efforts aimed at explaining the effectiveness of peer 
review process conducted by international organizations in issue areas of global concern.  
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Annex  
Annex I 
South Africa’s National Governing Council 
Civil Society Members 
1. Bheki Sibiya, Business Unity South Africa 
2. Looks Matoto, Disabled People South Africa 
3. Zanele Twala,  SANGOCO 
4. Dr. Nomonde Mqhayi, South African Youth Council 
5. Thabisile Msezane, South African Council of Churches 
6. Randall Howard, South African Transport and Allied Workers’ Union  
7. Dr Mongane Wally Serote, Arts and Culture Sector 
8. Master Mahlobogoane, South African National Civics Organization 
9. Laura Kganyago, National Women’s Coalition 
10. Moemedi Kepadisa, National Council of Trade Unions 
Government Representatives  
11. Dr. Essop Pahad (Minister in the Presidency) 
12. Trevor Manuel (Minister of Finance) 
13. Mandisi Mpahlwa (Minister of Trade and Industry) 
14. Bridgette Mabandla (Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development) 
15. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi (Minister of Public Service and Administration, Chairperson) 
Country Review Mission (CRM) to South Africa 
1. Prof. Adebayo Adedeji (Member of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons) 
2. Dr Bernard Kouassi (Executive Director APRM Secretariat) 
3. Evelynne Change (Coordinator, Corporate Governance, APRM Secretariat) 
4. Dr Afeikhena Jerome (Coordinator, Economic Governance and Management, APRM) 
5. Ferdinand Katendeko (Research Analyst, Democracy and Political Governance, APRM) 
6. Rachel Mukamunana (Research Analyst, Democracy and Political Governance, APRM) 
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7. Eunice Kamwendo (Research Analyst, Economic Governance and Management, APRM) 
8. Dalmar Jama (Research Analyst, Corporate Governance, APRM) 
9. Nana Boateng (Research Analyst, Socio-economic Development, APRM) 
Independent technical consultants 
Democracy and Political Governance 
10. Prof. Amos Sawyer (Former President of Liberia and Academic) 
11. Prof. Peter Anyang Nyongo (Former Minister and Member of Parliament, Kenya) 
Economic Governance and Management 
12. Prof. Roland Ubogu (Retired Chief Economist, African Development Bank) 
Corporate Governance  
13. Dr. Babacar Ndiaye (Former President of African Development Bank) 
14. Prof. Adebayo Ogunlesi (Head of the Global Investment Division, Credit Suisse First 
Boston) 
Socio-economic Development 
15. Dr. Francis Chigunta (Lecture in Development Studies, University of Zambia) 
16. Prof. Mbaya Kankwenda (Former UNDP Resident Representative in Nigeria) 
17. Prof. Julia Duany (Lecturer in Political Science, Makerere University) 
Partner Institutions 
18. Charles Muthuthi (Principal Governance Expert, African Development Bank) 
19. Prof. Ahmed Mohiddin (Expert Consultant UNDP) 
20. Prof. Emmanuel Nnadozie (Senior Economic Affairs Officer, Economic Commission for 
Africa) 
21. Dr. Bartholomew Armah (Senior Regional Advisor, Economic Commission for Africa) 
22. Dr. Kojo Busia (Development Management Officer, Economic Commission for Africa) 
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National APRM Governing Council (NAPRM-GC) of Ghana 
1. Rev. Prof. S.K. Adjepong, a former University Vice-Chancellor and currently President 
of the Methodist University as Chairperson. 
2. Amb. Alex Ntim Abankwa, a Retired Diplomat and former ambassador who has worked 
with all governments of Ghana since independence. 
3. Prof. Samuel K. Botwe Asante, an International Consultant and former Principal 
Regional Adviser, UNECA. 
4. Most Rev. Dr Bishop Paul Bemile, the Catholic Bishop of Wa and Director of the Inter- 
region Dialogue. 
5. Prof. Miranda Greenstreet, a leading Educationist, former Director of Institute of Adult 
Education of the University of Ghana, and Chairman of the Coalition of Domestic 
Election Observers in the Ghana 2001/2004 elections. 
6. Mr Nutifafa Kuenyehia, a former Chairperson of the Ghana Bar Association and Media 
Commission. 
7. Ms Gloria Ofori-Boadu, a former Executive Director of the International Federation of 
Women Lawyers (FIDA) in Ghana and currently President of the Women's Assistance 
and Business Association(WABA). 
Country Review Mission (CRM) to Ghana 
1. Dr Chris Stals (Member of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons).  
2. Dr Bernard Kouassi (Executive Director, APRM).  
3. Ms Evelynne Change (Coordinator: Corporate Governance, APRM). 
4. Mr Dalmar Jama (Research Analyst: Corporate Governance, APRM). 
5. Mr Sudir Chuckun (Coordinator: Multilateral Relations and Policy, NEPAD secretariat). 
6. Mr Seward M. Cooper (Chief Counsel and Head of the Good Governance Unit, AfDB). 
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7. Prof. Claudius Dele Olowu (Principal Governance Expert, Public Administration, AfDB). 
8. Ms Zemenay Lakew (Senior Programme Coordinator, AU-NEPAD Support Unit 
UNDP). 
9. Dr Okey Onyejekwe (Senior Regional Adviser, UNECA). 
Independent technical consultants for APR Secretariat: 
Democracy and Good Political Governance  
10. Prof. Ahmed Mohiddin (Director, 21st Century Africa Foundation).  
11. Prof. Michelo K. Hansungule (Professor of Human Rights Law, Centre for Human 
Rights, University of Pretoria, South Africa).  
12. Mr Alfred Mubanda (former UNDP Resident Representative in Ghana in 1981-1986 and 
former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Uganda). 
Economic Governance and Management  
13. Dr Afeikhena T. Jerome (Consultant and Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, 
University of Ibadan, Nigeria).  
14. Dr Omotunde Johnson (Consultant on Economic Issues and former International 
Monetary Fund Resident Representative in Ghana). 
Corporate Governance  
15. Ms Gertrude Takawira (former Country Director, South and Eastern African Trade 
Information and Negotiating Institute (SEATINI) and Managing Consultant, Governance 
and Development Services, Zimbabwe). 
Socio-Economic Development  
16. Prof. L. Adele Jinadu (Executive Director, Centre for Advanced Social Science, Port 
Harcourt, Nigeria).  
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National APRM Governing Council of Kenya18 
Civil Society Members 
1. Rev. Jephthah Gathaka (Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace). 
2. Rev. Peter Orawo (Climate Network Africa). 
3. Muhib Noorani (Kenya Paraplegic Organisation). 
4. Philip Kisia (International Commission of Jurists). 
5. Geoffrey Omedo (National Youth Parliament). 
6. Abdullahi  Abdi (Northern Aid). 
7. Fatma Ibrahim (Kenya National Human Rights Commission). 
8. Osendo Omore (Transparency International Kenya). 
9. Rose Ogega (Institute of Certified Public Accountants). 
10. Winnie Kinyua (Kenya Private Sector Alliance, KEPSA). 
11. Juliet Makhokha (National Council of Women of Kenya). 
12. Nduati Kariuki (Kenya National Federation of Agricultural Producers). 
Conveners (non-voting members) 
13. Esther Ndisi Bertolli (Bertolli and Associates). 
14. Joseph Kimani (African Youth Parliament). 
15. Victoria Kioko (Kenya Episcopal Conference). 
16. Dr. Mbui Wagacha (Independent Consultant). 
Technical Agencies (non-voting members) 
17. Prof. Wafula Masai (African Centre for Economic growth, Political Governance and 
Democracy). 
18. Dr. Hezron Nyangito (KOPPRA, Economic Management). 
19. Karugor Gatamah (Centre for Corporate Governance, Corporate Governance). 
20. Prof. Mohamed Jama (Institute of Development Studies University of Nairobi, Socio-
economic Development).  
                                                          
18 The National APRM National Governing Council of Kenya had 33 Members. Four Members from the NGO 
Council were expelled from the governing Council. The second member appointed at the discretion of the Minister 
of Development and national Planning resigned and are not listed above.  
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Ex-officio Representatives of line Ministries and key Public Institutions  
21. Permanent secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
22. Permanent secretary, Governance and Ethics 
23. Permanent secretary, Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs 
24. Permanent secretary, Ministry of Finance  
25. Permanent secretary, Ministry of Planning and National Development 
26. Solicitor-General, Office of the Attorney General 
27. Chairman of Electoral Commission of Kenya 
Other appointments at the discretion of the Minister of Development and National Planning 
28. Bernard Aende Ogada 
Country Review Mission (CRM) to Kenya 
1. Dr. Graca Machel, Member of the APRM Panel of Eminent Persons. 
2. Dr Bernard Kouassi, Executive Director APRM. 
3. Dr. Moise Nembot, Coordinator, Democracy and Good Political Governance.  
4. Mr. Gaston Bushayija, Coordinator, Socio-Economic Development. 
5. Mr. Dalmar Jama, Research Analyst, Corporate Governance. 
6. Ms Nana Boateng; Research Analyst, Socio-Economic Development. 
Independent Technical Consultants  
7. Ayodele Aderinwale, Executive Director, African Leadership Forum Nigeria 
8. Prof. Chudi Uwazurike, North Academic Centre City College, City University of New 
York 
9. Laura Nyirinkindi, Director, Pro Initiatives Agency, Uganda. 
10. Dr. Afeikhena T. Jerome, Consultant and Senior Lecturer, University of Ibadan Nigeria 
11. Dr. Omotunde Johnson, Former IMF Resident Representative in Ghana  
12. Patricia Cisse, Managing Partner, Africa Investment and Business Advisers Dakar 
Senegal 
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13. Dr. Bernard Z. Dasah, CEO, Bendas Consultants, Ottawa Canada 
Partner Institutions  
14. Seward M. Cooper, Governance Legal Department, African Development Bank 
15. Dr. Michael Mahmoud, Senior advisor, African Development Bank  
16. Dr. Abdul-Nashiru Issahaku, Senior Governance Exprt, African Development Bank 
17. Zemenay Lakew, Senior Programme Coordinator, AU-NEPAD Support Unit UNDP 
18. Dr. Emmanuel Nnadozie, Senior Economic Affairs Officer, UNECA 
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Annex II  
Interview Guide for the Qualitative Expert Interviews Conducted 
Interview guide for Panel members and other independent consultants 
1. What goes into appointing persons to serve on the APR Panel? 
2. What considerations are made in the selection of the chairperson of the Panel and for how 
long does the chairperson of the Panel stay in office? 
3. What goes into taking a decision at the Panel meetings? 
4. Which interests are mostly at stake at the committee meetings? 
5. Do member States sometimes have a preference for decision to go a certain way? 
6. Have there been situations where a member States raises a protest on a particular decision 
taken by the panel? If any, explain the circumstances and the nature of those protests 
7. What is the general attitude of the Heads of State or their representatives on final 
decisions handed down to them by the Panel. 
8. Do the Heads of State or their representatives have the opportunity to protest or disagree 
with a decision and what is the procedure? Which States have exercised that window and 
what were the issues of contention? 
9. Has the Panel in any way ever accepted a protest by a State on an initial decision and 
amended their own decisions?  
10. What might be the reason for having various bodies working independent of each other 
within the APRM? 
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Interview guide for the APRM Secretariat  
1. What role does the secretariat play in the peer review process? 
2. Which States make the most contributions towards the operations of the APRM? 
3. Which member States appear more active in the process and why might it be the case? 
4. Who appears to be more powerful, the APR Panel, the research institutes or the Heads of 
State, in making the final recommendations for a participating State? 
5. How are members appointed to sit on a particular peer review case? 
6. How long does it take for reports to be drafted and published at each stage of the decision 
process of the APRM? 
7. At which points are amendments to the reports accepted and under which conditions? 
8. How long does it take for a State to respond to deficiencies that are identified in their 
self-assessment reports? 
9. What role does civil society and the general public plays in shaping the outcome of the 
decision that are taken? 
10. What is the standard practice if a State has a complaint on a particular decision?  
11. Can a State over step the final recommendations and go ahead with its own programs or 
an alternative solution on how to proceed?  
12. Which States have not met the timeline in submitting their annual progress reports? 
13. Are there sanctions for such countries? If not why? 
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